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INTRODUCTION'
The owner of a web hosting company that carries websites for
thousands of legitimate customers discovers that one of the sites is
disseminating child pornography. Utterly indifferent, he continues to
1. All research for this Article is current through December 31, 2001.
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carry the site, treating it no differently than the legitimate sites. By
carrying the site, he clearly facilitates its business, but under federal
law, is he guilty of aiding and abetting a child pornography offense?
Is it enough that he carries the site with awareness of its nature, or
must he act with something more than knowledge-perhaps with the
purpose or desire to help the website succeed?2
A cab driver transports a bank robber to the bank. The driver is
aware of the robber's plan, but does not care. All the driver wants to
do is make some money. She carries the passenger, charging the
robber the standard fare that she charges anyone else. Is she guilty of
aiding and abetting the bank robbery? Is her knowledge of the crime
enough, or must she also want the robbery to succeed?
A secretary at a firm that bills by the hour has just been ordered by
his boss to alter an invoice to inflate the hours worked by the firm.
The secretary has no wish to defraud the client, but desperately needs
his job, and makes the alteration. Is the secretary guilty of aiding and
abetting the fraud on the customer? Is it enough that the secretary
helps the scheme, knowing of its fraudulent nature, even if his act of
assistance was rendered, in some sense, unwillingly, or must he also
want or intend that the fraud succeed?
What of a legitimate gun dealer who sells a gun in compliance with
all applicable rules and regulations, but makes the sale knowing that
the purchaser will use it to commit a murder? Again, is mere
knowledge enough to make the dealer criminally liable as an aider
and abettor, or must the dealer intend that the murder take place?
In the federal case law, there is no clear answer to the "knowledge
versus purposeful intent" question. The absence of a definitive
answer is surprising for a number of reasons. First, the doctrine of the
aider and abettor has been around for a long time. Judge Learned
Hand traced the earliest judicial formulations to the common law of
fourteenth century England, and the earliest federal statutory
formulation to a 1790 statute dealing with murder, robbery, and
piracy.3 The current federal aiding and abetting statute dates back to
1909.4
Second, not only is the aiding and abetting doctrine old, the
"knowledge versus purposeful intent" debate that it has engendered is
also old. In fact, the Supreme Court grappled with the issue as long
ago as 1870.1 As Professor Robert Weisberg recently noted, "[f]or
decades, the American courts and legislatures have debated whether
2. This and the following examples are all loosely based on those quoted in
Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law § 6.7, at 576-86 (2d ed. 1986)
(quoting examples from the Model Penal Code § 2.06 cmt. at 316-17 (1985)).
3. United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401,402 (2d Cir. 1938).
4 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (originally enacted as Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 332.
35 Stat. 1152).
5. See Hanauer v. Doane, 79 U.S. (10 Wall.) 342, 347-48 (1870).
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knowledge or 'true purpose' should be the required mens rea for
accomplice liability." 6
Third, the consequences of aiding and abetting liability are quite
serious. The aider and abettor is guilty not of some lesser offense, but
of the very offense committed by the actual perpetrator (commonly
referred to as the "principal").' In the words of the federal statute,
the aider and abettor "is punishable as a principal."' Thus, our taxi
driver, if she is an aider and abettor, is guilty of bank robbery and
subject to the same potential penalties as the actual bank robber who
went into the bank, threatened the teller, and grabbed the money.
Fourth, the absence of any resolution of the "purposeful intent
versus knowledge" question is even more baffling, given the
astonishingly broad scope of the aiding and abetting statute, and the
consequent frequency with which this question arises. The federal
aiding and abetting doctrine applies to "the entire criminal code,"' so
6. Robert Weisberg, Reappraising Complicity. 4 Buff. Crim. L Rev. 217. 236
(2000); see also United States v. Fountain. 768 F.2d 790, 797-98 (7th Cir.)
(summarizing the history of the "'knowledge versus purposeful intent" debate),
modified on other grounds, 777 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1985) (per curiam): G. Robert
Blakey & Kevin P. Roddy, Reflections on Reves v. Ernst & Young: Its Meaning and
Impact on Substantive, Accessory, Aiding Abetting and Conspiracy Liability Under
RICO, 33 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1345, 1387 (1996) ("Judicial interpretations of § 2(a) on
the issue of state of mind reflect a substantial debate carried out in the late 1930's.
1940's and 1950's, which was also reflected in the debate that preceded the adoption
of the Model Penal Code ... in 1962.").
7. "[A]iding and abetting does not constitute a discrete criminal offense but only
serves as a more particularized way of identifying persons involved.... In fact, when a
person is charged with aiding and abetting the commission of a substantive offense.
the crime charged is... the substantive offense itself." United States v. Smith, 198
F.3d 377, 383 (2d Cir. 1999) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v.
Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 55 (2d Cir. 1977)).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a).
9. United States v. Ramirez-Martinez. 273 F.3d 903, 911 (9th Cir. 2001); accord
United States v. Simpson, 979 F.2d 1282. 1285 (8th Cir. 1992) ("applies to the entire
criminal code"); United States v. Jones, 909 F.2d 533, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (-applies
to all federal offenses"); United States v. Pino-Perez. 870 F.2d 1230, 1233 (7th Cir.
1989) (en banc) ("[E]very time Congress has passed a new criminal statute the aider
and abettor provision has automatically kicked in and made the aiders and
abettors... punishable as principals."); United States v. Jones, 678 F.2d 102, 105 (9th
Cir. 1982) ("applicable to the entire criminal code"): Pigford v. United States, 518
F.2d 831, 834 (4th Cir. 1975) ("applies implicitly to all federal offenses").
The only exception is if "Congress plainly says otherwise." Rsznirez-Martinez,
273 F.3d at 911. According to at least some cases, Congress intended that the aiding
and abetting statute not apply to certain complex federal offenses aimed only at high-
level criminal operatives. In Reves v. Ernst & Young. 507 U.S. 170 (1993), the
Supreme Court held that there is no civil liability for aiding and abetting a violation of
the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. §
1962 (1970). See 507 U.S. at 186. Following Reves, the Second Circuit extended the
reasoning to criminal liability as well. See United States v. Viola, 35 F.3d 37, 41 (2d
Cir. 1994), abrogated on other grounds, Salinas v. United States. 522 U.S. 52 (1997).
Similarly, the Second Circuit has held that there can be no aiding and abetting of a
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1970), the "continuing criminal enterprise-drug kingpin"
statute, United States v. Joyner, 201 F.3d 61. 69 (2d Cir. 2000): United States v.
2002] 1 345
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the "knowledge versus purposeful intent" question can arise no
matter what federal crime is at issue. The doctrine also applies to just
about everyone. Although commonly thought of as applying to the
less culpable actor-the one who simply "assists" the principal'°-in
reality, the aiding and abetting doctrine applies to any actor other
than the principal, regardless of his or her culpability. In the words of
the federal aiding and abetting statute, the doctrine encompasses
anyone who "aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures"
the commission of a federal offense." Once there is a principal who
actually commits the offense (a hijacker, say, who crashes a plane into
the World Trade Center), the criminal liability of all the remaining
actors is adjudged under the doctrine. It does not matter whether the
other actor is a relatively insignificant driver who, in support of the
criminal plan, drives the hijackers to the airport ("aids [or] abets"), or
is Osama bin Laden himself who conceives of and initiates the
commission of the crime ("commands, induces or procures"), or is a
terrorist friend in Afghanistan sympathetic to the criminal cause who
does nothing more than make suggestions for the successful
completion of the offense ("counsels"). In each instance, liability is
determined under the aiding and abetting doctrine.12 Indeed, because
of the doctrine's applicability to all offenses and to all participants
(other than the principal), the aiding and abetting statute is probably
invoked more frequently than any other federal criminal statute.
Finally, the lack of resolution is even more puzzling in light of the
crucial role the answer to that question plays in determining liability.
Once a principal commits an offense, there are two basic elements
that the government must prove in a federal case to convict an aider
Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 382 (2d Cir. 1987), although the Seventh Circuit has taken a
contrary view, see Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d at 1231-37. See generally Blakey & Roddy,
supra note 6, at 1402-09 (discussing exceptions to the general applicability of the
aiding and abetting doctrine).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58, 64 (1951); Nye & Nissen v.
United States, 336 U.S. 613, 620 (1949).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a).
12. Like the exceptions for certain offenses, see supra note 9, there are also
exceptions for certain individuals. The aiding and abetting statute does not
encompass those individuals for whom "an affirmative legislative policy... create[s]
an exemption from the ordinary rules of accessorial liability." Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d at
1234 (quotation marks and citation omitted); see United States v. Shear, 962 F.2d 488,
493-94 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Southard, 700 F.2d 1, 19-20 (1st Cir. 1983);
Blakey & Roddy, supra note 6, at 1402-04. The cases have identified three classes of
individuals whom Congress has implicitly excluded from the scope of the aiding and
abetting statute: first, a victim, such as one who pays an extortionist, Southard, 700
F.2d at 19; second, a member of a special class that Congress has sought to protect, id.
at 19-20 (citing Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 119 (1932) (indicating that a
prostitute is not the aider and abettor of a pimp who transports her across state
lines)); and third, an individual whom the statute defines as necessary to the
commission of the offense, such as the purchaser in an illegal sale, id. at 20; see United
States v. Farrar, 281 U.S. 624, 634 (1930) (holding that where sale of intoxicating
liquor is prohibited, the purchaser is "guilty of no offense").
[Vol. 701346
WHAT WERE THEY THINKING?
and abetter: (1) that the defendant committed an act of facilitation,
and (2) that he or she committed the act with a culpable mental
state.13  Because virtually any act of assistance, no matter how
insubstantial, satisfies the "act" element 4 (indeed, even words of
13. See, e.g., Hicks v. United States, 150 U.S. 442, 449 (1893) (requiring "acts or
words of encouragement" and "intention of encouraging and abetting"); United
States. v. Searan, 259 F3d 434, 444 (6th Cir. 2001) (."Aiding and abetting has two
components: an act on the part of a defendant which contributes to the execution of a
crime and the intent to aid in its commission."' (quoting United States v. Phillips, 664
F.2d 971, 1010 (5th Cir. Unit B Dec. 1981))); United States v. Pipola, 83 F.3d 556, 562
(2d Cir. 1996) (discussing the "act and intent elements" of aiding and abetting);
United States v. Smith, 546 F.2d 1275, 1284 (5th Cir. 1977) (aiding and abetting has
"two components: An act on the part of a defendant which contributes to the
execution of a crime and the intent to aid in its commission"); United States v. Greer,
467 F.2d 1064, 1069 (7th Cir. 1972) (stating that there are "two general components of
aiding and abetting-an act on the part of a defendant which contributes to the
execution of a crime and the intent to aid in its commission").
14. See, e.g., United States v. Whitney, 229 F.3d 1296, 1303 (10th Cir. 2000)
("[T]he level of participation may be of relatively slight moment." (quotation marks
omitted) (quoting United States v. Anderson, 189 F.3d 1201, 1207 (10th Cir. 1999)));
United States v. Taylor, 226 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir. 2000) (it "does not take much to
satisfy" facilitation requirement (quotation omitted))- United States v. Woods, 148
F.3d 843, 848 (7th Cir. 1998) ("'Once knowledge on the part of the aider and abettor
is established, it does not take much to satisfy the facilitation element."' (quoting
United States v. Bennett, 75 F.3d 40, 45 (1st Cir. 1996))); Bazemore v. United States,
138 F3d 947, 950 (11th Cir. 1998) (same); United States v. Garguilo, 310 F.2d 249,253
(2d Cir. 1962) ("an act of relatively slight moment"); see also United States v.
Sanders, 211 F.3d 711, 722 n.1 (2d Cir.) ("The requirement that one who aids and
abets a crime must contribute to its success should not be understood too
literally...."), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1015 (2000). But see United States v. Kessi, 868
F.2d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating, in a criminal securities fraud case, that an
aider and abettor must provide "'substantial assistance"' (quoting a civil securities
fraud case, SEC v. Rogers, 790 F.2d 1450, 1460 (9th Cir. 1986), which was abrogated
on other grounds in Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988))).
According to many courts, the act need not even abet all the elements of the
underlying offense; all it need do is abet one of them. See Woods, 148 F.3d 843 at 849-
50 & n.2 ("The government need not prove assistance related to every element of the
underlying offense .... ); United States v. Pefia, 949 F.2d 751, 755 (5th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Sigalow, 812 F.2d 783, 785 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Garrett,
720 F.2d 705, 713 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Other courts, although slightly less explicit,
seem to agree. See United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 873 (4th Cir. 1996) ("[Tlo be
convicted of aiding and abetting, participation in every stage of an illegal venture is
not required, only participation at some stage accompanied by knowledge of the
result and intent to bring about that result." (quotation marks and citations omitted));
United States v. Broadwell, 870 F.2d 594, 608-09 (11th Cir. 1989) (upholding
conviction of an aider and abettor under the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952, even
though he "did not commit all acts constituting elements of the crime (such as
interstate travel)").
Other courts, however, require that the aider and abettor abet each element.
United States v. Lombardi, 138 F.3d 559, 561 (5th Cir. 1998) (defendant "must have
aided and abetted each material element of the alleged offense"); United States v.
Bancalari, 110 F.3d 1425, 1429 (9th Cir. 1997) (same); United States v. Vasquez, 953
F.2d 176, 183 (5th Cir. 1992) (same). But see Woods, 148 F.3d at 849 n.2 (noting that
"[e]ven the Ninth Circuit appears to be pulling back" from the view that an aider and
abettor must abet every element of the offense).
2002] 1347
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encouragement suffice15), the mental element is really what defines
the aider and abettor. It is the mental element that converts even an
insignificant act of assistance into criminal liability for child
pornography, bank robbery, mail fraud, murder, terrorism, money
laundering, embezzlement, or whatever else the underlying federal
offense may be.
This Article focuses, in large part, on the mental state of the federal
aider and abettor. What mental state triggers federal aiding and
abetting liability?16 What mental state suffices to convert even an
insubstantial act of assistance into criminal liability equivalent to that
of the principal?
To complicate the issue, it is not quite correct to speak of the mental
state as if the aider and abettor possesses only one. In reality, the
aider and abettor possesses two. The hypothetical questions about the
liability of the owner of the website hosting company, the secretary,
the taxi driver, and the gun salesman presuppose the existence of the
first, most basic mental state: that the aider and abettor acted
volitionally, deliberately, and intentionally rather than by mistake or
accident. 7 This mental state requires that the owner of the web
hosting company carry the offending website deliberately, not
accidentally by an inadvertent push of some key on the computer
keyboard. The secretary must alter the invoice, the cab driver must
drive his cab, and the gun dealer must sell the gun deliberately, not in
a bizarre fit of sleepwalking.' The act in each instance must be the
15. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 178 (1993) ("aid and abet" is a
"term of breadth indeed"); id. (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 68 (6th ed. 1990),
which states that aiding and abetting "comprehends all assistance rendered by words,
acts, encouragement, support or presence"); Hicks, 150 U.S. at 449 ("acts or words of
encouragement").
16. A number of commentators have dealt generally with the issue of the mental
state of the accomplice, not focusing in particular on federal law. See Model Penal
Code § 2.06 & cmt. at 312-19 (1962); LaFave & Scott, supra note 2, § 6.7(b)-(f), at 579-
86; Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of
Doctrine, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 323, 346-55 (1985); Sanford H. Kadish, Reckless Complicity,
87 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 369 (1997); Weisberg, supra note 6, at 236-47; Candace
Courteau, Comment, The Mental Element Required for Accomplice Liability: A
Topic Note, 59 La. L. Rev. 325 (1998); Grace E. Mueller, Note, The Mens Rea of
Accomplice Liability, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2169 (1988). Other commentators have
focused on the mental state of the aider and abettor in the context of a particular
offense or type of offense. See Blakey & Roddy, supra note 6, at 1385-1402; Audrey
Rogers, Accomplice Liability for Unintentional Crimes: Remaining Within the
Constraints of Intent, 31 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1351 (1998); Tyler B. Robinson, Note, A
Question of Intent: Aiding and Abetting Law and the Rule of Accomplice Liability
Under 924(c), 96 Mich. L. Rev. 783 (1997). Of the various commentators, Professor
Blakey and Roddy, who dealt with the applicability of aiding and abetting to RICO,
were the most comprehensive in examining federal case law.
17. See Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 268 (2000) (defining this sort of
mental state as requiring proof that "the defendant possessed knowledge with respect
to the actus reus of the crime").
18. See id. at 269.
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result of a volitional choice to act or not to act. Otherwise, there can
be no criminal liability. No matter how much the taxi driver may want
the crime to take place, if she drives in her sleep, she is not guilty of
aiding and abetting the bank robbery.
The more difficult issue, and the focus of this Article, is the nature
of the second mental state: assuming that the aider and abettor
commits the act of assistance deliberately, does the aider and abettor
have to want this deliberate act to assist the principal, or is it enough
to know that this deliberate act would assist the principal? If neither
is applicable, is some other mental state necessary?
Whatever the second mental state, does it relate in any way to the
mental state prescribed for the principal by the underlying criminal
statute? In the example of the secretary inflating the hours worked, is
the requisite mental state for aiding and abetting liability dependent
at all on the mental state prescribed by the mail fraud statute," which
requires of the principal an intent to defraud,2' or only on that
prescribed by the aiding and abetting statute? Does one who aids and
abets an offense requiring specific intent (a phrase that, as we shall
see, is commonly used but possesses many meanings) incur liability
with the same mental state as one who aids and abets an offense
requiring only general intent? In other words, is the mental state of
the aider and abettor the same as that of the principal (whose mental
state may vary from offense to offense), or is it the same for all aiders
and abettors, regardless of the mental state required of the principal?
The commonly held view is that the issue was resolved in 1938,
when Judge Learned Hand held in the case of United States v. Peonin
that the aider and abettor must not only know that his or her act will
assist the principal, but also want his or her act to assist the principal.
In a pithy formulation so typical of Judge Hand, he explained that the
aiding and abetting statute requires that the aider and abettor "in
some sort associate himself with the venture, that he participate in it
as in something that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his
action to make it succeed."2' Thus, in our examples, the website
hosting company must desire the success of the child pornography
website, the cab driver must intend that the bank be robbed, the
secretary must intend to defraud, and the gun salesman must want the
murder to take place before being liable as aiders and abettors. An
act of facilitation with mere knowledge that the act will assist the
principal is not sufficient.
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1948).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Fernandes. 272 F.3d 938,944 (7th Cir. 2001): United
States v. Godwin, 272 F.3d 659, 666 (4th Cir. 2001): United States %. Bearden, 265
F.3d 732,736 (6th Cir. 2001).
21. 100 F.2d 401,402 (2d Cir. 1938).
22. Id.
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Since Peoni, and especially after the Supreme Court in Nye &
Nissen v. United States23 quoted Judge Hand's formulation with
approval,24 the prevailing wisdom among courts and commentators
has been that the issue is now closed. Six years ago, for example, one
scholarly article declared that the Supreme Court in Nye & Nissen
"resolve[d] the debate for federal criminal jurisprudence in favor of
Judge Hand's interpretation of 'intent."'" Judge Hand himself, after
having been quoted with approval in Nye & Nissen, described his
Peoni formulation as "authoritative. 26
Similarly, one federal court of appeals after another has paid
homage to Judge Hand and his formulation. Peoni is "the seminal
case" in aiding and abetting liability. 7 Judge Hand's "well-known
formulation"'-that the aider and abettor "associate himself with the
venture, that he participate in it as in something that he wishes to
bring about, that he seek by his action to make it succeed"-"aptly
characterize[s] ' '29 the rule of aiding and abetting liability, and has been
"repeated in innumerable subsequent cases. ' 3° His "enunciation has
been adopted by all federal appellate courts as the law of aiding and
abetting,"'31 and "for years [has] been almost verbatim the standard
boilerplate charge on the subject. '32  Cases "speak reverentially of
Judge Hand. '33  His test has been "oft quoted,"'  and typically
referred to as the "classic" interpretation or formula,35 the "most well-
23. 336 U.S. 613 (1949).
24. Id. at 618-19.
25. Blakey & Roddy, supra note 6, at 1389 (footnotes omitted).
26. United States v. Chiarella, 184 F.2d 903, 909 (2d Cir. 1950) (L. Hand, J.),
modified on other grounds, 187 F.2d 12 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 341 U.S. 946
(1951).
27. United States v. Greer, 467 F.2d 1064, 1068 (7th Cir. 1972).
28. United States v. Valencia, 907 F.2d 671, 677 (7th Cir. 1990).
29. United States v. Morrow, 977 F.2d 222,230 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
30. United States v. Ortega, 44 F.3d 505, 507 (7th Cir. 1995). It is difficult to
quantify the precise number of cases that have re-affirmed the Peoni formulation.
Aside from the cases citing Peoni and Nye & Nissen directly, many cases cite to
second, third, and fourth generation cases, which quote the formulation, but cite to
more recent cases rather than to Peoni or Nye & Nissen. All in all, the number of
cases that endorse the formulation, including those cases that do so without directly
citing Peoni or Nye & Nissen, must significantly exceed a thousand.
31. United States v. McNeese, 901 F.2d 585, 608 (7th Cir. 1990), overruled on
other grounds, United States v. Westmoreland, 240 F.3d 618, 633 (7th Cir. 2001); see
also United States v. Ledezma, 26 F.3d 636, 641 (6th Cir. 1994) ("Judge Learned
Hand's formulation has become the accepted standard .... ); United States v. Pino-
Perez, 870 F.2d 1230, 1235 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc) ("We and other courts have
endorsed Judge Learned Hand's definition of aiding and abetting.").
32. United States v. Blitz, 533 F.2d 1329, 1346 (2d Cir. 1976) (Mansfield, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
33. United States v. Blankenship, 970 F.2d 283,287 (7th Cir. 1992).
34. United States v. Bryant, 461 F.2d 912, 919 (6th Cir. 1972); see Blakey &
Roddy, supra note 6, at 1390 n.167 (collecting cases quoting Judge Hand's test).
35. United States v. Irwin, 149 F.3d 565, 569 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Cruz-Paulino, 61 F.3d 986, 998 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. Monroe, 990 F.2d
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accepted formulation, ' 3 6  the "accepted standard,"37  and the
"canonical definition."38 His formulation has been incorporated by
numerous federal circuits into their pattern jury instructions.)
Predictably, once Nye & Nissen adopted Peoni, voices of dissent in the
federal cases have been very rare.?
Nonetheless, despite the seeming uniformity in approach since
Peoni, the current status of the law on the aider and abettor's mental
state is far from clear. In fact, it is best described today as in a state of
chaos-a chaos to which the cases seem oblivious.
Here are a few examples. In light of Peoni, is simple knowledge
enough? Yes, said the Supreme Court in a pre-Peoni case in 1870;41
no, said Judge Learned Hand in Peoni in 1938;4- yes, implied the
Supreme Court in 1947; 4 no, said the Supreme Court in 1949; yes, if
it is accompanied by an act that substantially facilitates the
commission of the underlying offense, said the Supreme Court in
1961;45 usually, said the Second Circuit in 1962-4' only if knowledge is
enough for the underlying offense, said the Second Circuit in another
case in 1962;47 sometimes, said the Seventh Circuit in 1985;- always,
1370, 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1993); United States v. Reiswitz, 941 F.2d 488, 494 (7th Cir.
1991); United States v. Raper, 676 F.2d 841, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States v.
Tarr, 589 F.2d 55, 59 (1st Cir. 1978).
36. United States v. Beck, 615 F.2d 441,448 (7th Cir. 1980).
37. United States v. Searan, 259 F.3d 434,444 (6th Cir. 2001).
38. United States v. Ortega, 44 F.3d 505,507 (7th Cir. 1995).
39. See, e.g., Kevin F. O'Malley et al., Federal Jury Practice and Instructions §
18.01 (5th ed. 2000) (setting forth proposed aiding and abetting instruction, citing Nye
& Nissen and Peoni, and quoting pattern jury instructions from various circuits), see
also 1 Leonard B. Sand et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, instruction no. 11-2
& cmt. at 11-6 (2001).
40. But see United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790,797-98 (7th Cir.) ("[Alfter the
Supreme Court in Nye & Nissen ... adopted Judge Learned Hand's test ... it came to
be generally accepted that the aider and abettor must share the principal's
purpose... to be guilty of violating.., the federal aider and abettor statute. But ...
there is support for relaxing this requirement.. " (citations omitted)), modified on
other grounds, 777 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1985) (per curiam); Model Penal Code § 2.06
cmt. at 317 (1962) ("The Supreme Court has quoted the Peoni formulation with
approval and it has had influence in other circuits. Strong disagreement has, however,
been expressed." (footnotes omitted)), LaFave & Scott, supra note 2, § 6.7. at 583
("[C]ourts have tended to accept the Peoni limitation on accomplice liability,
although dictum to the contrary still persists." (footnotes omitted)).
41. Hanauer v. Doane, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 342,346-47 (1870).
42. United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401,403 (2d Cir. 1938).
43. Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 164-65 (1947).
44. See Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 618-19 (1949) (quoting Peoni
with approval).
45. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 225 n.17 (1961) (quoting with approval
from the Model Penal Code § 2.04(3) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1953)).
46. United States v. Campisi, 306 F.2d 308,310-11 (2d Cir. 1962).
47. United States v. Jones, 308 F.2d 26, 31-32 (2d Cir. 1962).
48. United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790. 797-98 (7th Cir.), modified on other
grounds, 777 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1985) (per curiam).
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implied the Seventh Circuit in 1995;19 no, said the Second Circuit in
199550 and the Seventh Circuit in 1998.51
Another example of the disarray: does aiding and abetting require
specific intent? In 1991, the Seventh Circuit held that "[p]roof of
specific intent is not a requirement. '52 But in 1998, without any
indication that it was making any change in the law and without any
citation to its earlier precedent, the Seventh Circuit held the exact
opposite: the aider and abettor "must have had the specific intent to
aid in the commission of the crime. ' 53 The Eighth Circuit moved in
the opposite direction, stating at first that aiding and abetting is a
specific intent offense,54 but then saying that it did not really mean
specific intent when it said specific intent.
A third example: in 1962, the Second Circuit, en banc, held that
there is no one mental state that always applies to the aider and
abettor. Instead, it held that the mental state of the aider and abettor
is the same as that required of the principal, whatever that mental
state may be: "if a certain knowledge or intent is required to be
proven in order to convict one of violating a federal criminal statute,
the proof to convict one as an aider and abettor will not be different
from that necessary to convict the violator. '5  But in a 1995
loansharking case, without any reference to its earlier en banc
opinion, the Second Circuit held that the mental state of an aider and
abettor is different from that of the principal, and that aiding and
abetting requires specific intent even if the underlying offense does
not.57 Then, four years later in another loansharking case, the Second
Circuit seemed to hold that the aider and abettor need not act with
specific intent; knowledge is enough.
As this Article will demonstrate, the cases interpret Judge Hand in
so many different ways that there is no agreement as to how his
seemingly simple formulation should be applied even in the most
straightforward situations. There are disagreements among the
circuits, and even intra-circuit splits, with one panel often failing to
recognize the entirely different approach adopted by another panel on
the same court. Even more surprising, there are often internal
inconsistencies within an individual case; a case will quote from two
49. United States v. Ortega, 44 F.3d 505, 508 (7th Cir. 1995).
50. United States v. Scotti, 47 F.3d 1237, 1245 (2d Cir. 1995).
51. United States v. Irwin, 149 F.3d 565,573 (7th Cir. 1998).
52. United States v. Reiswitz, 941 F.2d 488,494 (7th Cir. 1991).
53. United States v. Nacotee, 159 F.3d 1073, 1076 (7th Cir. 1998).
54. United States v. Hill, 464 F.2d 1287, 1289 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Kelton, 446 F.2d 669, 671 (8th Cir. 1971).
55. United States v. Roan Eagle, 867 F.2d 436,445 (8th Cir. 1989).
56. United States v. Jones, 308 F.2d 26, 31-32 (2d Cir. 1962) (en banc).
57. United States v. Scotti, 47 F.3d 1237, 1246-47 (2d Cir. 1995).
58. United States v. Smith, 198 F.3d 377, 386 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S.
864 (2000).
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previous cases without realizing that those cases are radically at odds
with one another. 9 It was with perhaps unintended understatement
that a recent case observed, "[i]t is difficult to articulate a precise
intent standard for an aider and abetter [sic]." ,'
A number of factors have contributed to the plethora of views on
the proper standard for the aider and abettor. One factor, presumably
at work but infrequently mentioned in the cases, is the dispute over
simple fairness-how easy or hard it should be to hold an aider and
abettor liable. Another factor is the confusion spawned by the various
meanings of legal terms, such as "willfully" and "specific intent," used
by the cases in describing the aider and abettor's mental state.
Another complicating factor is the mental state required of the
principal. Different criminal statutes prescribe different mental states
for the principal depending on the nature of the crime, yet most of the
approaches to the mental state of the aider and abettor fashion a one-
size-fits-all standard without any regard for those differences.
Similarly, most of the approaches apply the same mental state
regardless of the seriousness of the underlying offense, the degree of
the aider and abettor's involvement in the underlying offense, and the
nature of that involvement. Because the one-size-fits-all standard
does not fit some criminal statutes or some factual situations very well
at all, it pushes the cases to pronounce different "universal" standards
depending on the circumstances.
What makes all the conflicting case law interpreting Peoni yet more
confusing is that, contrary to the widespread understanding of that
case, Peoni did not even purport to resolve the issue of the ordinary
aider and abettor's mental state; instead, it expressly left that question
open.
In addition to focusing on the mental state of the aider and abettor,
this Article also focuses on the mental state of a different type of
accomplice: the causer. One who "causes" another to commit an
offense is also punishable as a principal."' Because the aiding and
abetting doctrine requires the existence of a criminally acting
principal,62 the common law developed a separate doctrine to apply
when the principal is an innocent intermediary," "as in the case of
59. See infra notes 152-56 and accompanying text (discussing United States v.
Otero-Mdndez, 273 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2001)).
60. Otero-Mgndez, 273 F.3d at 52.
61. 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (2000).
62. See Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 26 (198U) (noting that the
acquittal of the principal at an initial trial does not absolve the government at a
subsequent trial of the aider and abettor from having to prove that the principal
committed the offense); United States v. Ruffin, 613 F.2d 408, 412-13 (2d Cir. 1979);
id. at 421-22 (Wyatt, J., dissenting); LaFave & Scott, supra note 2, at § 6.6(e), at 574.
All citations to the Ruffin dissent in this Article are to those portions not disputed by
the majority.
63. See, e.g., United States v. Mohrbacher. 182 F.3d 1041, 1050-51 (9th Cir. 1999);
United States v. Nolan, 136 F.3d 265, 272 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that liability as a
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infants, or idiots, employed to administer poison,"' or any other case
where the principal, even if an adult of sound mind, is an innocent
dupe.65 In such a case, rather than being guilty of "aiding and
abetting" the innocent principal, the defendant is guilty of "causing"
the innocent principal to commit the offense. Like the aider and
abettor, the causer is not guilty of some separate offense, but of the
very offense committed by the principal.66 Like the aider and abettor,
the causer "is punishable as a principal." 67
Although the causer is conceptually distinct from the aider and
abettor, and is governed by a different statutory subsection, the
similarity of the causer to the aider and abettor is readily apparent.
Indeed, many of the questions regarding the mental state of the aider
and abettor have been raised about the causer, and have yielded even
more inconsistencies than those afflicting the aider and abettor.
A sensible approach to the mental state of these accomplices (this
Article uses the word "accomplice" to refer generically to both the
aider and abettor and the causer) would apply the same mental state
to both. Indeed, Judge Learned Hand favored such an approach. '
But, a close analysis of the cases reveals that, apart from Judge Hand,
hardly anyone has even thought of comparing, let alone harmonizing,
the mental states for the two different, yet related, accomplices. Thus,
there is no consistency between a court's approach to the aider and
abettor and its approach to the causer. A court of appeals will apply
one mental state to the aider and abettor, and another to the causer,
without any recognition that, let alone an explanation as to why, the
two very similar concepts are being treated differently.69
causer "does not require proof of a guilty principal"); United States v. Gabriel, 125
F.3d 89, 92, 99 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Dodd, 43 F.3d 759, 762-63 (1st Cir.
1995); United States v. Walser, 3 F.3d 380, 388 (11th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Shear. 962 F.2d 488, 493 n.6 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Keefer, 799 F.2d 1115,
1123-24 (6th Cir. 1986) (noting that an earlier Sixth Circuit case, United States v.
Aarons, 718 F.2d 188, 190 (6th Cir. 1983), was mistaken when, in dictum, it stated that
the causer could be guilty only if there was a guilty principal); Ruffin, 613 F.2d at 412-
13.
64. United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460,469 (1827) (Story, J.).
65. See United States v. Giles, 300 U.S. 41, 49 (1937) (holding defendant
responsible as principal for causing another bank employee, an "innocent
intermediary," to make false entries in the bank's books).
66. See United States v. Armstrong, 909 F.2d 1238, 1243 (9th Cir. 1990).
67. 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (2000).
68. See United States v. Paglia, 190 F.2d 445, 448 (2d Cir. 1951) (L. Hand, J.),
overruled by United States v. Taylor, 217 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1954) (L. Hand, J.); see
also infra text accompanying notes 469-76.
69. Compare, e.g., United States v. Gabriel, 125 F.3d 89, 101 (2d Cir. 1997)
(holding the causer guilty when acting with whatever mental state applicable to the
principal), with United States v. Scotti, 47 F.3d 1237, 1244-46 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding
the aider and abettor guilty only when acting with specific intent, even if the principal
is guilty without specific intent).
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In short, although the issue of the federal aider and abettor's mental
state has long been treated as resolved, chaos prevails. Similar chaos
prevails in the case law of the causer.
After demonstrating how confusing the law is, this Article will
propose a uniform standard that will eliminate the confusion while
balancing the existing case law with congressional intent, and with the
need to achieve the fairest possible results.
Part I of this Article examines the history of the aiding and abetting
subsection and the causing subsection, both contained in 18 U.S.C. §
2, and the congressional effort to eliminate common-law distinctions
between the principal and the aider and abettor, and between the
principal and the causer. It argues that this "no distinction" rule
should apply to the issue of the mental state required of the respective
accomplices as well. Part II focuses on the aider and abettor, looking
at the early efforts to ascertain the aider and abettor's mental state,
and then examining Judge Learned Hand's opinion in Peoni. This
part also examines the various approaches to the aider and abettor's
mental state that Peoni spawned, finding essentially six irreconcilable
approaches: the purposeful intent approach, the bad purpose
approach, three different types of knowledge approaches, and the
derivative approach. Each approach is scrutinized as applied to a
variety of crimes possessing different mental states.
Part II also demonstrates that although Peoni is still the ultimate
source of almost all the law on the mental state of the aider and
abettor, it was really not an aiding and abetting case at all, but a
"natural and probable consequences" case that specifically left open
the question of what mental state would apply to an ordinary aider
and abettor.
Part III turns to the causer and examines the various approaches to
the causer's mental state, finding many similarities to the approaches
to the aider and abettor, but also finding significant differences. Part
IV presents a critique of the various approaches to the mental state of
both the aider and abettor and the causer. Finally, Part V
recommends that a modified derivative approach be applied to both
the aider and abettor and the causer.
I. THE HISTORY OF 18 U.S.C. § 2, AND ITS ELIMINATION OF THE
DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE ACCOMPLICE AND THE PRINCIPAL
The federal aiding and abetting provision does not explicitly contain
a mental state. Nonetheless, a careful examination of the provision's
history demonstrates that, in enacting it, Congress had a number of
distinct goals, and any effort to import into the provision a specific
mental state must remain in keeping with those goals. As will be
shown below, it was Congress's intent to eliminate the archaic,
common-law distinctions between the aider and abettor and the
principal, to eliminate the need to determine whether the defendant
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under consideration had acted as a principal or an aider and abettor,
and in general, to make it easier to convict the aider and abettor. In
conformity with that legislative agenda, in numerous contexts, the
courts have routinely treated the principal and the aider and abettor
as equivalent-even interchangeable.
Presumably, then, the courts should have also treated the principal
and the aider and abettor as interchangeable on the issue of their
mental states, requiring of the aider and abettor the same culpable
mental state as that required of the principal. As we shall see, that
was not so; most courts, in disregard of this legislative intent, have
interpreted the aiding and abetting provision in ways that have
generally multiplied, rather than diminished, the distinctions between
the principal and the aider and abettor.
With respect to the causing provision, 18 U.S.C. § 2(b), the situation
is similar, although not identical. It seems that it was also Congress's
overall intent to eliminate distinctions between the principal and the
causer. But, despite that congressional intent, the cases have also
applied to the causer mental states that differ from the mental states
applied to the principal. In addition, the issue of the causer's mental
state is complicated by a second factor not present in the case of the
aider and abettor: Congress's explicit inclusion of the word "willfully"
in the causing provision.
A. The History
The federal aiding and abetting provision is currently the first of a
two-part statute, whose second part is the causing provision. 18
U.S.C. § 2 currently provides:
§ 2. Principals
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids,
abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is
punishable as a principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly
performed by him or another would be an offense against the
United States, is punishable as a principal.7°
Subsection (a) and subsection (b) of the statute were not enacted
simultaneously. The aiding and abetting provision-§ 2(a)-was
enacted first, in 1909, to revamp "[e]arly Anglo-American accomplice
law[, which] was intricate and frequently illogical."'
70. 18 U.S.C. § 2.
71. Joshua Dressier, Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice
Liability: New Solutions to an Old Problem, 37 Hastings L.J. 91, 94 (1985) (footnotes
omitted).
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Prior to the enactment of the aiding and abetting statute in 1909,
the common law had divided parties to a felony into four distinct
categories:
(1) principals in the first degree who actually perpetrated the
offense; (2) principals in the second degree who were actually or
constructively present at the scene of the crime and aided or abetted
its commission; (3) accessories before the fact who aided or abetted
the crime, but were not present at its commission; and (4)
accessories after the fact who rendered assistance after the crime
was complete.
These common-law distinctions were originally introduced to mitigate
the harshness of the common law "when all felonies carried the same
sanction-death.7 T3 The distinctions allowed the common-law courts
to punish some participants-the aiders and abettors-less severely.'
In solving the death penalty problem, however, these gradations
created others. Determining which common-law category applied to a
defendant began to assume importance wholly apart from the issue of
punishment. For example, the category determined venue (the
principal had to be prosecuted where the crime took place, while the
aider and abettor had to be prosecuted where his or her act of
abetting took place);75 the phrasing of the indictment (variance was
fatal);7 6 and, at times, whether the prosecution could even be initiated
altogether (accessories could be tried only after the conviction of the
72. Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10. 15 (1980) (citing Wayne R. LaFave &
Austin W. Scott, Criminal Law § 63 (1st ed. 1972), 4 William Blackstone,
Commentaries *33, and Rollin M. Perkins, Parties to Crime. S9 U. Pa. L Rev. 581
(1941)); see United States v. Ruffin, 613 F.2d 408, 420-21 (2d Cir. 1979) (Wyatt. J.,
dissenting) (reviewing in careful detail the history of 18 U.S.C. § 2); Blakey & Roddy.
supra note 6, at 1385 n.148.
73. United States v. Ambrose. 740 F.2d 505, 508 (7th Cir. 1984). overrded on
other grounds, United States v. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir. 1989): see
Standefer, 447 U.S. at 15: Dressier, supra note 71. at 95-96 ("Commentators have
documented an early concern that the death penalty should not reach all parties to
felonies. Specifically, the accessory was considered less deserving of execution."
(footnote omitted)). Professor Dressler also notes that "Blackstone suggested a
utilitarian explanation for the more lenient treatment of accessories." i.e.. to deter
wrongdoers from serving as principals. Id. at 96 (citing 4 William Blackstone,
Commentaries *39-40).
74. Standefer, 447 U.S. at 15; Ambrose, 740 F.2d at 508.
75. LaFave & Scott, supra note 2. § 6.6(d)(1), at 572.
76. Id. at § 6.6(d)(2). at 573 (noting that it was thus "possible for an accomplice to
escape altogether because of uncertainty as to whether he had been ... constructively
present at the time [of] the offense").
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principal).77 Consequently, "considerable effort was expended in
defining the categories. 78
With the demise of the automatic death penalty for principals, and
with the introduction of sentencing discretion allowing courts "to
proportion the severity of the sentence to the aider and abettor's
fault,179 the common-law distinctions became an unnecessary burden.
Consequently, in 1909, Congress eliminated many of these intricate,
judge-made distinctions80 by enacting the forerunner of what today is
18 U.S.C. § 2(a).81 It provided: "Whoever directly commits any act
constituting an offense defined in any law of the United States or aids,
abets, counsels, commands, induces, or procures its commission is a
principal."'
As the Supreme Court has made clear, the statute "abolishe[d] the
distinction between principals and accessories and [made] them all
principals. "3 Nothing better supported that conclusion than the very
77. Standefer, 447 U.S. at 15 (stating that acquittal, death, pardon, or flight of the
principal precluded prosecution of the accessory before the fact, although not of the
principal in the second degree); see also id. at 19-20 (quoting the identical Senate and
House Reports, S. Rep. No. 60-10, pt. 1, at 13 (1908), and H.R. Rep. No. 60-2, pt. 1, at
13 (1908)); LaFave & Scott, supra note 2, at § 6.6(d)(3), at 573.
78. Standefer, 447 U.S. at 16 (citing 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *34).
79. Ambrose, 740 F.2d at 509.
80. Standefer, 447 U.S. at 16-19.
81. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 332, 35 Stat. 1152 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 2(a) (2000)); see Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
511 U.S. 164, 181 (1994), superseded by statute on other grounds, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(f)
(2000). Prior to this enactment, there was no general federal aiding and abetting
statute; rather, a few individual, substantive criminal statutes by their terms applied to
aiders and abettors as well. See, e.g., Coffin v. United States, 162 U.S. 664, 667-68
(1896) (interpreting a provision of the predecessor to the current bank embezzlement
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 656, which then made it a crime for a bank officer to embezzle
money with intent to defraud, and for any person to aid or abet the embezzlement
with like intent to defraud); United States v. Ruffin, 613 F.2d 408, 421 (2d Cir. 1979)
(Wyatt, J., dissenting) (noting that the old bank embezzlement statute discussed in
Coffin imposed liability not only on the principal, but also on "every person who with
like intent aids or abets.., in violation of this section" (quotation omitted)).
82. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 332, 35 Stat. 1152.
83. Standefer, 447 U.S. at 19 (emphasis added) (quoting Hammer v. United
States, 271 U.S. 620, 628 (1926)); see also Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 411
n.18 (1980) ("Section 2 makes [the aider and abettor] punishable 'as a principal,' and
those words mean what they say."), superseded by statute on other grounds,
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1005(a), 98 Stat.
2138-39 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)); United States v. Busch, 758 F.2d 1394, 1398
(10th Cir. 1985) ("This statute was designed to abolish the historical distinction
between an accessory before the fact and a principal, to the end that an aider or
abettor may be charged, tried, and punished as a principal."); United States v. Jones,
308 F.2d 26, 31 (2d Cir. 1962) (en banc) (indicating that the statute's "effect is to erase
whatever distinctions may have previously existed between different classes of
principals and between principals and aiders and abettors."); S. Rep. No. 60-10, at 27
(1908); LaFave & Scott, supra note 2, § 6.6(e), at 574. In effect, the statute required
that felonies be treated like common-law misdemeanors, where "all participants were
deemed principals." Standefer, 447 U.S. at 16.
One exception to the statute's treatment of aiders and abettors as principals
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language in the statute itself, which explicitly provided that the aider
and abettor "is a principal." Thus, all aiders and abettors, whether
present or not during the commission of the crime, were to be treated
as principals. No longer would the courts have to struggle with the
fine distinctions of whether, on a given set of facts, the defendant was
a principal in the first degree, a principal in the second degree, or an
accessory before the fact. Only the accessory after the fact remained a
separate category.s4
The second paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 2-the causing subsection-
was not enacted until 1948 to codify a different doctrine of imputed
liability applicable to cases where the principal was an innocent
intermediary.'s At common law, one who caused an innocent
intermediary to act, even though not present at the scene, and even if
not the one actually to administer the poison, for example, was still
recognized at common law as a principal in the first degree.' But,
rather than being guilty of "aiding and abetting" the principal, the
defendant was guilty of "causing" the commission of the offense, as if
he or she had done so through an animal or inanimate object.
In 1948, Congress codified the common-law concept of criminal
causation by adding to 18 U.S.C. § 2 the precursor to what is now §
may be in the death penalty context. It is unconstitutional to impose the death
penalty on an aider and abettor convicted of felony murder, where the defendant did
not commit, and had no intention of causing or committing, the murder. Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782,797-801 (1982).
84. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2000), with 18 U.S.C. § 3 (2000). See, e.g.,
Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 611 (1946) ("While § 332 [currently § 2(a)]
of the Criminal Code... made aiders and abettors of an offense principals, Congress
has not made accessories after the fact principals. Their offense is distinct and is
differently punished."); United States v. Ortega, 44 F.3d 505, 507 (7th Cir. 1995);
Ruffin, 613 F.2d at 421 (Wyatt, J., dissenting) (quoting S. Rep. No. 60-10, at 27 for the
proposition that the statute made only "accessories before the fact" principals
(emphasis added)). Some cases speak too sweepingly, and declare inaccurately, that
even accessories after the fact are to be treated as principals. See United States v.
Bryan, 483 F.2d 88, 95 (3d Cir. 1973) (en banc) ("18 U.S.C. § 2 has eliminated the
archaic common law distinctions between principals and accessories before and after
the fact, and makes them all principals, whether the offense is a felony or a
misdemeanor, and subject to the same liability." (emphasis added)); United States v.
Greer, 467 F.2d 1064, 1069 n.5 (7th Cir. 1972) ("18 U.S.C. § 2 abolished the
differentials in punishment that resulted from characterizing a defendant as an
accessory before or after the fact, or as a principal." (emphasis added)).
85. While causing liability applies even when the principal is innocent, it is not
limited to the innocent principal. United States v. Rapoport, 545 F.2d 802, 806 (2d
Cir. 1976) ("Though [§ 2(b)] removes any requirement that the intermediary be
guilty, [it] contains no express requirement that the intermediary actually be
innocent."); see Ruffin, 613 F.2d at 413 ("The guilt or innocence of the
intermediary.., becomes irrelevant in determining whether a person charged as a co-
principal under § 2(b) may be found guilty."). Thus, when there is a culpable
principal, the accomplice can be liable either as an aider and abettor or as a causer.
86. Ruffin, 613 F.2d at 421 (Wyatt, J., dissenting); LaFave & Scott, supra note 2, §
6.6(a), at 569.
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2(b).87 It read: "Whoever causes an act to be done, which if directly
performed by him would be an offense against the United States, is
also a principal and punishable as such."'  Here, too, the relevant
statutory language "is also a principal" (i.e., is a principal just like the
aider and abettor is a principal) made it clear that Congress was
eliminating the distinctions between the causer and the principal, and
that the two were to be treated as equivalent.89 With respect to the
aiding and abetting section, Congress made no change in 1948 other
than to change its designation from "2" to "2(a)."
In 1951, Congress again amended the statute, this time replacing the
phrase "is a principal" in § 2(a), and the phrase "is also a principal and
punishable as such" in § 2(b), with the phrase "is punishable as a
principal." 9 Prior to the amendment, it was questionable whether an
accomplice who was not a bank officer, for example, could be liable
under a criminal statute whose terms apply only to "bank officers,"
such as a statute prohibiting bank officers from making false
statements on the bank's books. The old language, in providing that
the accomplice "is" a principal, made it difficult to argue that an
outside accomplice "is" a bank officer. The primary change made by
the amendment-from "is" a principal to "is punishable as" a
principal-removed any doubt that Congress intended that an
accomplice should be liable even if he or she lacks the capacity
required of the principal by the underlying criminal statute.91
These amendments did not, however, alter the 1909 enactment's
design to eliminate the common-law distinctions between the
principal and the aider and abettor, or the 1948 enactment's design to
87. The enactment was not designed to introduce a new concept into the law of
accomplice liability. Ruffin, 613 F.2d at 413-14; see also id. at 422 (Wyatt, J.,
dissenting) ("There was.., no intention by Section 2(b) to change what had been the
law theretofore." (relying on H.R. Rep. No. 80-304, at 2448-49 (1948))).
88. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 2(b), 62 Stat. 684, 684.
89. United States v. Am. Investors of Pittsburgh, Inc., 879 F.2d 1087, 1094 (3d
Cir. 1989) (indicating that "§ 2(b) abolishes the common law distinction" between the
principal and the causer).
90. Act of Oct. 31, 1951, ch. 655, § 17b, 65 Stat. 710, 717 (emphasis added).
91. See Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 18 n.11 (1980). Section 2 makes
the aider and abettor "punishable 'as a principal,' and those words mean what they
say. One consequence is that aiders and abettors may be held vicariously liable
,regardless of the fact that they may be incapable of committing the specific violation
which they are charged to have aided and abetted."' Busic v. United States, 446 U.S.
398, 411-12 n.18 (1980) (quoting S. Rep. No. 82-1020, at 7 (1951)); see also Ruffin, 613
F.2d at 413-14. To further demonstrate its intention to hold a causer liable even when
he or she lacks the capacity required by the underlying statute, Congress added the
words "or another" to the causing subsection, so that it now applies to whoever
"causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an
offense against the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (2000) (emphasis added); see
United States v. Heyman, 794 F.2d 788, 791 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v.
Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d 1092, 1100-01 (11th Cir. 1983); Ruffin, 613 F.2d at 414-15.
Thus, if "another," i.e., the bank officer, has the requisite capacity, then the causer,
even if he or she lacks that capacity, falls within the statute's reach.
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eliminate the distinctions between the principal and the causer. 2 In
other words, dropping the words "is a principal" should not be
understood as implying that the concept of equivalence was also
dropped.93
In the 1951 amendments, Congress made another interesting
addition to § 2(b). Whereas neither of the subsections had previously
contained any term explicitly prescribing a mental state, Congress
added the word "willfully," but only to § 2(b), so that the causing
subsection has since applied to "[w]hoever willfidly causes an act to be
done." 9  Congress left § 2(a), the aiding and abetting subsection,
without a statutorily prescribed mental state.
Nothing in the legislative history of the 1951 amendments to § 2(b)
indicates why Congress added the word "willfully," or what precisely
Congress meant in that section by the word.' As for § 2(a), from its
original enactment until the present, Congress has never included in it
any explicit indication of the aider and abettor's mental state.
The history of § 2 indicates that any effort to divine the required
mental state of the aider and abettor and of the causer must take into
account two factors: Congress's intent to eliminate the old common-
law distinctions between the accomplice and the principal, and its
inclusion of the word "willfully" in the causing subsection but not in
the aiding and abetting subsection.
These two guiding principles, however, do not easily lend
themselves to ready application. For one thing, there is some inherent
tension between them. Presumably, by including the word "willfully"
in the causing subsection, and by not including it in the aiding and
abetting subsection, Congress's intent was to require "willfulness" for
the causer, but not for the aider and abettor. But, both subsections
provide that the accomplice-whether an aider and abettor or a
causer-is to be treated as a principal. If an aider and abettor is to be
treated as a principal, and a causer is also to be treated as a principal,
then, by the transitive principle, an aider and abettor and a causer
would have to be treated as equivalent. That is a somewhat
perplexing result, if one need act willfully and the other not.
Even if this puzzle can be solved, the suggestion that § 2-with the
addition of "willfully" to one subsection but not the other-may have
92. See Standefer, 447 U.S. at 18 n.11 ("The change was fully consistent with
congressional intent to treat accessories before the fact as principals ... ").
93. See United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 55 (2d Cir. 1977) ("There is... no
evidence of any Congressional intent [in enacting the 1951 amendments] to change
the substantive law that an aider and abettor is a principal." (quoting Swanne Soon
Young Pang v. United States, 209 F.2d 245, 246 (9th Cir. 1953))).
94. 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (emphasis added).
95. United States v. Leppo, 177 F.3d 93, 95 & n.2 (Ist Cir. 1999); Jorge C.
Gonzalez, Comment, Punishing the Causer As the Principal: Mens Rea and fie
Interstate Transportation Element of the National Stolen Property Act, 38 San Diego L.
Rev. 629, 648 & n.109 (2001); see infra Part III.C.
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created certain distinctions as to mental states is at odds with the clear
congressional intent to eliminate distinctions in this area of the law.
Congress clearly sought to eliminate all the problematic common-law
distinctions between the principal and the aider and abettor, and
between the principal and the causer. This elimination of distinctions
speaks in favor of applying to the accomplice whatever mental state
applies to the principal. If the principal is only liable upon acting with
purposeful intent, then the aider and abettor or the causer should not
be liable unless he or she acts with purposeful intent. If, by contrast,
the principal is guilty when acting with mere knowledge, then under
this principle of "no distinctions," that should also be true for both the
aider and abettor and the causer. But, can that conclusion square with
the presence of the word "willfully" in the causing subsection and its
absence in the aiding and abetting subsection?
Before turning to the cases dealing with the issue of mental state,
however, it is worthwhile to focus on the cases that reiterate in other
contexts the clear congressional intent to eliminate the old distinctions
between the accomplice and the principal. Time and time again, the
cases say that all participants-aiders and abettors, causers, and
principals-are to be treated as equivalent. As we shall see, it makes
no sense to eliminate distinctions in other contexts while retaining
them when it comes to the accomplice's mental state. Nonetheless,
most of the cases fail to apply this "no distinction" rule to the issue of
mental state, and in fact, usually create, rather than eliminate,
distinctions between the accomplice and the principal.
B. The "No Distinction" Rule As Applied to Issues Other Than Mental
State
In a myriad of contexts, the cases have applied the rule that both
the aider and abettor and the causer are to be treated as principals. In
Hammer v. United States,96 decided seventeen years after the
enactment of the aiding and abetting provision, the Supreme Court
decided that the well-established two-witness rule applicable to
perjury cases, which precludes a conviction based solely on the
testimony of one witness, also applies to subornation cases. The
Court based its conclusion on the doctrine that aiders and abettors are
to be treated as principals. Subornation is simply the procuring of
perjury, and therefore, under the aiding and abetting statute (which
applies to anyone who "procures" the commission of an offense), the
suborner is the equivalent of the perjurer; consequently, the suborner
is entitled to the benefit of the perjurer's rule.' In other words, the
aiding and abetting statute's elimination of all distinctions between
96. 271 U.S. 620 (1926).
97. Id at 628-29. Section 332 of the Criminal Code, referred to by the Court, is a
reference to the aiding and abetting provision, currently codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2(a).
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the aider and abettor and the principal means that the aider and
abettor is entitled to the benefits of a rule of evidence otherwise
applicable exclusively to the principal.
This "no distinction" rule is applied today in many other contexts as
well. The courts have recognized that indictments need not
particularize whether a defendant is charged as a principal, an aider
and abettor, or a causer, since "both causing and aiding and abetting
are implied in every indictment.""8 Similarly, juries need not decide
whether the participant being considered is a principal, an aider and
abettor, or a causer.99 The defendant is guilty as a principal regardless
of the precise nature of his or her participation.1"'
Numerous cases have gratefully relied on the elimination of these
distinctions when faced with facts that would have resurrected the old
common-law difficulties in distinguishing between the aider and
abettor and the principal. For example, in a murder case involving
multiple assailants, the Fourth Circuit had no difficulty affirming the
conviction despite uncertainty as to "who delivered the fatal blow."'""
The court stated:
This case is thus a classic one for an aiding and abetting
instruction-the commission of a criminal offense is not in doubt,
98. United States v. Armstrong, 909 F.2d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 1990); accord
United States v. Howick, 263 F.3d 1056, 1064-65 (9th Cir. 2001) ("All indictments
must be read in effect, then, as if the alternatives provided by 18 U.S.C. § 2 were
embodied in each count thereof." (quotation omitted)); United States v. Footman,
215 F.3d 145, 153-54 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting that an aiding and abetting charge is
implicit in every indictment, and that the jury was therefore properly instructed on
aiding and abetting and on causing); United States v. Knoll, 16 F.3d 1313, 1323 (2d
Cir. 1994) (noting that "[o]ther circuits have stated that all charges in an indictment
implicitly carry an 18 U.S.C. § 2 charge," and that defendant could, therefore, be
convicted as principal, aider and abettor, or causer); see also United States v. Palmer,
203 F.3d 55, 66 (1st Cir.) (aiding and abetting, citing cases), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1281
(2000); United States v. Rivera, 153 F.3d 809. 813-14 (7th Cir. 1998) (aiding and
abetting); United States v. Nolan, 136 F.3d 265, 271-72 (2d Cir. 1998) (causing);
United States v. Becerra, 97 F.3d 669, 672 (2d Cir. 1996) (aiding and abetting)- United
States v. Wills, 88 F.3d 704, 720 (9th Cir. 1996) (aiding and abetting); United States v.
Mullins, 22 F.3d 1365, 1368 (6th Cir. 1994) (aiding and abetting); United States v.
Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1132 (3d Cir. 1990) (aiding and abetting); United States v.
Broadwell, 870 F.2d 594, 607-08 (1lth Cir. 1989) (aiding and abetting); United States
v. Gaskins, 849 F.2d 454, 459 (9th Cir. 1988) (aiding and abetting); United States v.
Michaels, 796 F.2d 1112, 1118 (9th Cir. 1986) (causing); United States v. Ruffin, 613
F.2d 408, 415-16 (2d Cir. 1979) (causing); United States v. McCambridge, 551 F.2d
865, 871 (1st Cir. 1977) (aiding and abetting).
Although the indictment need not particularize, the defendant still must have
an opportunity to address the prosecutor's theory, and has a right not to be surprised
by a sudden switch from an aiding and abetting theory to a principal theory. See
United States v. Horton, 921 F.2d 540, 546-49 (4th Cir. 1990); Gaskins, 849 F.2d at
459-60.
99. Horton, 921 F.2d at 546; United States v. Gleason, 616 F.2d 2, 21 (2d Cir.
1979).
100. See Horton, 921 F.2d at 545-46.
101. Id. at 544.
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but the identity of the principal may be unclear, and the defendant's
participation in the venture can be established by the evidence. The
very purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 2 is to render equally culpable all who
participate in an offense.'02
In a similar vein, courts have recognized that the elimination of the
distinctions between the principal and the aider and abettor also
dispenses with the need for unanimity. A jury may convict, even if
some jurors determine that the defendant is a principal, and others
determine that he or she is an aider and abettor.10 3
Given the widespread application of this "no distinction" rule, one
would have thought that it would also eliminate distinctions between
the participants' mental states. Since accomplices are now considered
principals, they should be held liable based on the same mental states
that apply to principals. Whatever mental state that the underlying
criminal statute prescribes for the principal should apply to the
accomplice.
That is not to say that the "no distinction" rule has eliminated every
difference among the aider and abettor, the causer, and the principal.
The principal is a direct perpetrator, while the accomplices are
vicarious perpetrators. The aider and abettor must act through a
guilty principal, while the causer may act through an innocent
intermediary. The aider and abettor, whose provision is broadly
phrased to encompass anyone who "aids, abets, counsels, commands,
induces or procures,"1" is liable for any act of facilitation 15-even
102. Id.; see United States v. Bryan, 483 F.2d 88, 95 (3d Cir. 1973) (en banc)
(noting, in a case of transportation of stolen goods, that after "passage of 18 U.S.C. §
2" there no longer was any need to determine whether it was the driver of the truck or
the engineer of the theft who was the principal); United States v. Provenzano, 334
F.2d 678, 691 (3d Cir. 1964) ("[T]he distinction between principal actors and aiders
and abettors in the enterprise is somewhat illusory."); see also id. at 691-92 n.11
(quoting the portion of Nye & Nissen which quoted Judge Learned Hand's
formulation in Peoni).
103. See, e.g., Horton, 921 F.2d at 545 (citing United States v. Eagle Elk, 820 F.2d
959 (8th Cir. 1987), and United States v. Peterson, 768 F.2d 64, 67 (2d Cir. 1985)); see
also United States v. Harris, 8 F.3d 943, 945 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that general
unanimity instruction is sufficient, and jury need not be specifically instructed that
they have to unanimously determine whether the defendant is an aider and abettor or
a principal).
Presumably, this is true not only for the aider and abettor, but also the causer.
Interestingly, according to at least one district court, the jury cannot convict if it splits
between an aiding and abetting theory and a causing theory. See United States v.
Keefer, 799 F.2d 1115, 1125 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting the district court's instruction).
104. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2000).
105. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. For example, in United States v.
Price, 76 F.3d 526, 529-30 (3d Cir. 1996), a bank robbery case, the court found that the
act facilitating the principal's use of a gun was the aider and abettor's collection of
money from cash drawers after the principal had threatened bank employees with the
gun. See also Dressier, supra note 71, at 102 (indicating that "the most trivial
assistance is sufficient basis to render the secondary actor accountable for the actions
of the primary actor," and giving examples from various state cases, which include
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encouragement'06-while the causer is not guilty unless he or she
"causes"1°7
-i.e., brings about, or is the cause-in-fact of-the
offense."5  Nonetheless, these distinctions emanating from the
language of the statute, and from the historical development of the
doctrine of aiding and abetting and the doctrine of causing, are clearly
the contemplated exceptions to the "no distinction" rule.
Indeed, the "no distinction" rule makes little sense unless it is
extended to the issue of mental state. If the mental state for the
principal is allowed to differ in any way from that for the aider and
abettor or the causer, then the jury would have to first determine in
each instance whether the defendant is an aider and abettor, a causer,
or a principal, in order to know which mental state to apply.
Requiring the jury to make those distinctions effectively resurrects the
pre-1909 state of the law, and stands in direct contradiction to the "no
distinction" rule.
As we shall see in the following parts, what is so striking in so many
of the judicial efforts at ascertaining the mental state of the aider and
abettor or the causer is the almost universal neglect of the "no
distinction" rule. Even the cases that apply the principal's mental
state to the aider and abettor or the causer usually fail to invoke it.
II. THE MENTAL STATE OF THE AIDER AND ABET'TOR
Despite the similarities between the aider and abettor and the
causer, the judicial efforts at ascertaining their mental states have
usually taken two separate paths, sometimes reaching different
results. The analysis turns first to the aider and abettor, looking
initially at the case law prior to Peoni, then focusing on Peoni itself,
and then discussing the many approaches that have developed in the
years since Peoni. The analysis of the aider and abettor concludes
applauding at an illegal event, holding the principal's child, and preparing food for the
principal).
106. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
107. 18 U.S.C. § 2(b).
108. See United States v. Nelson, Nos. 98-1231, 98-1437, 2002 WL 14171. at *35 (2d
Cir. Jan. 7, 2002) ("cause in fact" (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v.
Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 384 (2d Cir. 1992))), United States v. Keats, 937 F.2d 58, 64
(2d Cir. 1991) ("physical consequence" (quoting United States v. Muni, 668 F.2d 87,
89-90 (2d Cir. 1981))); United States v. Jordan. 927 F.2d 53, 55 (2d Cir. 1991) (-brings
about"); United States v. Goldberg, 830 F.2d 459,463 (3d Cir. 1987) ("brings about");
United States v. Kegler, 724 F.2d 190, 199 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("bringing about"
(quoting United States v. Kenofskey, 243 U.S. 440, 443 (1917) (interpreting the word
"causes" in the mail fraud statute))): United States v. Levine, 457 F.2d 1186, 1188
(10th Cir. 1972) ("procures or brings about" (quoting United States v. Inciso, 292 F.2d
374, 378 (7th Cir. 1961), which cites Kenofskey)): United States v. Markee. 425 F.2d
1043, 1046 (9th Cir. 1970) ("cause-in-fact"); United States v. Scandifia, 390 F.2d 244.
249-50 (2d Cir. 1968) ("bringing about" (quoting Kenosfkey)), vacated on other
grounds, 394 U.S. 310 (1969); United States v. Leggett. 269 F.2d 35, 37 (7th Cir. 1959)
("bringing about" (quoting Kenos.fkey)): Blakey & Roddy. supra note 6. at 1417 &
n.285.
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that despite all the cases that have viewed Peoni as a simple aiding
and abetting case, Peoni was nothing of the sort; rather, it was a
"natural and probable consequences" case that explicitly left the issue
of the mental state of the ordinary aider and abettor unresolved.
A. Initial Judicial Efforts at Ascertaining the Mental State of the Aider
and Abettor
1. The Case Law Prior to United States v. Peoni
The general concept of aiding and abetting liability long predated
the enactment of the federal aiding and abetting statute in 1909. In
United States v. Peoni,1' Judge Learned Hand traced the earliest
federal statutory formulation to a 1790 statute dealing with murder,
robbery, and piracy, and the earliest judicial formulations to the
common law of fourteenth century England."'
The more specific issue of the aider and abettor's mental state also
predated Peoni and the 1909 enactment. One of the strongest early
federal pronouncements rejecting purposeful intent in favor of
knowledge, at least for serious crimes, was voiced by the Supreme
Court in a civil case in 1870, Hanauer v. Doane."' The plaintiff, a
vendor who had sold military goods during the Civil War knowing
that the purchaser was supplying the Confederate Army, sought to
collect on the promissory notes used to pay for the goods."' The
validity of the notes depended on whether the vendor had aided and
abetted treason in making the sales." 3
The trial court had instructed the jury that the vendor was guilty of
treason, and therefore, barred from collecting on the notes, only if he
intended to aid the rebels, not if he merely knew that the goods he sold
would ultimately aid the rebels."' The jury found that the notes were
valid."'5 The Supreme Court reversed. Selling to a purchaser with
knowledge that the purchaser would turn the goods over to the rebel
army was sufficient to make the vendor guilty of treason as an aider
and abettor and to bar collection on the notes." 6 Purposeful intent
was not necessary:
Can a man furnish another with the means of committing murder, or
any abominable crime, knowing that the purchaser procures them,
and intends to use them, for that purpose, and then pretend that he
is not a participator in the guilt? Can he wrap himself up in his own
109. 100 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1938)
110. Id. at 402.
111. 79 U.S. 342 (1870).
112. Id. at 342-43.
113. Id. at 343-44.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 344.
116. Id. at 347.
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selfishness and heartless indifference and say, "What business is that
of mine? Am I the keeper of another man's conscience?" No one
can hesitate to say that such a man voluntarily aids in the
perpetration of the offence, and morally speaking, is almost, if not
quite, as guilty as the principal offender.
... He cannot be permitted to stand on the nice metaphysical
distinction that, although he knows that the purchaser buys the
goods for the purpose of aiding the rebellion, he does not sell them
for the purpose. The consequences of his acts are too serious and
enormous to admit of such a plea. He must be taken to intend the
consequences of his own voluntary act.117
This is a most emphatic, carefully reasoned statement. Especially
for serious offenses, it speaks strongly in favor of imposing liability
even when the aider and abettor acts with mere knowledge, and
specifically rejects the higher, purposeful intent standard. Yet, the
case was to be ignored in future federal cases, even by those cases
adopting the simple knowledge standard that it propounded.
Indeed, the Supreme Court did not cite Hanauer at all twenty-three
years later in an aiding and abetting case, when it reversed a murder
conviction and apparently adopted a purposeful intent approach. In
Hicks v. United States,'1 8 the purported aider and abettor, who was
present at the shooting, said to the victim, "Take off your hat and die
like a man."' 9 The Supreme Court reversed his conviction because
the trial court failed to instruct the jury that the defendant could be
liable only if he had uttered those words with the "intention of
encouraging and abetting" the murder.2 While the words uttered by
the defendant may have had the effect of encouraging the principal,
the jury had to find that the defendant "intend[ed] that they.., be
understood by [the principal] as an encouragement to act."'1'
It seemed, then, that purposeful intent, rather than simple
knowledge, had become the standard.2-' But, whichever approach was
gaining sway, these common-law cases, decided before Congress
enacted the aiding and abetting statute, and thereby evinced its intent
to eliminate distinctions between the aider and abettor and the
117. Id.
118. 150 U.S. 442 (1893).
119. Id. at 446.
120. Id. at 449.
121. Id.
122. Although the Court in Hicks spoke of intent rather than knowledge, one must
admittedly be careful about drawing too definitive a conclusion from the case. Unlike
the Court in Hanauer v. Doane, which focused on the difference between intent and
knowledge, the Court in Hicks focused on a jury instruction that seemed to imply that
the defendant's act of assistance was sufficient for liability regardless of his mental
state. Thus, Hicks may well use the language of "intent" only to stress the need for
some level of culpable mental state, without considering what precise level would be
appropriate.
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principal, understandably felt no need to consider whether or not their
results would create further distinctions. At that time, arcane
distinctions between the aider and abettor and the principal were the
norm.
2. Judge Learned Hand's Decision in United States v. Peoni
The "knowledge versus purposeful intent" controversy continued
beyond the 1909 enactment of the federal aiding and abetting
provision and well into the twentieth century. Initially, a number of
different federal circuits came down on the "knowledge" side.
213
(Interestingly, those circuits neglected to cite the Supreme Court's
decision in Hanauer v. Doane in support of their position.)
Ultimately, however, Judge Learned Hand's strong position on behalf
of the purposeful intent position carried the day.
In United States v. Peoni,z4 the defendant, Peoni, while in the
Bronx, sold counterfeit bills to Regno, who, in turn, sold them to
Dorsey, who was arrested while trying to pass them in Brooklyn. All
were well aware of the nature of the bills."z Peoni in the Bronx was
charged with aiding and abetting Dorsey's possession of the bills in
Brooklyn. '26 The prosecution argued that Peoni possessed the
requisite mental state for aiding and abetting liability because "Peoni
put the bills in circulation and knew that Regno would be likely, not to
pass them himself, but to sell them to another guilty possessor ....
The Second Circuit rejected the argument that knowledge was
enough and reversed the conviction. Writing for the court, Judge
123. See, e.g., Bacon v. United States, 127 F.2d 985, 987 (10th Cir. 1942); Backun v.
United States, 112 F.2d 635, 637 (4th Cir. 1940); Borgia v. United States, 78 F.2d 550,
555 (9th Cir. 1935); Vuckich v. United States, 28 F.2d 666, 669 (9th Cir. 1928). See
generally United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790, 797 (7th Cir.) ("Under the older
cases... it was enough that the aider and abettor knew the principal's purpose."),
modified on other grounds, 777 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1985) (per curiam); Model Penal
Code § 2.06 cmt. at 315-17 (1962); LaFave & Scott, supra note 2, § 6.7, at 582; Blakey
& Roddy, supra note 6, at 1387-89.
124. 100 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1938).
125. Id. at 401
126. Id. at 402. Apparently Peoni was not charged with uttering the bills himself
because of venue problems; the prosecution was brought in Brooklyn (the Eastern
District of New York), where Dorsey was arrested, rather than the Bronx (the
Southern District of New York), where Peoni had originally uttered the bills.
127. Id. (emphasis added). The case does not reveal how Peoni knew that Regno
would sell the bills to another guilty possessor instead of passing them to an innocent
party. Interestingly, shortly after deciding Peoni, the Second Circuit-in a per curiam
opinion, which included Judge Learned Hand-described the facts in Peoni
differently: "Peoni, the accused, did not know that Regno, his buyer, was to sell the
counterfeit bills to Dorsey, and had no interest in whether he did, since Regno might
equally well have passed them to innocent persons himself." United States v. Bruno,
105 F.2d 921, 922 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), rev'd on other grounds, 308 U.S. 287 (1939).
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Hand first reviewed the long history of the concept of aiding and
abetting liability and its various formulations.'- He then concluded:
It will be observed that all these definitions have nothing whatever
to do with the probability that the forbidden result would follow
upon the accessory's conduct; and that they all demand that he in
some sort associate himself with the venture, that he participate in it
as in something that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his
action to make it succeed. All the words used [in the aiding and
abetting statute]-even the most colorless, "abet"-carry an
implication of purposive attitude towards it.Y-
Judge Hand concluded that on the facts of the case in Peoni there
was no evidence supporting a conclusion that Peoni had acted with a
"purposive" attitude. Peoni had been charged with aiding and
abetting not the possession by Regno (the purchaser), but rather the
possession by Dorsey (the purchaser's purchaser). He could be guilty
of aiding and abetting such possession once removed, but only if he
"wish[ed] to bring about" that more remote possession, not if he
merely knew or foresaw it. "[i1t was of no moment" to Peoni
"whether Regno passed them himself, and so ended the possibility of
further guilty possession, or whether he sold them to a second possible
passer";13 Peoni clearly lacked the wish to bring about the remote
possession, and therefore, lacked the purposeful intent necessary to be
Dorsey's aider and abettor.3
Judge Hand also based his reasoning on the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee of a trial in the district where the crime was committed,3'
pointing out the difficulty in preserving that right when an aider and
abettor's liability is extended to cover not just the purchaser, but also
the purchaser's purchaser:
[N]obody, so far as we can find, has ever held that a contract is
criminal, because the seller has reason to know, not that the buyer
will use the goods unlawfully, but that some one further down the
line may do so. Nor is it at all desirable that the seller should be
held indefinitely. The real gravamen of the charge against him is his
utterance of the bills; and he ought not to be tried for that wherever
the prosecution may pick up any guilty possessor-perhaps
thousands of miles away. The oppression against which the Sixth
Amendment is directed could be easily compassed by this device,
128. Peoni, 100 F.2d at 402.
129. Id
130. Id. at 402-03.
131. For the same reason, Judge Hand also reversed the conviction on the
conspiracy count. Id at 403.
132. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a ... trial, by
an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed .... U.S. Const. amend. VI.
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because if the seller be a real accessory he may be removed to the
place of the crime.133
Only under the more culpable, purposeful intent standard, reasoned
Judge Hand, would it be fair to hold the aider and abettor liable in the
venue where the guilty possession took place, which may well have
been thousands of miles away.
In discussing his two rationales-that the language of the statute,
reinforced by its history, conveys the "implication of purposive
attitude," and that sensitivity to the Sixth Amendment favors limiting
aiding and abetting liability to the purposeful actor-Judge Hand
made no mention of the legislative purpose behind the enactment of
the federal aiding and abetting statute, namely, the elimination of the
common-law differences between the aider and abettor and the
principal. Had that been part of his analysis, he would have had to
examine the mental state of the principal under the relevant
counterfeiting statute, and would have had to impose the purposeful
intent mental state on the aider and abettor only if that was the
mental state required of the principal.
Indeed, Judge Hand never, despite the numerous opportunities
presented in the aiding and abetting cases that came before him,
considered whether imposing the mental state of purposeful intent on
the aider and abettor was consistent with the elimination of all
distinctions between the aider and abettor and the principal. Rather,
he simply repeated the purposeful intent concept in a number of
slightly different ways whenever he could. Two years after Peoni, in a
conspiracy case, (he was of the view that conspirators and abettors
were roughly equivalent when it came to mental state' 34) he phrased it
this way:
It is not enough that [the accused conspirator] does not forego a
normally lawful activity, of the fruits of which he knows that others
will make an unlawful use; he must in some sense promote their
venture himself, make it his own, have a stake in its outcome. 135
In 1950, he stressed again that liability for aiding, abetting, and
procuring requires something more than simply taking steps "which
133. Peoni, 100 F.2d at 403.
134. See United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J.) ("[The]
question is whether the seller of goods, in themselves innocent, becomes a conspirator
with-or, what is in substance the same thing, an abettor of-the buyer because he
knows that the buyer means to use the goods to commit a crime." (emphasis added)),
aftd, 311 U.S. 205 (1940); infra note 271.
135. Falcone, 109 F.2d at 581; see also United States v. Di Re, 159 F.2d 818, 819 (2d
Cir. 1947) (L. Hand, J.) ("[W]e have uniformly held that the prosecution must prove
the accused to have associated himself with the principals in the sense that he has a
stake in the success of the venture."), affd, 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
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the actor knows to be likely so to result."'36 In 1951, he phrased it this
way:
[Knowledge] will not suffice to establish a criminal liability, because
an accessory must make the venture his own; the crime must be a
fulfillment in some degree of an enterprise which he has adopted as
his; his act must be in realization of his purpose..1
7
The different formulations all amount to the same conclusion:
knowledge is insufficient. What is necessary is intent, desire,
purposefulness, or a wish to bring about the outcome, regardless of
the mental state prescribed by the underlying criminal statute for the
principal.
Judge Hand's purposeful intent stance did not immediately find
universal acceptance in the federal courts. For example, five years
later, the Supreme Court used the phrase "contributed consciously" to
describe the aider and abettor's mental state'--a phrase which seems
purposely ambiguous so as to avoid the "knowledge versus purposeful
intent" controversy. Then, in 1947, the Supreme Court in Bozza v.
United States 39 apparently rejected the purposeful intent standard in
favor of the knowledge approach that it had articulated so eloquently
in its old Civil War treason case of Hanauer v. Doane (but without
citing it). In Bozza, the Court upheld a conviction for aiding and
abetting the crime of conducting the "business of distiller... with
intent wilfully to defraud the ... United States of the tax on ... spirits
so distilled."''" Although the defendant had clearly abetted the
running of the distillery, he claimed that he did so without "knowledge
that the distillery business was carried on with an intent to defraud the
Government of its taxes."'' The Court rejected that contention,
concluding that he did possess such knowledge, and strongly implying
that such knowledge, rather than purposeful intent, was all that was
necessary:
Men in the jury box, like men on the street, can conclude that a
person who actively helps to operate a secret distillery knows that he
is helping to violate Government revenue laws. That is a well
known object of an illicit distillery. Doubtless few who ever worked
in such a place, or even heard about one, would fail to understand
the cry: "The Revenuers are coming!' 42
136. United States v. Chiarella, 184 F.2d 903. 909 (2d Cir. 1950) (L. Hand, J.)
(emphasis added), modified on other grounds, 187 F.2d 12 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 341 U.S. 946 (1951).
137. United States v. Paglia, 190 F.2d 445.448 (2d Cir. 1951).
138. United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503,515 (1943).
139. 330 U.S. 160 (1947).
140. Id at 162 (quoting the then current version of 26 U.S.C. § 2833(a)).
141. Id. at 164 (emphasis added).
142. Id. at 165 (emphasis added).
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Interestingly, Bozza, in holding that knowledge was sufficient, did
not seem to be the least bit concerned that the underlying offense was
a specific intent offense that explicitly required an "intent willfully to
defraud" the United States. In effect, Bozza held the aider and
abettor guilty on a less culpable mental state than that required of the
principal.
Justice Douglas, dissenting, contended that purposeful intent,
rather than mere knowledge, was necessary for aiding and abetting
liability. But, like the majority, he did not tie his conclusion in any
way to the mental state required of the principal by the distillery
statute. Rather, he quoted Judge Hand's Peoni formulation, 43 and
argued that what was necessary was evidence that the defendant
"promoted" not only the distilling, but also the fraud, or stated
differently, that the defendant "furthered the unlawful scheme, or in
fact had some interest in the project.""
Soon thereafter, Justice Douglas got his way when he authored the
majority opinion for the Supreme Court in Nye & Nissen v. United
States,4 ' where the defendant was convicted of aiding and abetting the
making of misrepresentations as to the weights, grades, and prices of
dairy products sold to the War Shipping Administration during World
War II. Without much discussion, the Court upheld the conviction,
citing 18 U.S.C. § 2, and quoting Judge Hand's Peoni standard: "In
order to aid and abet another to commit a crime it is necessary that a
defendant 'in some sort associate himself with the venture, that he
participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring about, that he
seek by his action to make it succeed."'"46 Like Judge Hand in Peoni,
Justice Douglas in Nye & Nissen applied the purposeful intent
standard without examining the mental state of the principal, and
without determining whether adoption of that standard was consistent
with Congress's desire to eliminate the distinctions between the aider
and abettor and the principal.
While Nye & Nissen's adoption of Peoni should have ended the
matter, a review of the subsequent case law demonstrates that it did
nothing of the sort.
B. What Does Peoni Really Mean? The Current Approaches to the
Mental State of the Aider and Abettor
1. Overview
Purposeful intent rather than knowledge-the Peoni standard
seems simple enough. But, after Peoni, and its adoption by the
143. Id. at 168 n.1 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 167-68 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
145. 336 U.S. 613 (1949).
146. Id. at 619 (quoting Peoni).
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Supreme Court in Nye & Nissen, does aiding and abetting liability
always require purposeful intent? Yes, said Professor G. Robert
Blakey and Kevin P. Roddy in an article surveying the federal cases.
They came to the commonly-held conclusion: "The federal courts of
appeals now uniformly use 'intent' as the necessary state of mind for
accomplice liability."'47
In reality, the federal case law is far from "uniform" in its use of the
"intent" standard. It is more accurately described as hopelessly
muddled and divided, despite the sixty years that have elapsed since
Judge Hand's decision in Peoni, and despite the seeming clarity of his
pronouncements. Although the cases uniformly adopt Judge Hand's
standard in Peoni, they disagree as to what the Peoni standard is.
Indeed, the federal courts ostensibly following Peoni (or following
cases, such as Nye & Nissen, which adopt it) have employed at least
six different approaches to the question of an aider and abettor's
mental state.
An examination of the six approaches to the mental state of the
aider and abettor requires, as a preliminary matter, an understanding
of the various mental states that may apply to the principal. Different
crimes require different mental states. Citing the Model Penal Code,
the Supreme Court has identified four levels of mens rea or mental
state, listed as follows in descending order of culpability: purpose,
knowledge, recklessness, and negligence." In addition to these four,
there are at least three others: some crimes-usually those containing
the word "willfully"-also require the additional mental element that
the defendant be generally aware that his or her conduct violates the
law;149 a few unusual crimes require not only that the defendant have a
general awareness that his or her conduct violates the law, but also a
147. Blakey & Roddy, supra note 6. at 1389-90; see supra text accompanying note
25. Despite their conclusion that the federal cases now uniformly utilize the Peoni
approach, Professor Blakey and Roddy acknowledged that "occasionally 'knowledge'
language (or knowledge-like results) can be found in the opinions." Blakey & Roddy,
supra note 6, at 1390.
148. Liparota v. United States. 471 U.S. 419, 423 n.5 (1985) (citing the 1962
proposed official draft of the Model Penal Code); United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S.
394, 404 (1980) (same); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 444
(1978) (citing the 1955 Tentative Draft No. 4).
149. See Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191 (1998) (indicating that the use of
the word "willfully" in a criminal statute, -[a]s a general matter." requires that the
defendant act with a "bad purpose" (i.e., a general awareness that his or her conduct
violates the law)); United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533, 539 (2d Cir. 1995) ("The
term 'willfulness' has generally, albeit not uniformly, been interpreted as referring to
knowledge that the conduct in question was wrongful or unlawful."). But see United
States v. Georgopoulos, 149 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (limiting Bryan,
and refusing to extend its interpretation of "willfully" to 29 U.S.C. § 186(b), which
prohibits payments to union officials). For a discussion of the word "willfully" as used
in federal criminal statutes, see Sharon L. Davies, The Jurisprudence of Willfulness:
An Evolving Theory of Excusable Ignorance, 48 Duke LJ. 341 (1998).
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specific awareness of the provision that he or she is violating;150 by
contrast, some crimes-strict liability offenses -require no culpable
mental state at all.151
Keeping these criminal mental states in mind, we can turn to the
questions that have divided the courts after Peoni, and that have led
to the disparate approaches to the mental state of the aider and
abettor.
1. Does Peoni always require purposeful intent?
2. If not, when does purposeful intent apply? And, what mental
state applies when purposeful intent does not: knowledge?
3. Can a mental state other than either purposeful intent or
knowledge apply to the aider and abettor? If the principal commits a
strict liability offense, or some other lesser intent offense, does that
affect the mental state required of the aider and abettor? What is the
relationship, if any, between the mental state required of the aider and
abettor and that required of the principal? Are they linked at all?
4. Does Peoni set forth a specific intent standard?
5. Does Peoni dispense with "ignorance of the law is no excuse,"
and require that the aider and abettor know that his or her conduct
violates the law?
6. What mental state does Peoni require for jurisdictional elements,
such as interstate transportation, which normally require no mental
state at all on the part of the principal?
Two questions, however, have rarely been asked by the courts: how
should the courts further Congress's desire to eliminate distinctions
between the principal and the aider and abettor; and, how should the
150. Bryan, 524 U.S. at 193-94, gives two examples: (1) structuring cash
transactions in excess of $10,000, citing Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994),
and (2) tax crimes, citing Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991). Congress has
amended the anti-structuring statute and deleted the word "willfully" to overrule
Ratzlaf. See Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, § 411, 108 Stat. 2160, 2253 (codified as amended at 31
U.S.C. §§ 5322(a), 5321(c)(1) (1994)). Now, the structuring statute requires only an
intent to avoid the reporting requirement; the defendant need not have any awareness
regarding the unlawfulness of the act. See, e.g., United States v. Simon, 85 F.3d 906,
909 n.3 (2d Cir. 1996).
151. See, e.g., United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975) (holding the responsible
corporate officer criminally liable for company's storage of contaminated food, even
though he was unaware of the contamination); United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601
(1971) (finding the possessor of hand grenades criminally liable, even though he was
unaware that they were not properly registered); United States v. Dotterweich, 320
U.S. 277 (1943) (contaminated food or drugs); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250
(1922) (narcotics); United States v. Figueroa, 165 F.3d 111, 114 & n.3 (2d Cir. 1998)
(reviewing Supreme Court cases); see also Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 606-
07 & n.3 (1994) (summarizing cases, and noting that strict liability offenses dispense
with the conventional mens rea requirement, but also adding that the Supreme Court
has not recognized "true" strict liability offenses, and thus, the defendant charged
with the possession of an unregistered machinegun usually must at least know that he
or she is dealing with a dangerous item).
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courts account for the absence of the word "willfully" in the aiding
and abetting subsection, an absence underscored by its presence in the
neighboring causing subsection?
In answering the questions that the courts do ask, the cases have
articulated various approaches, which are summarized below and
thereafter discussed at length, and which answer these questions in
different ways:
1. Purposeful intent. Knowledge is never sufficient; purposeful
intent is always necessary. No matter what the facts, or what the
nature of the substantive offense, an aider and abettor is liable only if
he or she acts with the purposeful desire to bring about the crime.
This purposeful intent mental state is always applicable, and is
independent of any mental state that might apply to the principal.
2. Bad purpose. The aider and abettor has an independent mental
state unconnected to that of the principal, but it is not simply
purposeful intent. Even purposeful intent is insufficient for liability;
the aider and abettor is not liable unless he or she acts not only with
the desire to bring about the result, but also with a bad purpose and
an awareness of the unlawfulness of the act.
3. Knowledge is sufficient in most cases. Knowledge remains the
mental state of the aider and abettor, and all Peoni does is set forth a
very limited exception to the rule that knowledge is sufficient. Peoni
requires proof of the more culpable, purposeful mental state only in
cases where there is a special need to limit the liability of the aider
and abettor. Such a need arises in cases where the aider and abettor's
connection to the principal is as tenuous as it was in Peoni, where the
defendant was charged with aiding and abetting the possession of
counterfeit bills by his purchaser's purchaser. A similar need to
impose the tougher standard arises in cases where the defendant is a
vendor making routine, lawful sales of innocent goods at the standard
market rate to all purchasers, but knows that one of the purchasers
will use the goods to commit a crime. In such unusual cases, aiding
and abetting liability is appropriate only if the defendant did not
simply know, but actually wanted, the crime to be committed. But, in
the ordinary case, knowledge suffices.
4. Knowledge is sufficient in a small number of particularly grave
cases. Peoni established a purposeful intent standard for most crimes,
but certain crimes, such as treason or murder, are so serious that the
law must penalize any act of abetting, even if committed simply with
knowledge as opposed to purposeful intent.
5. Knowledge is sufficient whenever coupled with a substantial act.
The mental state of the aider and abettor depends on the
substantiality of the act of assistance. For a substantial act, knowledge
is sufficient, while for a lesser act, the aider and abettor is liable only if
acting with purposeful intent.
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6. The aider and abettor's mental state is a derivative of that of the
principal. Neither purposeful intent, nor bad purpose, nor knowledge
is the mental state applicable to the aider and abettor. The aider and
abettor's status is not measured by any independent mental state;
rather, Peoni requires that the aider and abettor act with the same
mental state as that required of the principal. If the principal is not
guilty unless he or she acts with purposeful intent or bad purpose, the
same holds true for the aider and abettor. But, if the mental state for
the principal is mere knowledge, then the same is true for the aider
and abettor. If no culpable mental state at all is required of the
principal (because, say, the offense is a strict liability offense), then
the same is true for the aider and abettor.
Determining which approach is employed by a given case is often a
confounding task. Because the courts are typically unaware of the
existence of the disparate approaches, a given court will often cull
legal pronouncements indiscriminately from previous aiding and
abetting cases without realizing that those earlier cases are wholly
inconsistent with one another. One recent First Circuit case illustrates
this common problem. In summarizing the relevant law, it quotes
language suggestive of the purposeful intent approach, 52 the
derivative approach, 53 and the knowledge approach.'-' The case then
concludes that mere knowledge is sufficient for the two offenses at
issue, "'55 even for the offense that requires a mental state of the
principal that is more culpable than mere knowledge, namely, an
"intent to cause death or serious bodily injury."'56
Despite the incongruities, the cases can often be categorized. Each
of these approaches is analyzed in turn.
2. The Purposeful Intent Approach
Under this approach, Peoni always requires purposeful intent. The
aider and abettor's mental state is a constant, unaffected by the
mental state required of the principal. Even if the particular offense
requires that the principal act only with knowledge or some other
lesser mental state, the aider and abettor is not guilty unless he or she
acts with the more culpable mental state of purposeful intent.
152. United States v. Otero-Mrndez, 273 F.3d 46, 51 (1st Cir. 2001) ("intended to
help the principal" (quoting United States v. Taylor, 54 F.3d 967, 975 (1st Cir. 1995)));
id. at 52 ("specific intent crime").
153. Id. at 51 ("consciously shared" in the principal's mental state (quoting Taylor,
54 F.3d at 975)); id. at 52 ("consciously shared" (citing United States v. Loder, 23 F.3d
586, 591 (1st Cir. 1994))).
154. Id. at 52 ("some knowledge of the principal's criminal intent" (citing Loder,
23 F.3d at 591)).
155. Id. at 52-53.
156. Id. at 51 (referring to the carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994)).
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One of the corollaries of this reading of Peoni is that Judge Learned
Hand, by always requiring purposeful intent, established aiding and
abetting liability as an offense of "specific intent" (in at least one of
the phrase's many meanings) rather than "general intent." As the
Supreme Court has recognized, "[i]n a general sense, 'purpose'
corresponds loosely with the common-law concept of specific intent,
while 'knowledge' corresponds loosely with the concept of general
intent." '157 This specific intent reading of Peoni means that the aider
and abettor must alvays act with the purpose and desire' to bring
about the crime, even when the principal is liable on some lesser
mental state. Many cases have employed this specific intent
approach,159 and for certain crimes, have recognized a sharp
dichotomy between the specific intent mental state required of the
aider and abettor and the mental state required of the principal, which
is often knowledge (i.e., general intent). As we shall see,
characterizing aiding and abetting liability as a specific intent offense
has important practical consequences. It has also contributed
significantly to the confusion in this area of the law, because "specific
intent" is susceptible to many meanings, not all of which are
consistent with the mental state for the aider and abettor set forth by
Judge Hand in Peoni.'6
a. The Purposeful Intent Approach As Applied to Knowledge Offenses
i. Loansharking
United States v. Scottit 6' illustrates the application of the purposeful
intent approach to the aider and abettor of a knowledge offense. The
157. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394,405 (1980).
[A] person who causes a particular result is said to act purposefully if he
consciously desires that result, whatever the likelihood of that result
happening from his conduct, while he is said to act knowingly if he is aware
that that result is practically certain to follow from his conduct. whatever his
desire may be as to that result.
Id at 404 (quotation omitted).
158. E.g., United States v. Hunt, 272 F.3d 488. 493 (7th Cir. 2001) (-a desire to
help the activity succeed" (emphasis and quotation omitted)) United States v. Folks.
236 F.3d 384, 389 (7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 74 (2001); United States v.
Hill, 55 F.3d 1197, 1204 (6th Cir. 1995) ("with the desire that the crime be
accomplished" (quoting United States v. Newman, 490 F.2d 139. 142-43 (3d Cir.
1974))).
159. See, e.g., United States v. Samaria, 239 F.3d 228. 234-35 (2d Cir. 2001)
(collecting Second Circuit cases): United States v. Jackson. 213 F.3d 1269, 1292 n.12
(10th Cir.) (collecting cases from various circuits). vacated on other grounds, 531 U.S.
1033 (2000).
160. For other meanings of "specific intent," and a discussion on how the other
meanings have influenced various courts in setting forth the mental state for the aider
and abettor, see infra text accompanying notes 250-54, 323-37, 64046.
161. 47 F.3d 1237 (2d Cir. 1995).
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defendants were charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 894(a)(1), which
provides that whoever "knowingly participates in any way" in the use
of extortionate means to collect on a loan is guilty of loansharking. 161
One defendant was a mortgage broker who provided the victim with
the needed financing on his home to repay the extortionate loan. 63
One of the issues before the court was the mental state necessary to
hold the mortgage broker liable for aiding and abetting: was he guilty
if he simply knew that he was assisting in an extortionate transaction,
or did he have to have the purpose or the desire to bring about the
success of the crime?"M
The answer, the court determined, hinged on whether the
defendant was a principal or an aider and abettor. The statute's
explicit language-"knowingly"-"indicates that Congress decided
that extortion was a grave enough evil to warrant criminal liability on
the basis of knowledge alone.., and did not impose the additional
mens rea requirement of specific intent or purpose to bring about the
crime."165 But, that was true only for the principal. Despite the
existence of a lesser mental state for the principal, nothing in the
statute changed the "well-settled rule' 1 66 that an aider and abettor can
be liable only if acting with "'the specific intent that his act or
omission bring about the underlying crime.""' 67 Citing Peoni, the court
in Scotti had no problem concluding that "aiding and abetting requires
a finding of specific intent or purpose to bring about the crime...
whereas [the loansharking statute] only requires knowledge."'"
Thus, under Scotti's reading of Peoni, the aider and abettor's mental
state-purposeful intent (which Scotti described as specific intent)-is
independent of the principal's mental state. For the very same crime,
the principal can be guilty when acting with knowledge or general
intent, while the aider and abettor would not be guilty unless acting
with the more culpable mental state of purposeful intent.
Scotti, then, is a straightforward application of the purposeful intent
standard to a knowledge crime, with a resulting disparity in mental
states between the aider and abettor and the principal. Scotti does not
explain how it squares such a disparity in mental states with
Congress's desire to eliminate all distinctions between the aider and
162. Id. at 1244 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 894(a)(1)).
163. Id. at 1240.
164. See id. at 1244-46.
165. Id. at 1245-46 (emphasis omitted).
166. Id. at 1244. Of course, as this Article demonstrates, this rule is anything but
"well-settled"; Scotti was oblivious to both contrary Supreme Court precedent, see,
e.g., supra text accompanying notes 111-17, 139-42; infra text accompanying notes
310-13, 346-63, and contrary Second Circuit precedent, see, e.g., infra text
accompanying notes 266-77,320-22.
167. Scotti, 47 F.3d at 1244 (quoting United States v. Aiello, 864 F.2d 257, 262-63
(2d Cir. 1988)).
168. Id. (citing Aiello, 864 F.2d at 262-63, and United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401,
402 (2d Cir. 1938)).
1378 [Vol. 70
WHAT WERE THEY THINKING?
abettor and the principal. 69  Nor does Sconi discuss the word
"willfully." Its requirement of specific intent for the aider and abettor
seems to imply a requirement that the aider and abettor act
"willfully." But, the word "willfully" is glaringly absent from the
aiding and abetting provision; in 18 U.S.C. § 2, it is found in the
causing subsection alone.
In any event, even apart from these unaddressed issues, the Second
Circuit has not consistently applied Scotti. Rather, consistent with the
lack of any doctrinal clarity in this area, the Second Circuit reached a
different conclusion four years later, when it again confronted this
issue of the mental state required of an aider and abettor of
loansharking.1 ° The court reiterated the premise that aiding and
abetting is a "specific intent" offense,' and made it clear that the
defendant had been charged and tried on an aiding and abetting
theory," but then inexplicably concluded that the government was
not required to prove specific intent. "The government needs only
prove that [the aider and abettor's] participation was 'knowing,' not
that he possessed specific intent."'" Even more puzzling was the
court's citation to Scotti in support of that conclusion.'
Nonetheless, whatever the vitality of Scotti in the Second Circuit
today, it serves as a simple illustration of what occurs with some
frequency under the purposeful intent approach, and indeed, under
the other approaches that similarly define the aider and abettor's
mental state without any reference to the mental state required of the
principal. The mental state of the aider and abettor and the principal
can diverge, and can diverge markedly, even though they have both
been charged with the very same underlying offense.
ii. Bank Robbery
Another instance where application of the purposeful intent
approach yields one mental state for the aider and abettor, while
requiring another for the principal, is the offense of bank robbery.'
Bank robbery, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), is a general intent
crime, not a specific intent crime. 6 As long as the robber is aware of
what he or she is doing, the robber need not desire any specific result.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 83-84; infra Part IV.C.
170. United States v. Smith, 198 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1999). cert. denied, 531 U.S. 864
(2000).
171. Id. at 383.
172. Id. at 380 n.1, 382-86.
173. Id. at 386.
174. Id- at 385-86.
175. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1994), first paragraph, punishes "[w]hoever. by force and
violence, or by intimidation, takes... from the person or presence of another... any
property or money or any other thing of value belonging to, or in the ... possession
of, any bank ...."
176. Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255,267-71 (2000).
2002] 1379
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
All that the government need prove is "that the defendant possessed
knowledge with respect to the actus reus of the crime (here, the taking
of property of another by force and violence or intimidation).'"
Consequently, as the Supreme Court has noted, it is no defense if the
bank robber, lacking an intent to steal-i.e., "permanently to deprive
the bank of its possession of the money"17S-simply takes the money
from the bank in the hope of being arrested and returned to prison for
alcoholism treatment. 1 9 Similarly, it is no defense if the robber
intends only to recover his or her own deposit, 80 or if the robber does
not intend to intimidate the bank teller.'8 1
Yet, when it comes to the aider and abettor, the purposeful intent
cases require proof of specific intent." Acting with
specific/purposeful intent to bring about the success of a bank robbery
177. Id. at 268 (emphasis omitted).
178. Id.; see United States v. Mosley, 126 F.3d 200, 204 (3d Cir. 1997); United
States v. DeLeo, 422 F.2d 487,490 (1st Cir. 1970).
179. See Carter, 530 U.S. at 268-69 (citing United States v. Lewis, 628 F.2d 1276,
1279 (10th Cir. 1980)).
180. See Mosley, 126 F.3d at 204; United States v. Brown, 547 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir.
1976); DeLeo, 422 F.2d at 490-91.
181. See United States v. Foppe, 993 F.2d 1444, 1451 (9th Cir. 1993); see also
United States v. Woodrup, 86 F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that "nothing in
the statute even remotely suggests that the defendant must have intended to
intimidate").
182. Second Circuit: United States v. Watts, 89 F.3d 826, No. 95-1052, 1995 WL
722825, at *1 (2d Cir. Nov. 14, 1995) (unpublished opinion).
Eighth Circuit United States v. Hill, 464 F.2d 1287, 1289 (8th Cir. 1972)
("'[s]pecific intent' or 'purposive attitude"'); United States v. Kelton, 446 F.2d 669,
671 (8th Cir. 1971) ("The crime of aiding and abetting is one requiring 'specific intent'
or as Judge L. Hand once described it 'purposive attitude."' (citing United States v.
Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938))); see also United States v. Holder, 566 F.2d
617, 618-19 (8th Cir. 1977) (holding that "purposeful attitude" is required of the aider
and abettor of a robbery of a Postal Inspector in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153 and
2112, based on the holdings in Peoni, Nye & Nissen, Kelton, and Hill); United States
v. Crow Dog, 532 F.2d 1182, 1195 (8th Cir. 1976) (same). But see United States v.
Roan Eagle, 867 F.2d 436, 445 & n.16 (8th Cir. 1989) (attempting to reinterpret
Kelton and Hill as if they did not require specific intent). The Roan Eagle court
stated:
Although the language in Kelton might appear to be contradictory [to the
conclusion that aiding and abetting does not require specific intent], the
court was referring to specific intent or purposive attitude. The language
indicates that there must be knowing participation in the activity, not that
one can only be guilty of aiding and abetting if one has the specific intent to
aid and abet.
Id.
Ninth Circuit: United States v. Dinkane, 17 F.3d 1192, 1196-98 (9th Cir. 1994).
Dinkane involved an aider and abettor to armed bank robbery in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d), which is an aggravated form of simple bank robbery. Id. at 1196.
It is clear, however, from the opinion that the aider and abettor to either variety must
act with specific intent. Id. at 1196-1200.
Tenth Circuit: United States v. Lambert, 995 F.2d 1006, 1008 & n.2 (10th Cir.
1993).
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means, for example, acting with an intent to steal,1' a mental state not
required of the principal. A getaway car driver lacking any intent to
steal, who simply seeks to get arrested and returned to prison for
alcoholism treatment, is not guilty, while the principal who enters the
bank with the very same lack of intent to steal is guilty. A mother
who sends her son into a bank for the same purpose is also not guilty
of bank robbery; her son, however, is guilty.
In requiring purposeful intent of the aider and abettor of a bank
robbery, these cases do not even mention, let alone reckon with, the
less culpable mental state applicable to the bank robbery principal.
To them, the general intent standard applicable to the principal is
simply not relevant; the only applicable standard is the usual standard
governing aiding and abetting liability: specific/purposeful intent.
The mental state of the aider and abettor is governed by a standard
that is unconnected to the standard governing the principal's mental
state. Furthermore, these cases do not examine Congress's intent to
eliminate all distinctions between the aider and abettor and the
principal, nor do they explain why they require this mental state for
the aider and abettor, when the word "willfully" is absent from the
aiding and abetting subsection and present only in the causing
subsection.
iii. Armed Bank Robbery
What is true for the aider and abettor of simple bank robbery is also
true for the aider and abettor of armed bank robbery. The purposeful
intent cases employ the very same purposeful intent approach for the
weapon element of the crime of armed bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. §
2113(d), that they do for the crime of bank robbery itself. While
subsection (a) of § 2113 makes it a federal offense to rob a bank,
subsection (d) makes it a crime for anyone, in committing a bank
robbery, to "put[] in jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a
dangerous weapon or device."' "s4 Thus § 2113(d) is comprised of two
elements: bank robbery plus the aggravating element of a weapon-'
183. See Carter, 530 U.S. at 268-70. see also United States v. Darby, 857 F.2d 623,
625-26 (9th Cir. 1988). Darby dealt with the mental state required for an attempted
bank robbery, holding that the crime of attempted bank robbery requires specific
intent, even while acknowledging that the completed crime of bank robbery requires
only general intent. Id.; see also United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 405 (1980)
(explaining that attempt crimes require a "heightened mental state [i.e., specific
intent] [to] separate[] criminality itself from otherwise innocuous behavior"). The
court in Darby concluded that specific intent includes the intent to steal: thus, while
the defendant who completes the robbery need not act with an intent to steal, the
defendant who attempts the robbery must. 857 F.2d at 626. That conclusion regarding
the specific intent of an attempt is presumably no less true for the specific intent of
aiding and abetting.
184. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (1994).
185. E.g., United States v. Coleman. 208 F.3d 786, 793 (9th Cir. 20W0) (quoting
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Like the bank robbery element, the weapon element of § 2113(d)
requires of the principal only general intent or knowledge, not specific
intent.'86
Admittedly, when applied to the weapon element in the case of the
principal, the distinction between knowledge and purposeful intent is
somewhat esoteric. It is difficult to conceive of a bank robber using a
gun, only knowing of the gun but not wanting to use it. Nonetheless,
the cases are clear: it is enough if the principal simply knows that he
or she is using a gun. 87 But, once again, under the purposeful intent
approach, the knowledge standard applicable to the principal does not
govern the aider and abettor.
The purposeful intent cases ignore the knowledge mental state
applicable to the principal, and look instead to the universal standard
governing all aiders and abettors, namely, purposeful intent. The
aider and abettor is guilty of armed bank robbery only if he or she
purposefully intends and desires that the principal use a weapon.Y a
Under this approach, a getaway car driver who purposefully abets a
bank robbery, knowing that his or her confederate is using a gun, but
not wanting the confederate to do so, is guilty only of bank robbery,
not armed bank robbery.189
iv. Use of Firearm During a Crime of Violence or Drugs
Another similar offense for which the purposeful intent approach
requires a more culpable mental state for the aider and abettor than
for the principal is 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).' 90 The relevant portion
of that section provides that whoever, "during and in relation to any
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime[,]... uses or carries a
firearm" is guilty of a criminal offense. 91 Section 924(c) provides for
Dinkane, 17 F.3d at 1196).
186. See, e.g., United States v. Fazzini, 871 F.2d 635, 641 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding
that "armed bank robbery is a general intent crime" (citations omitted)); United
States v. Brown, 547 F.2d 36,38-39 (3d Cir. 1976).
187. See, e.g., United States v. Reiswitz, 941 F.2d 488, 494-95 (7th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Sanborn, 563 F.2d 488, 490-91 (1st Cir. 1977); Brown, 547 F.2d at 39.
The distinction between knowledge and purposeful intent is not wholly without effect,
even for the principal. For example, as shown below, if the use of the gun requires
purposeful intent, then diminished capacity is a defense, but it is no defense if the use
of the gun requires only knowledge. See infra text accompanying notes 239-49.
188. See Coleman, 208 F.3d at 793; United States v. Oliver, 60 F.3d 547, 551 (9th
Cir. 1995), rev'd on other grounds, Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 251-52 (1999);
Dinkane, 17 F.3d at 1196-97.
189. Dinkane, 17 F.3d at 1197 & n.3 (noting that its approach differs from that of
the Second Circuit, which held in United States v. James, 998 F.2d 74, 80-82 (2d Cir.
1993), that aiding and abetting with knowledge of the gun is sufficient for armed bank
robbery liability).
190. See generally Robinson, supra note 16.
191. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (1999). The statute also makes it a crime to
"possess[] a firearm" "in furtherance of" crimes of violence or drugs. Id. The
possession prong was added to the statute by the Criminal Use of Guns Act, Pub..L.
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the imposition of a mandatory sentence, its length depending on the
criminal record of the defendant and the nature of the firearm,
consecutive to the sentence for the underlying offense of violence or
drugs. The section creates an offense distinct from the underlying
crime, and double jeopardy does not preclude conviction and
sentencing for both a violation of § 924(c) and the underlying
offense."9 As they do for any distinct offense, the provisions of the
aiding and abetting statute apply.193
What is the requisite mental state for a § 924(c) offense? For the
principal, § 924(c) does not require specific intent-," knowledge is
sufficient. 95 Of course, as is true of the gun element for the armed
bank robber under § 2113(d), any theoretical distinction between
knowledge and purposeful intent is usually irrelevant; it is hard to
No. 105-386, § 1(a)(1), 112 Stat. 3469 (1998). See, e.g., United States v. McKissick, 204
F.3d 1282, 1292 & n.2 (10th Cir. 2000). The amendment legislatively overruled the
Supreme Court's decision in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995). See United
States v. Speight, 95 F. Supp. 2d 595 (S.D. W. Va. 2000); United States v. Juan, 59 F.
Supp. 2d 210, 215 n.11 (D. Mass. 1999). The aiding and abetting cases that have
reached the courts of appeals generally involve the older use and carry provisions
rather than the newer possession provision. United States v. liland, 254 F,3d 1264,
1272 n.3 (10th Cir. 2001) (observing that "[i]t appears that only two published cases
have addressed 'possession' under the amended version of section 924(c)").
192. Congress amended § 924(c) in 1984 to ensure that the section's additional,
consecutive punishment would apply even when the underlying crime of violence
already provides for enhanced punishment for the use of a weapon. See United States
v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 10 (1997). Thus, a defendant who robs a bank with a gun may
be separately convicted and sentenced for armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. §
2113(d) and, in addition, for violating § 924(c), even though the former already has as
an element "the use of a dangerous weapon or device." See, e.g., United States v.
Harris, 832 F.2d 88, 90-91 (7th Cir. 1987).
193. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 76 F.3d 526, 528-29 (3d Cir. 1996) (collecting
cases from all the circuits).
194. United States v. Brown, 915 F.2d 219, 225 (6th Cir. 1990) ("[Slection
924(c)(1) is not a specific intent offense.... [W]e adhere to the general rule of
construction of criminal statutes that provides that where a statute does not specify a
heightened mental element such as specific intent, general intent is presumed to be
the required element."). The Supreme Court's decision in Bailey, 516 U.S. at 137.
which narrowed the understanding of "use" of a firearm under § 924(c), did not affect
Brown's holding that § 924(c) is a general intent crime. United States v. Peralta, 930
F. Supp. 1523, 1529-30 (S.D. Fla. 1996), aff'd No. 01 -11823, 2001 WL 1711251 (11th
Cir. Dec. 28, 2001). But see United States v. Sorrells, 145 F.3d 744, 753 (5th Cir. 1998)
(inexplicably holding that, after Bailey, the mental state for the principal, at least
under the "use" prong of § 924(c), is no longer knowledge, but rather "knowledge or
specific intent").
195. United States v. Salazar, 66 F.3d 723, 728 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Santeramo, 45 F.3d 622, 623-24 (2d Cir. 1995) (collecting cases); United States v.
Chairez, 33 F.3d 823, 825 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Williams, 985 F.2d 749, 755
(5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Powell, 929 F.2d 724, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1991): United
States v. Edun, 890 F.2d 983, 987-88 (7th Cir. 1989): United States v. Wilson, 884 F.2d
174, 178-79 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Nelson, 733 F.2d 364, 370-71 (5th Cir.
1984); United States v. Barber, 594 F.2d 1242, 1244 (9th Cir. 1979), abrogated on other
grounds, United States v. Foster, 133 F.3d 704 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), vacated on
other grounds, 525 U.S. 801 (1998); Robinson, supra note 16, at 785 n.10.
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imagine the § 924(c) principal who, while engaged in a crack sale,
carries a gun, knowing of its presence but not desiring it. Still, one can
conceive of an unusual case where that might be so. For example, a
principal who regularly carries a firearm lawfully "in accordance with
an alleged common practice and custom in the pertinent region," " '
who unexpectedly one day stumbles on an opportunity for a drug
transaction, would obviously be aware that he or she has a gun, but
might not be said to have desired or intended to carry it in relation to
the drug transaction. Nonetheless, if he or she simply knows that he
or she is carrying a gun, it is sufficient."9  Thus, this distinction
between purposeful intent and knowledge may bear on the liability of
the principal, albeit in very few cases.
For the aider and abettor, however, the distinction will significantly
affect liability with some frequency. One can readily imagine many
situations where the aider and abettor knows that the principal is
carrying a gun, but does not necessarily desire that the principal do so.
The purposeful intent cases focus on that distinction, and hold that
despite the adequacy of knowledge for the principal, the more
culpable, purposeful intent standard applies to the aider and abettor.
Moreover, those cases apply the more culpable mental state to both
components of § 924(c): the underlying crime of violence or drugs.
and the use and carrying of the firearm. Thus, an aider and abettor is
not guilty of a § 924(c) violation unless he or she facilitates not only
the underlying crime with purposeful intent, but also the use or
carrying of the firearm, again, with purposeful intent.'98  Not
196. Fair v. United States, 157 F.3d 427, 430-31 (6th Cir. 1998) (a rural area of
eastern Kentucky).
197. See id. at 431 ("[W]hether the perpetrator habitually totes a pistol is an
immaterial issue."). Apart from the requirement that the principal know that he or
she is carrying the gun, the carrying of the gun must also be "during and in relation
to" the drug offense. In the example, the principal clearly carried the gun "during"
the drug transaction. As for the "in relation to" element, while that can be satisfied
by showing that the principal had the "purpose" of using the gun with respect to the
drug trafficking crime, Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 238 (1993), that element
does not necessarily convert the offense into one of purposeful intent as opposed to
knowledge. The "in relation to" element can also be proven without demonstrating
purpose by demonstrating that the gun had some "effect" on, or the "potential of
facilitating," the drug offense. See id; see also Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S.
125, 137 (1998) (indicating that the "in relation to" element was added by Congress
"in part to prevent prosecution where guns played no part in the crime" (quotation
marks and citation omitted)).
Aside from the example in the text, the distinction between knowledge and
purposeful intent would also have a practical effect for the § 924(c) principal who
raises the defense of diminished capacity. That defense is only available if the §
924(c) principal must act with purposeful intent, but not if he or she need act only
with knowledge. See supra note 187; infra text accompanying notes 239-49.
198. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 226 F.3d 593, 596-97 (7th Cir. 2000); United
States v. Garth, 188 F.3d 99, 113-14 (3d Cir. 1999); Wright v. United States, 182 F.3d
458, 464-66 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Persico, 164 F.3d 796, 802 (2d Cir. 1999);
United States v. Nelson, 137 F.3d 1094, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v.
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surprisingly, these § 924(c) cases invoke the purposeful intent
standard because "liability for aiding and abetting... requires...
specific intent.., and mere knowledge... is not sufficient for
conviction." 19 Thus, an act of assistance by the aider and abettor
performed with mere knowledge that the principal is using or carrying
a firearm, even when accompanied by purposeful intent to abet the
underlying crime of violence or drugs, is insufficient. Of course, if the
prosecution shows that a defendant has acted with knowledge of the
use of the firearm, "a jury may more easily be able to infer that the
defendant specifically intended to aid the use of the firearm,""' but if
the jury concludes that the defendant only knew of, but did not
intend, the use of the firearm, there is no aiding and abetting liability.
To these aiding and abetting cases, the lesser mental state
applicable to the § 924(c) principal is simply not relevant. Indeed,
these cases fail even to mention, let alone reckon with, the
knowledge/general intent standard governing the § 924(c) principal.2'1
Nor is there any reason they should, since, in their view, the only
standard applicable to the aider and abettor is the usual standard of
specific/purposeful intent, a standard that is independent of the
standard required of the principal.0 '
b. The Purposeful Intent Approach As Applied to Strict Liability
Offenses and to Strict Liability Elements
Some federal crimes-strict liability offenses-require no culpable
mental state. For example, the Supreme Court has held that a
corporate officer may, under certain circumstances, be liable for the
Bancalari, 110 F.3d 1425, 1429 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Pipola, 83 F.3d 556,
562-63 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Giraldo, 80 F.3d 667, 676 (2d Cir. 1996),
abrogated on other grounds, Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 125; United States v. Bennett, 75
F.3d 40, 48 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Medina, 32 F.3d 40, 45-46 (2d Cir. 1994):
Robinson, supra note 16, at 786 n.14.
199. Garth, 188 F.3d at 113; accord Persico, 164 F.3d at 802-03; Bancalari. 110 F.3d
at 1430 ("Aiding and abetting is a specific intent crime." (citing United States v.
Andrews, 75 F.3d 552,555 (9th Cir. 1996))); Pipola, 83 F.3d at 562.
200. Nelson, 137 F.3d at 1104.
201. See, e.g., Persico, 164 F.3d at 802; Nelson, 137 F.3d at 1103-05: Banculari, 110
F.3d at 1429-30; Pipola, 83 F.3d 561-66; Giraldo, 80 F.3d 674-78; Medina, 32 F.3d at
45-47. These cases all discuss the mental state applicable to the aider and abettor, see,
e.g., Medina, 32 F.3d at 45 (citing Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619
(1949), and United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938)), without any
reference to the lesser, knowledge standard applicable to the principal. They also
make no reference to the "natural and probable consequences" doctrine. See infra
Part II.C.
202. Thus, one court of appeals found that it was not error for the district court to
give the jury a specific intent instruction on aiding and abetting, even though the
underlying offense was only a general intent offense. United States v. Hicks, 980 F.2d
963, 974 (5th Cir. 1992). The court also noted that, in any event, even if it was an
error, such an instruction was, from the defendant's perspective, "salutary error," as it
increased the burden on the government. Id.
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corporation's storage of contaminated foods, even if he or she is
unaware of the contamination.2 3 Similarly, a possessor of hand
grenades may be liable, even if he or she is unaware that they were
not properly registered.2c 4 Offenses such as these require no culpable
state of mind; there need be no proof that the defendant sought or
knew of the "statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent
conduct.""20
Certain other offenses, although not strict liability offenses, may
still contain strict liability elements. Because different elements of a
criminal offense may require different mental states,0 6 a criminal
statute may require a culpable mental state for certain elements of an
offense, but not for others. 21 A strict liability element is one that does
not require a culpable mental state, yet may be contained within an
offense that requires a culpable mental state for other elements,
namely, those key elements that "separat[e] legal innocence from
wrongful conduct. ' 21
For example, the National Stolen Property Act, which prohibits the
interstate transportation of stolen property2° and the possession of
stolen interstate property,210 requires as one element that the property
be stolen, and as another element that the property have crossed state
lines. But, while the Act requires that the defendant know that the
property was stolen, it does not require that the defendant know of
the interstate nature of the transportation. As Judge Learned Hand
203. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 673-74 (1975); see United States v.
Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943) (misbranded and adulterated drugs); infra
notes 346-63 and accompanying text.
204. United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 607 (1971); infra notes 217-21 and
accompanying text.
205. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64,72 (1994).
206. See, e.g., Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 609 (1994); Liparota v. United
States, 471 U.S. 419, 423 n.5 (1985); United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 405-06
(1980).
207. See, e.g., Freed, 401 U.S. at 612 (Brennan, J., concurring) (determining that
the National Firearms Act created an offense based on strict liability as to some, but
not all, of its elements); United States v. Corso, 20 F.3d 521, 526 (2d Cir. 1994).
208. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. at 73.
209. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1994).
210. Id. § 2315.
211. Id. § 2314 ("knowing the same to have been stolen, converted or taken by
fraud"); id. § 2315 ("knowing the same to have been stolen, unlawfully converted or
taken").
212. See, e.g., United States v. Lack, 129 F.3d 403, 410 (7th Cir. 1997) (§ 2314);
United States v. Rosa, 17 F.3d 1531, 1544 (2d Cir. 1994) (§ 2315); United States v.
Lothian, 976 F.2d 1257, 1266 (9th Cir. 1992) (§ 2314); United States v. Mastrandrea,
942 F.2d 1291, 1294 (8th Cir. 1991) (same); United States v. Scarborough, 813 F.2d
1244, 1245-46 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (same); United States v. Lennon, 751 F.2d 737,740 (5th
Cir. 1985) (same); United States v. Franklin, 586 F.2d 560, 565 (5th Cir. 1978) (same);
United States v. Kilcullen, 546 F.2d 435,445 n.15 (1st Cir. 1976) (same); United States
v. Ludwig, 523 F.2d 705, 706-07 (8th Cir. 1975) (same); United States v. White, 451
F.2d 559, 559-60 (6th Cir. 1971) (same); United States v. Strauss, 443 F.2d 986, 988
(1st Cir. 1971) (same); United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 891 (9th Cir. 1970)
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himself held in construing a very similar statute, "it was enough, if
they knew that the bales had been stolen, for it was not necessary that
they should also know them to have been stolen from foreign
commerce."213 Thus, two elements-stolen property and interstate
transportation-differ in the requisite mental state; the "stolen"
element requires knowledge, while the "interstate" element requires
no mental state at all. The "interstate" element is thus a strict liability
element contained in an offense requiring a culpable mental state for
a different element.
In the National Stolen Property Act, the strict liability element is
the element conferring federal jurisdiction-converting a state offense
into a federal offense. This sort of jurisdictional element is typically a
strict liability element. The jurisdictional element is usually one of
strict liability, precisely because it is not what makes the conduct
criminal, but rather what makes it criminal under federal, rather than
only state, law.Z14 If a culpable mental state is required for the
jurisdictional element, then someone who otherwise is guilty in every
respect will have a defense if he or she does not know of the
jurisdictional element, leaving the federal interest insufficiently
protected.215 As the Supreme Court said: "The concept of criminal
intent does not extend so far as to require that the actor understand
not only the nature of his act but also its consequence for the choice of
a judicial forum. 216
(same); United States v. Kierschke, 315 F.2d 315, 317 (6th Cir. 1963) (same); United
States v. Tannuzzo, 174 F.2d 177, 180 (2d Cir. 1949) (same): Gonzalez, supra note 95,
at 639.
213. United States v. Sherman, 171 F.2d 619, 623 (2d Cir. 1948) (L Hand, J.).
Soon after Judge Hand decided Sherman, the Second Circuit relied on it to reach the
identical conclusion under the National Stolen Property Act. See Tannuzzo, 174 F.2d
at 180 ("[K]nowledge that the goods... [moved interstate] %vas... not [necessary] for
the substantive offense. To convict of that offense, it was only necessary to show that
the defendant knew that the goods were stolen and that they were in fact transported
in interstate or foreign commerce.") (citing Sherman).
214. See United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 676 n.9 (1975) (describing the
jurisdictional requirement as one which "confer[s] jurisdiction on the federal courts
for what otherwise are state crimes"). In Feola, the jurisdictional element, unknown
to the defendants, was the federal identity of the undercover law enforcement agents
whom they assaulted. Id. at 676.
The jurisdictional element, while perhaps the most common, is not the only
strict liability element. Aggravating elements, which take what is already criminal
conduct and subject it to enhanced penalties, can also be strict liability elements. See,
e.g., United States v. Frazier, 213 F.3d 409,418-19 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that a drug
dealer need not know that his or her employee is a minor to be subject to the
enhanced penalties of 21 U.S.C. § 861(a)(1)) (collecting cases); United States v.
Dimas, 3 F.3d 1015, 1022 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that a drug dealer need not know
that his or her distribution of drugs took place within 1.000 feet of a school to be
subject to the enhanced penalties of 21 U.S.C. § 860(a)) (collecting cases).
215. Feola, 420 U.S. at 684.
216. Id. at 685.
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What of the aider and abettor? What mental state must he or she
have to be guilty of aiding and abetting a strict liability offense, or an
offense containing a strict liability element? As discussed below, the
purposeful intent approach requires that the aider and abettor act
with purposeful intent for strict liability offenses, but not for strict
liability elements.
i. Strict Liability Offenses
Perhaps the most striking application of the purposeful intent
approach is in strict liability cases, where it creates an especially wide
divergence between the mental state of the principal and the mental
state of the aider and abettor. For example, one section of the
National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), makes it a crime to
possess a firearm that has not been registered with the Secretary of
the Treasury. In United States v. Freed,217 where the defendant was
charged with possession of unregistered hand grenades, the Supreme
Court held that "[t]he Act requires no specific intent or knowledge
that the hand grenades were unregistered. 2 18 Although the lack of
registration is the determinative fact that made the otherwise legal
possession illegal, the defendant's lack of knowledge of that fact is no
defense. The statute is an exception in the "expanding regulatory
area involving activities affecting public health, safety and welfare" '
to the usual requirement of criminal responsibility that there be
"'vicious will' or mens rea."2 0 The possessor of the hand grenades is
guilty even if "consciousness of wrong-doing be totally wanting. ' 22,
Assume that Freed was abetted in his possession of the hand
grenades by an aider and abettor. Need the aider and abettor, who is
liable under the purposeful intent approach only if he or she acts with
the purpose to bring about the crime, be aware of the lack of
registration? Does specific/purposeful intent for the aider and abettor
imply a culpable mental state even for a strict liability offense?
Yes, says the purposeful intent approach, at least in its most
extreme form. In United States v. Lawson,222 the defendant was
charged with aiding and abetting the receipt and possession of illegal
217. 401 U.S. 601 (1971).
218. Id. at 607. The offense does have some mental state component in that the
defendant must know that he or she is in possession of a hand grenade. But, once the
defendant is in knowing possession, he or she need not know of the lack of
registration. See id.; see also Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 609 (1994); United
States v. Int'l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 560 (1971) ("Here as in...
Freed... strict or absolute liability is not imposed; knowledge of the shipment of the
dangerous materials is required." (citation omitted)).
219. Freed, 401 U.S. at 607 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251
(1952)).
220. Id. (emphasis omitted).
221. Id. at 609 (quoting United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284 (1943)).
222. 872 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1989).
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machine guns in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(c). The court
acknowledged that, for the principal, the offense charged was "a strict
liability offense," and therefore, "he need only possess the firearm" to
be liable.22 With respect to the aider and abettor, however, the court
cited Peoni and concluded that he had to have an "intent to aid" the
commission of the offense. 4 The court upheld the aider and abettor's
conviction only after finding that he "acted with the requisite intent,"
"knew that his possession of the unregistered guns would be illegal,"
and had participated in the offense with "a desire to bring about the
illegal possession of machine guns.- '
This disparity between the mental state of the principal and the
mental state of the aider and abettor is of enormous consequence. It
means that, under the purposeful intent approach, there are no strict
liability offenses for aiders and abettors; they must always act with
purposeful intent. 6
ii. Strict Liability Elements
Presumably, the purposeful intent approach should require for strict
liability elements the same mental state it requires for strict liability
offenses. The aider and abettor should be liable only upon acting with
purposeful intent even for the strict liability element. In other words,
a defendant charged with aiding and abetting the interstate
transportation of stolen goods should be guilty only if he or she not
only knew of, but also desired, the interstate transportation. An aider
and abettor who wanted the stolen goods transported from New York
to New Jersey in order to have them fenced there would be guilty. If,
however, he or she knew of, but was indifferent to, the fact that they
would be fenced in New Jersey, he or she would escape liability.
223. Id. at 181 (citing United States v. Decker, 292 F.2d 89,90 (6th Cir. 1961)).
224. Id. (citing United States v. Stanley, 765 F.2d 1224. 1242 (5th Cir. 1985)).
225. Id.; see also United States v. Baumgarten. 517 F.2d 1020, 1027 (8th Cir. 1975)
(holding defendant who aided and abetted violations of 26 U.S.C. § 5861 liable only if
he had a "purposeful attitude," without referring to the strict liability nature of the
offense for the principal).
226. In this sense, aiding and abetting is similar to the crime of attempt in that both
are specific intent offenses, see United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 405 (1980)
(noting that attempt crimes require a "heightened mental state" (i.e., specific intent)
"[to] separate[] criminality.., from otherwise innocuous behavior"), no matter what
mental state the underlying offense requires:
[T]here is no such thing as strict liability attempt. That is, even if the
completed crime may be committed without intent, knowledge. recklessness
or even negligence, the same is not true of an attempt to commit that crime.
An attempt to commit a strict liability offense is thus possible only if it is
shown that the defendant acted with an intent to bring about the proscribed
result.
United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry. 192 F.3d 926. 932 (9th Cir. 1999) (Silverman, J..
concurring) (quoting 2 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott. Jr.. Substantive
Criminal Law § 6.2 (1986)), vacated on other grounds. 231 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000)
(en banc).
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This view has been expressed by a number of cases dealing with the
causer under 18 U.S.C. § 2(b); those cases have held that the causer
must want to cause not only the proscribed act, but also the federal
jurisdictional element.227 It seems that this was, at least at one point,
Judge Learned Hand's view-that the aider and abettor must
purposefully desire even the strict liability element (at least in the
usual case of a federal jurisdictional element), 228 But, this has not
been the generally accepted view for the aider and abettor. Aiding
and abetting cases after Peoni seem almost uniform in concluding that
there is no culpable mental state whatsoever for jurisdictional
elements (as long as no culpable mental state is required of the
principal). 229  Thus, the aider and abettor of the interstate
transportation of stolen goods need not be aware of the interstate
nature of the transaction." The same holds true for the aider and
abettor of other offenses containing the jurisdictional strict liability
element, such as the interstate transportation of stolen cars;23' the use
of interstate facilities to promote unlawful activity; 32 robbery
interfering with interstate commerce;233 and the use of interstate
facilities in a murder for hire.234
227. See infra text accompanying notes 469-82, 513-22.
228. See United States v. Paglia, 190 F.2d 445, 448 (2d Cir. 1951) (L. Hand, J.),
overruled by United States v. Taylor, 217 F.2d 397, 399 (2d Cir. 1954) (L. Hand, J.);
infra text accompanying notes 469-82.
229. For one possible exception, see Metcalf v. United States, 195 F.2d 213,217 (6th
Cir. 1952) (explaining that aiders and abettors, "being in possession of stolen property
and intending that it be transported to another State," who then sell the property to
someone "who they knew would promptly transport it to another State" are liable for
violating the statutory prohibition on interstate transportation of stolen cars
(emphasis added)) (citing Nye & Nissen). However, even if Metcalf meant to impose
purposeful intent on the aider and abettor for the jurisdictional element, the Sixth
Circuit has since abandoned that position. See United States v. Hayes, 739 F.2d 236,
237-39 (6th Cir. 1984) (18 U.S.C. § 2312).
A few unusual cases seem to hold with respect to jurisdictional elements that
although the aider and abettor need not act with purposeful intent, he or she must at
least know of the element. See, e.g., United States v. Wisniewski, 478 F.2d 274,280 n.6
(2d Cir. 1973) (citing Peoni and Nye & Nissen, and then quoting with approval the
district court's aiding and abetting instruction, which stated, in part, that "[olne must
have knowledge of the essential elements of the offense, that is... that it was wilfully
transported... from one state to another"); Backun v. United States, 112 F.2d 635,
636-37 (4th Cir. 1940).
230. United States v. Franklin, 586 F.2d 560, 565 & n.9 (5th Cir. 1978) (18 U.S.C. §
2314); United States v. Cowden, 545 F.2d 257, 263 (1st Cir. 1976) (same); United
States v. Strauss, 443 F.2d 986, 988 (1st Cir. 1971) (same); United States v. Kierschke,
315 F.2d 315, 317 (6th Cir. 1963) (same); see United States v. Lothian, 976 F.2d 1257,
1266 (9th Cir. 1992) (same).
231. Hayes, 739 F.2d at 237-39 (§ 2312).
232. United States v. Vaccaro, 816 F.2d 443, 453-54 (9th Cir. 1987) (18 U.S.C. §
1952)), abrogated on other grounds, Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988);
United States v. Sigalow, 812 F.2d 783, 785-86 (2d Cir. 1987) (same).
233. United States v. Nelson, 137 F.3d 1094, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 1998).
234. United States v. Razo-Leora, 961 F.2d 1140, 1143,1148 (5th Cir. 1992).
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Most of these cases do not explain why the aider and abettor
requires no culpable mental state for strict liability elements. One
possibility may be that at least some of these cases implicitly adopt the
derivative approach, and require no culpable mental state of the aider
and abettor because none is required of the principal. Another
possibility is that they employ the purposeful intent approach, but
make an exception for the jurisdictional element: the objective of the
purposeful intent approach is, perhaps, to protect the marginal aider
and abettor by compelling the government to prove a highly culpable
mental state, but such protection need not be extended to cover the
jurisdictional element, which functions only to determine whether a
crime is a federal or state offense rather than whether it is a crime at
all.
In any event, what is clear is that at least some of the cases requiring
no mental state for the jurisdictional element are purposeful intent
cases. For example, in a robbery and firearms case, the Ninth Circuit
clearly adopted the purposeful intent approach, - - but held that the
aider and abettor need have no knowledge whatsoever of the
interstate element conferring federal jurisdiction for the Hobbs Actz3
robbery count. 7 Thus, even under the purposeful intent approach, if
the principal need not know of the federal jurisdictional element, then
the same holds true for the aider and abettor - This is so despite the
holding of the purposeful intent cases that strict liability offenses-as
opposed to elements-can be aided and abetted only with purposeful
intent.
In sum, under the purposeful intent approach, there is an
unexplained exception for jurisdictional elements. Unlike other
elements, and unlike strict liability offenses, the strict liability
jurisdictional element requires of the aider and abettor no culpable
mental state at all.
235. Nelson, 137 F.3d at 1103 (holding that, for the aider and abettor of a § 924(c)
offense, "mere foreknowledge that a gun would be used remains insufficient. The
prosecution must still prove a specific intent to aid the firearms crime." (emphasis
omitted)).
236. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994).
237. Nelson, 137 F.3d at 1102-03.
238. In this respect, the aider and abettor is just like the co-conspirator. The
Supreme Court has held that just as the federal nature of the agent need not be
known to the defendant charged with the substantive offense of assaulting a federal
agent, it need not be known to the defendant charged with conspiring to do so. United
States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 694-96 (1975); see United States v. Rosa, 17 F.3d 1531,
1544-46 (2d Cir. 1994) (explaining that a conspiracy to violate IS U.S.C. § 2315, which
prohibits possession of stolen property that has moved interstate, does not usually
require that the conspirators know of the interstate jurisdictional element).
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c. The Purposeful Intent Approach As Applied to the Diminished
Capacity Defense
The dichotomy between the mental state required of the principal
and that required of the aider and abettor can also affect the
availability of certain defenses. A defense of diminished capacity-
voluntary intoxication, for example-is a defense only in cases of
specific intent crimes. 9 Thus, in a homicide case, a district court
should instruct the jury that evidence of intoxication is relevant to the
charge of first degree murder, a specific intent offense, but not to
second degree murder, involuntary manslaughter, 240 or assault,24'
which are not specific intent offenses.
But, what if the defendant is charged not with directly committing,
but rather with aiding and abetting, a general intent offense, such as
second degree murder2 42 or assault?243  According to the purposeful
intent cases, "aiding and abetting contains an additional element of
specific intent, beyond the mental state required by the principal
crime" of second degree murderz44 or assault.z45 Because aiding and
abetting always requires the additional mental element of specific
intent, regardless of the mental state required for the underlying
crime, voluntary intoxication is a defense for the aider and abettor,
even when it is not a defense for the principal. 246 Failure to give a
voluntary intoxication instruction to a jury in such an aiding and
abetting case is plain error.2 47 Hence, in a joint trial of a principal and
239. See, e.g., United States v. Sewell, 252 F.3d 647, 650-51 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
122 S. Ct. 382 (2001); United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1196 (9th
Cir. 2000) (en banc); United States v. Jackson, 213 F.3d 1269, 1291-92 (10th Cir.),
vacated on other grounds, 531 U.S. 1033 (2000); United States v. Burdeau, 168 F.3d
352, 356 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Phelps, 168 F.3d 1048, 1056 (8th Cir. 1999);
United States v. Gonyea, 140 F.3d 649, 650-51 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Oliver,
60 F.3d 547, 551 (9th Cir. 1995), overruled on other grounds, Jones v. United States,
526 U.S. 227 (1999); United States v. Fazzini, 871 F.2d 635, 641 (7th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Lewis, 780 F.2d 1140, 1143 (4th Cir. 1986); see also Montana v. Egelhoff, 518
U.S. 37, 49 (1996) (indicating that a majority of states now allow evidence of
voluntary intoxication as defense, but only to specific intent crimes); Hopt v. People,
104 U.S. 631, 633-34 (1881).
240. United States v. Sayetsitty, 107 F.3d 1405, 1411 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing United
States v. Lopez, 575 F.2d 681, 684 (9th Cir. 1978)).
241. United States v. Nacotee, 159 F.3d 1073, 1075 (7th Cir. 1998).
242. See Sayetsitty. 107 F.3d at 1412.
243. See Nacotee, 159 F.3d at 1075-76.
244. Sayetsitty, 107 F.3d at 1412. The court noted, id. at 1412 n.2, that its approach
differed from that of the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Roan Eagle, 867 F.2d 436,
445 (8th Cir. 1989). See infra notes 379-82 and accompanying text.
245. Nacotee, 159 F.3d at 1075-76.
246. United States v. Jackson, 213 F.3d 1269, 1292 (10th Cir.) ("[Tihe crime of
aiding and abetting is a specific intent crime .... Therefore, voluntary intoxication is
a potential defense for an aiding and abetting charge."), vacated on other grounds, 531
U.S. 1033 (2000).
247. Sayetsitty, 107 F.3d at 1412; see Nacotee, 159 F.3d at 1076-77 (holding that it
was reversible error for the district court to refuse to give a requested jury instruction
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an aider and abettor to second degree murder, both of whom get
drunk together before committing the crime, the drunkenness of the
principal would be irrelevant (and evidence of his or her intoxication
might even be excluded altogether), whereas the intoxication of the
aider and abettor would be an admissible, relevant factor to be
considered in determining whether he or she acted with the requisite
specific intent.248
Under this application of the purposeful intent approach, which
permits the aider and abettor to raise the defense of diminished
capacity even when the principal cannot, the aider and abettor is
viewed as governed by a specific intent mental state that applies
invariably, even if the underlying crime is one of general intent. The
mental state of the aider and abettor is wholly unconnected to that of
the principal. Although the principal's liability may be predicated on a
mental state less than specific intent, the aider and abettor is never
liable unless acting with specific intent. Consequently, even when the
underlying offense is a general intent offense, the aider and abettor
may always invoke the defense of diminished capacity. 2
3. The Bad Purpose Approach
Under the second approach to Peoni, the mental state required of
the aider and abettor is even more culpable than purposeful intent.
Not only must the aider and abettor purposefully intend and desire
that the principal commit the acts that constitute a violation of the
law, the alder and abettor must also act with a bad purpose-i.e., he or
she must understand that the principal's conduct violates the law, and
desire that the conduct violate the law. The aider and abettor must
act "voluntarily and intentionally and with the specific intent to do
something which the law forbids or with the specific intent to fail to do
something which the law requires to be done, that is to say, with bad
that voluntary intoxication is a defense to aiding and abetting, unless the defense
failed to produce sufficient evidence at trial to support this theory of defense).
248. See Sayetsitty, 107 F.3d at 1412. When confronted with the need to prove
specific intent for the aiding and abetting of what otherwise is an offense of general
intent, prosecutors simply drop the aiding and abetting theory altogether if the facts
allow it. They proceed solely on the theory that the defendant is a principal, thereby
foreclosing a defense of voluntary intoxication, which may be raised only with respect
to specific intent crimes. See United States v. Hatatley, 130 F.3d 1399, 1404-05 (10th
Cir. 1997).
249. This peculiar result-that voluntary intoxication is a defense for the aider
and abettor but not the principal-echoes the law applicable to attempts. Attempt
crimes require specific intent even when the underlying crime does not, with the
result that voluntary intoxication is a defense for the former, but not the latter. See,
e.g., United States v. Sneezer, 900 F.2d 177, 180 n.4 (9th Cir. 1990) (-The distinction
between specific and general intent has been attacked on the ground, among others,
that it leads to incongruous results like an intoxication defense for attempted rape but
not completed rape.").
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purpose either to disobey or disregard the law."" 0  This approach
recognizes ignorance of the law as an excuse exculpating the aider and
abettor.
As the quote clearly indicates, this bad purpose approach is also a
"specific intent" approach, but it relies on another of the phrase's
many meanings.251 Apart from its use to describe purposeful intent,
the phrase is sometimes used outside of the aiding and abetting
context to describe a purpose to violate the lawY For example, for
criminal tax offenses, the Supreme Court has interpreted the relevant
mental state as a "specific intent to violate the law," "  or "bad
purpose." 4  The bad purpose approach applies the phrase in that
sense to the aider and abettor.
That the aider and abettor must act with "bad purpose either to
disobey or disregard the law"2" appears often in aiding and abetting
cases.2" Some cases temper this rather rigorous requirement and
250. United States v. Brown, 151 F.3d 476, 486 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting United
States v. Horton, 847 F.2d 313,322 (6th Cir. 1988)).
251. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403 (1980) (citing Wayne R. LaFave
& Austin W. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law § 28, at 201-02 (1972)); see also
LaFave & Scott, supra note 2, § 3.5(e), at 223-25; infra text accompanying notes 641-
44.
252. E.g., United States v. Gibbs, 182 F.3d 408, 433 (6th Cir. 1999); United States
v. Gonyea, 140 F.3d 649, 653 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Rawlings, 982 F.2d 590,
592 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia
3.01 (3d ed. 1978)); United States v. Barclay, 560 F.2d 812, 814 n.2 (7th Cir. 1977)
(quoting Walter J. La Buy, Manual on Uniform Jury Instructions in Federal Criminal
Cases, § 4.04 (1963), reprinted in 33 F.R.D. 525, 550-51)); see United States v. Francis,
164 F.3d 120, 121 (2d Cir. 1999) ("In the case of general-intent crimes ... [t]he
government would not need to prove that the defendant intended to violate the
law. ); United States v. Enochs, 857 F.2d 491, 493 (8th Cir. 1988) (reasoning that
if Congress had intended that statute, which prohibits removal of vehicle
identification numbers from automobiles, to "require specific intent, it certainly could
have added an appropriate phrase, such as 'for an unlawful purpose').
253. Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 194 n.18 (1998) (quoting Cheek v.
United States, 498 U.S. 192, 200 (1991)).
254. Cheek, 498 U.S. at 200 (quoting United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394
(1933), which was overruled on other grounds sub. nom. Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964)).
255. Brown, 151 F.3d at 486 (quoting Horton, 847 F.2d at 322).
256. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 213 F.3d 1269, 1291-92 & n.1l (10th Cir.),
vacated on other grounds, 531 U.S. 1033 (2000); United States v. Zichettello, 208 F.3d
72, 109 n.15 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting district court's jury instructions), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 1143 (2001); Brown, 151 F.3d at 486; United States v. Kline, 922 F.2d 610,
612 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting district court's jury instructions); United States v. Iredia,
866 F.2d 114, 118 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Gaskins, 849 F.2d 454, 457 (9th Cir.
1988); Horton, 847 F.2d at 322; United States v. McKnight, 799 F.2d 443,446 (8th Cir.
1986); United States v. Garza, 754 F.2d 1202, 1210 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Wright, 742 F.2d 1215, 1221-22 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting with approval district court's
jury instructions), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57
(1984); United States v. Gomez, 733 F.2d 69, 73 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Marvin, 687 F.2d 1221, 1228 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995,
997 (4th Cir. 1982) (quoting with apparent approval the district court's jury
instructions): United States v. Waller, 607 F.2d 49, 51-52 (3d Cir. 1979); Pattern Jury
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speak in terms of knowledge rather than purpose. Reflecting the
longstanding vacillation in the aiding and abetting case law between
purpose and knowledge, these cases require not that the aider and
abettor act with the purpose to disobey the law, but rather with the
knowledge that the principal's conduct violates the law. The aider and
abettor must be "cognizant of the principal's criminal intent and the
lawlessness of his activity."
Whether it is knowledge of the lawlessness, or purposeful intent to
behave lawlessly, this mental state is far more culpable and difficult to
establish than the mental state of purposeful intent. One can readily
imagine a situation where an individual acts with purposeful intent
and desires a result, but does not want the result to be criminal, and is
not even aware that the result is criminal. For example, a depositor
about to deposit $11,000 in cash, who learns that the bank is required
to report to the government any cash transactions in excess of
$10,000, 251 might divide the cash into two separate deposits to avoid
the reporting requirement. In so doing, the depositor acts, in the
language of the structuring statute, with the "purpose of evading the
reporting requirements," 9 and therefore, with the specific intent to
achieve the criminal result. The depositor might not be aware that
that result is criminal; he or she might well believe that the splitting of
the deposit is an entirely permissible way of circumventing an
intrusive reporting requirement. ' Nonetheless, because structuring
requires only purposeful intent-an intent to evade the reporting
requirement-the depositor is guilty, even if he or she lacks an
awareness of the unlawfulness of his or her conduct. -bI Thus,
requiring a bad purpose imposes a more culpable mental state than
that imposed by the purposeful intent approach.
Instructions of the District Judges Association of the Fifth Circuit, Criminal Cases,
instruction no. 2.06 (1997) ("with the intent to violate the law") (quoted in O'Malley
et al., supra note 39, § 18.01); Sand et al., supra note 39, instruction no. 11-2.
257. United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849,873 (4th Cir. 1996); accord United States
v. Winstead, 708 F.2d 925, 927 (4th Cir. 1983) (concluding that the aider and abettor
must be aware of the principals' criminal intent "and the unlawful nature of their
acts").
258. See 31 U.S.C. § 5313 (1994); 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(a) (2000).
259. 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (2001); see 31 U.S.C. § 5322 (1994) (setting forth the
penalties for committing the crime of structuring in violation of § 5324).
260. Rather than being motivated by a desire to "keep the Government in the
dark," a depositor might be "fearful that the bank's reports would increase the
likelihood of burglary, or... endeavor to keep a former spouse unaware of his
wealth." Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135. 145 (1994).
261. Prior to Congress's amendment of § 5322 in 1994. such activity was not
criminal unless conducted with knowledge of its unlawfulness. This was the holding
of Ratzlaf, where the Supreme Court interpreted the word "willfully" in the
structuring statute to require proof that the defendant was aware that his or her
structuring violated, and not just circumvented, the law. 510 U.S. at 144-49. In
response to Ratzlaf, however, Congress deleted the word "willfully" from § 5322 so
that now ignorance is no longer an excuse, and structuring is a crime even when the
defendant mistakenly believes otherwise. See supra note 150.
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The bad purpose approach to aiding and abetting requires that the
aider and abettor act with an "unlawful" state of mind even for
crimes, such as structuring, which do not require that mental state of
the principal. Other examples: although the drug dealer is guilty even
if he or she acts without a bad purpose to disobey the law,262 the aider
and abettor is not, unless he or she is "cognizant of the...
lawlessness" of the drug activity;263 a defendant who knowingly files
false statements with the federal government in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001, without any awareness of the unlawfulness of the act, is still
guilty,2" while the aider and abettor is not.265
Thus, the bad purpose approach, like the purposeful intent
approach, employs a mental state for the aider and abettor that is
independent of, and unrelated to, the mental state required of the
principal by the underlying criminal statute. Bad purpose is always
the required mental state, regardless of whether bad purpose,
purposeful intent, knowledge, or some other mental state applies to
the principal. The aider and abettor must always act with this bad
purpose form of specific intent.
4. The Knowledge Approach
Both the purposeful intent approach and the bad purpose approach
read Peoni as rejecting knowledge. A surprising number of cases,
however, retain knowledge as the aider and abettor's mental state
despite Peoni. Some of the knowledge cases simply ignore Peoni,
while others limit it.
This knowledge approach, although obviously at odds with the
purposeful intent and bad purpose approaches, does share one
attribute with them: the aider and abettor possesses his or her own
distinctive mental state, applicable regardless of the mental state
required of the principal. Still, unlike the other approaches, this
approach allows for some flexibility, as reflected by the assorted
variations to the approach. Some of the knowledge cases seem to
apply the knowledge standard to virtually all aiders and abettors,
some to most aiders and abettors, and others to just a few.
262. See, e.g., United States v. Rawlings, 982 F.2d 590, 592-93 (D.C. Cir. 1993);
United States v. Gutberlet, 939 F.2d 643, 647 (8th Cir. 1991); see also United States v.
Balint. 258 U.S. 250, 254 (1922).
263. United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 873 (4th Cir. 1996).
264. United States v. Lorenzo, 995 F.2d 1448, 1455 (9th Cir. 1993).
265. United States v. Brown, 151 F.3d 476, 486 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Winstead, 708 F.2d 925, 927 (4th Cir. 1983); see United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560,
568-70 (3d Cir. 1994) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 2(b), and holding that because of the
word "willfully" in that subsection, a causer of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 must be
aware of the unlawfulness of his or her activity even though the principal need know
no more than that the statement was false); see also infra text accompanying notes
525-43.
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a. Knowledge Is Usually Sufficient; Purposefid Intent Is Required Only
When the Connection Between the Aider and Abettor and the Principal
Is Tenuous or Routine
This variation on the knowledge theme, voiced by the Second
Circuit almost twenty-five years after it had decided Peoni, was the
first real curtailment of the purposeful intent approach. In fact, in
large measure, it did away with the approach by limiting it to a small
class of cases where there is a special need to restrict liability by
imposing a highly culpable mental state: where the connection
between the aider and abettor and the principal is especially tenuous
(as it was in Peoni), or where the connection between them is utterly
routine, as in the otherwise routine, lawful sale by a merchant of
merchandise to a customer who then uses the merchandise to commit
a crime.
In Peoni, the defendant was charged with aiding and abetting the
possession of counterfeit bills not by the purchaser, but by the
purchaser's purchaser. In allowing for the imposition of aiding and
abetting liability only with the higher mental state of purposeful
intent, Judge Learned Hand sought to protect the seller from
perpetual liability in every conceivable jurisdiction as the counterfeit
bills moved foreseeably from guilty hand to guilty hand.2" But, in
imposing the purposeful intent standard, he specifically allowed for
the possibility that knowledge would have been sufficient had the
defendant been charged with aiding and abetting the possession of the
immediate purchaser rather than that of the remote purchaser. "7 As
late as 1962, the Second Circuit in United States v. Campisi"  noted
that:
[Peoni] relied on the fact that the principal, i.e. the individual whose
possession defendant was charged with abetting, was not a vendee of
the defendant. The court expressly left open the question whether
the same result would obtain if the immediate vendee was charged
with possession.269
The Second Circuit in Campisi answered the question left open in
Peoni, essentially holding that knowledge is sufficient for the
immediate vendee. In Campisi, the defendants sold stolen bonds to
purchasers who, in turn, forged the names of the registered owners
and then uttered them. The defendants were charged with aiding and
266. See United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401,402 (2d Cir. 1938): see also supra text
accompanying notes 132-33.
267. Peoni, 100 F.2d at 403 ("Perhaps [in acting with simple knowledge or
foreseeabiity] he was Regno's [i.e., the immediate purchaser's] accessory.").
268. 306 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1962).
269. Id. at 311. Although it did not use "natural and probable consequences"
terminology, Campisi realized that Peoni was not really an aiding and abetting case at
all, but rather a "natural and probable consequences" case. See infra text
accompanying notes 430-31.
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abetting the immediate purchasers' forging and uttering. In making
the sales, the defendants acted with knowledge of what the purchasers
would do, but did not act with purposeful intent; they sold the stolen
bonds at an established price that was not affected by what the
purchasers did with the bonds, and thus, they were indifferent to what
happened after the sale.27 Nonetheless, the Second Circuit upheld
their convictions for aiding and abetting the immediate vendees,
limiting Peoni's purposeful intent standard to remote vendee cases
where it is unfair to impose liability unless the aider and abettor really
desires that distant, attenuated criminal conduct.
Because an aider and abettor typically works directly with the
principal, Campisi essentially relegates Peoni's purposeful intent
standard to a very narrow class of cases, leaving the knowledge
standard intact as the primary mental state applicable to the aider and
abettor. The only immediate vendee situation in which Peoni's
purposeful intent standard would still apply, according to Campisi, is
that involving the utterly routine sale of lawful goods. A merchant
who makes a routine sale of lawful goods should not become an aider
and abettor of the customer's subsequent crime absent a purposeful
desire on the merchant's part to aid and abet that crime. Judge Hand,
the court in Campisi opined:
evidently thought it undesirable to charge a merchant with the
unlawful use a customer may make of his product, although he may
know of the unlawful use, when he is selling the goods he normally
sells at the price he normally charges and he is not involved in the
subsequent wrongdoing.
2 71
But, that safe harbor for routine sales is a very limited one;272
knowledge is normally sufficient in an immediate vendee case. "[A]ny
270. Campisi, 306 F.2d at 310.
271. Id. Campisi was referring to Judge Hand's view in Falcone, which was
subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court. United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579
(2d Cir.), affd, 311 U.S. 205 (1940). See also Flowers v. Tandy Corp., 773 F.2d 585,
590 (4th Cir. 1985), in which the court reasoned:
[W]hether a seller of goods that are not themselves illegal to one who
intends to use them illegally shares the buyer's illegal intent [thereby
becoming an aider and abettor] has long been a close question in the law....
Resolution of the question has turned to a great degree on the
innocuousness of the sale and the extent to which the buyer has revealed the
particular use to which he plans to put the goods.
Id. (citing Backun v. United States, 112 F.2d 635 (4th Cir. 1940), an early proponent
of the knowledge approach rejected by Peoni).
Although Falcone was a conspiracy case, Judge Hand, as noted above, viewed
the "knowledge versus purposeful intent" issue as being the same in the contexts of
both conspiracy liability and aiding and abetting liability. See supra note 134.
272. "Falcone has been limited 'to its strict facts-the case of a supplier of goods,
innocent in themselves, who does nothing but sell those goods to a purchaser who, to
the supplier's knowledge, intends to and does use them in the furtherance of an illegal
conspiracy.'" Campisi, 306 F.2d at 310 (quoting United States v. Tramaglino, 197 F.2d
928, 930 (2d Cir. 1952)).
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deviation[,] ... even a lawful departure from the normal course of
business or cooperation in concealing delivery, is sufficient to connect
the vendor with the criminality of the vendee."2'  In Campisi, because
the sale of the stolen bonds was obviously not a routine sale of lawful
goods, knowledge was sufficient.
Campisi's view of Peoni is that rather than establishing a purposeful
intent standard in all instances of aiding and abetting liability, Peoni
generally retains knowledge as the appropriate standard. It imposes
the higher purposeful intent standard only in cases where the
connection of the aider and abettor to the principal is too remote for
liability on a lesser standard. Where the connection is direct, as in the
immediate vendee cases, knowledge is generally sufficient, except in
the cases falling within the safe harbor for routine, commonplace, and
otherwise lawful sales.
Interestingly, Campisi approved of the knowledge standard even
though the crime in Campisi itself was one of specific intent. The
forging and uttering of the bonds was charged as a violation of 18
U.S.C. § 495,74 which requires a showing of specific intent to
defraud. 75 Yet, Campisi upheld the conviction of the aiders and
abettors-the sellers who sold the bonds to the principals-on the less
culpable knowledge standard. The case applied the knowledge
approach without regard to the mental state required of the principal,
273. Campisi, 306 F.2d at 311 (citing United States v. Pampiano, 271 F.2d 273 (2d
Cir. 1959)). The court in Canipisi, 306 F.2d at 311, openly borrowed the concept from
conspiracy case law, citing the Supreme Court's conspiracy decisions in Falcone and
Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703 (1943). In Direct Sales, the defendant
sold unusually large amounts of morphine to a physician, knowing that the physician
distributed the morphine illegally. The Supreme Court upheld the seller's conviction
for conspiring with the physician. Interestingly, while Campisi seems to read Direct
Sales as establishing a knowledge standard, at least when non-routine sales of
dangerous items such as morphine are involved, the Supreme Court in Direct Sales
was explicit in its holding that intent was required. The seller is guilty of conspiracy if
by his sale "he intends to further, promote and cooperate in it. This intent ... is the
gist of conspiracy. While it is not identical with mere knowledge that another
purposes unlawful action, it is not unrelated to such knowledge. Without the
knowledge, the intent cannot exist." Direct Sales, 319 U.S. at 711. The Supreme
Court viewed the non-routine sale of morphine as a basis for inferring that the seller
acted with intent, not as a basis for justifying a lower standard of knowledge.
274. 18 U.S.C. § 495 (1994) provides:
Whoever falsely... forges... other writing... for the purpose of
obtaining or receiving, or of enabling any other person, either directly or
indirectly, to obtain or receive from the United States ... any sum of money;
or
Whoever utters or publishes as true any such ... forged... writing, with
intent to defraud the United States, knowing the same to be... forged[,
commits a federal offense].
275. E.g., United States v. Hall, 845 F.2d 1281, 1284-85 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing
United States v. Smith, 631 F.2d 391, 396 (5th Cir. 1980))- United States v. Thompson,
576 F.2d 784, 786 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Robinson, 545 F.2d 301, 305 (2d
Cir. 1976); United States v. Sullivan, 406 F.2d 180, 186 (2d Cir. 1969).
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and illustrates how the aider and abettor may be liable based on a
mental state of lesser culpability than that required of the principal.
Campisi's interpretation of Judge Hand-that knowledge is enough,
except in a case of a remote aider and abettor, or in a case of a
routine, lawful sale-has not gained widespread acceptance. Only the
Fifth Circuit, in one very brief, never-cited decision, seems to have
adopted it. 76 Other than that, Campisi has hardly ever been cited. A
Seventh Circuit opinion rejected Campisi's approach without even
citing Campisi.77
Campisi's lack of popularity is understandable for a number of
reasons. First, Judge Hand himself seems to have rejected Campisi's
limiting of Peoni. In the many post-Peoni cases in which Judge Hand
confronted the issue of an aider and abettor's mental state, he applied
Peoni uniformly to require purposeful intent, and rejected mere
knowledge as insufficient.2 78 He did so even in cases of immediate
transactions other than routine, lawful sales; in such cases, knowledge
should have sufficed under Campisi's reading of Peoni.2 19  Second,
although in some earlier cases the Supreme Court seemed inclined to
the knowledge approach, s0 in Nye & Nissen it adopted Judge Hand's
formulation without limitation. Had it adopted Campisi, the Supreme
Court would have been compelled to reach a different result in Nye &
Nissen itself, since that involved a simple case of a defendant aiding
and abetting the making of a false statement, where knowledge would
have sufficed under Campisi. Third, although Campisi limited Peoni's
holding of purposeful intent to two classes of cases, Judge Hand in
Peoni relied, in part, on the very language of the aiding and abetting
statute: "All the words used [in the aiding and abetting statute]-
even the most colorless, 'abet'-carry an implication of purposive
attitude."'" If purposeful intent is inherent in the language of the
276. See United States v. Blanke, 572 F.2d 543 (5th Cir. 1978).
277. See United States v. Blankenship, 970 F.2d 283, 287 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating
that the result under Peoni is the same whether or not the sale is routine and lawful;
the seller becomes an aider and abettor only when the seller seeks to make the
venture succeed).
278. See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
279. For example, in United States v. Di Re, 159 F.2d 818, 818-19 (2d Cir. 1947), at
issue was the liability of a third passenger in the car for the sale of counterfeit gasoline
ration coupons. Under Campisi's limiting view of Peoni, the answer should have
depended on whether the third passenger performed an act with the knowledge that it
would assist the other two parties. A higher mental state, purposeful intent, should
not have been applied, since the transaction was an immediate one-the potential
aider and abettor was in the car with the principals. Moreover, transactions involving
counterfeit coupons obviously cannot qualify for the safe harbor protecting lawful,
routine sales. Yet, in Di Re, Judge Hand still applied the purposeful intent standard,
citing Peoni. Di Re, 159 F.2d at 819 n.3.
280. See Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160 (1947); Hanauer v. Doane, 79 U.S.
(12 Wall.) 342 (1870); see also supra text accompanying notes 111-17, 139-42.
281. United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401,402 (2d Cir. 1938).
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statute, then it must apply to all aiders and abettors, not just a limited
few.
Even the Second Circuit itself has not continued to make the
distinction it made in Campisi. Despite the many instances after
Campisi was decided in 1962 in which the Second Circuit has cited
Peoni,2- z the Second Circuit has never since made Campisi's
distinction between the immediate and remote aider and abettor, or
between routine, lawful transactions and other transactions. Rather,
less than a month after Campisi, the Second Circuit issued an en banc
decision in another case,2 adopting, without citing Campisi, an
entirely different approach-a derivative approach-to the aider and
abettor's mental state.' More recently, it has applied the purposeful
intent approach in situations where the Campisi limitation would have
required no more than knowledge?"
Thus, although Campisi, in adopting the knowledge approach,
provides a plausible limitation of Peoni, and has the additional virtue
(alone among the non-purposeful intent cases) of explaining how a
non-purposeful intent approach can be reconciled with Peoni, it has
had virtually no impact.
b. The Vacillating Seventh Circuit: Knowledge Is Sufficient;
Knowledge Is Not Sufficient; Knowledge Is Sometimes Sufficient If the
Underlying Offense Is Particularly Grave
The Second Circuit is by no means the only circuit to have flip-
flopped. The Seventh Circuit has also vacillated between knowledge
282. A Westlaw search encompassing the period from the date Campisi was
decided, July 23, 1962, through the end of 2001 reveals that the Second Circuit has
cited Peoni fifty-seven times. A further search limiting the initial query to those cases
that not only cite Peoni, but also use the word "abet" or some extension thereof,
yields forty-six responses.
283. United States v. Jones, 308 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1962) (en banc).
284. See infra text accompanying notes 320-22.
285. For example, in Pipola v. United States, 83 F.3d 556 (2d Cir. 1996), the
defendant, as leader of a group that executed various robberies, delegated to a co-
conspirator the task of providing guns for the robberies. The defendant, who did not
actually go out on the robberies himself, was convicted of aiding and abetting the co-
conspirators' use of firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1994). The court
agreed with the defendant's contention on appeal that the government must prove
that the aider and abettor acted "with the specific intent of advancing the commission
of the [§ 924(c)] crime." Pipola, 83 F.3d at 562. Acting with mere knowledge that a
gun would be used was not sufficient. Id.
If Campisi's interpretation of Peoni is still valid, knowledge should have been
sufficient, since the defendant was an immediate, not remote, aider and abettor,
whose act of assistance was the antithesis of routine and lawful. Pipola's failure to
apply the knowledge standard strongly suggests that the Second Circuit has
abandoned the Campisi interpretation of Peoni. Indeed, many of the § 924 cases in
which the Second Circuit insisted on purposeful intent rather than knowledge are
similarly inconsistent with Campisi. See supra note 198 (listing purposeful intent §
924(c) cases, including cases from the Second Circuit).
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and purposeful intent over the past fifteen years, reaching conclusions
that are confusing and utterly irreconcilable-almost inevitable when
trying to promote a "knowledge" standard while, at the same time,
acknowledging Peoni as controlling precedent. Judge Posner, in
particular, has made numerous efforts to reinvigorate the old
knowledge standard while ostensibly adhering to Peoni.
In United States v. Fountain, 6 a murder case, the aider and abettor
supplied a home-made knife to a fellow inmate who used it to kill a
guard. The aider and abettor was convicted of aiding and abetting the
murder. On appeal, the issue was whether the aider and abettor who
supplied the weapon had to want the murder to take place, or just
know that it would take place.181
One would have thought that Peoni had long ago resolved that
question in favor of "want" rather than "know." Judge Posner,
however, thought differently. Although he began by confirming that
Peoni had rejected the knowledge approach, he made it clear that the
knowledge approach, under certain circumstances, still applies:
Under the older cases, illustrated by Backun v. United States, 112
F.2d 635, 636-37 (4th Cir. 1940) ... it was enough that the aider and
abettor knew the principal's purpose.... [However] after the
Supreme Court in Nye & Nissen ... adopted Judge Learned Hand's
test-that the aider and abettor "in some sort associate himself with
the venture, that he participate in it as in something that he wishes
to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it succeed," United
States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938)-it came to be
generally accepted that the aider and abettor must share the
principal's purpose in order to be guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2,
the federal aider and abettor statute. 2M
Certain offenses, however, require a special rule:
But... there is support for relaxing this requirement when the crime
is particularly grave. The holding of Backun itself may have been
superseded, but a dictum in Backun-"One who sells a gun to
another knowing that he is buying it to commit a murder, would
hardly escape conviction as an accessory to the murder by showing
that he received full price for the gun," 112 F.2d at 637-makes so
compelling an appeal to sense that [the defendant's] opening brief in
this court, after quoting the dictum, states, "Defendant... has no
quarrel with this rule of law."289
Judge Posner then proceeded to defend this distinction between
lesser crimes, for which Peoni's heightened purposeful intent is
286. 768 F.2d 790 (7th Cir.), modified, 777 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1985) (per curiam).
287. Id. at 793. Although the case does not say so explicitly, it seems that the
district court instructed the jury that knowledge alone is sufficient.
288. Id. at 797-98.
289. Id. at 798.
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required, and "particularly grave" crimes, for which knowledge is
sufficient:
Compare the following hypothetical cases. In the first, a shopkeeper
sells dresses to a woman who he knows to be a prostitute. The
shopkeeper would not be guilty of aiding and abetting prostitution
unless the prosecution could establish the elements of Judge Hand's
test. Little would be gained by imposing criminal liability in such a
case. Prostitution, anyway a minor crime, would be but trivially
deterred, since the prostitute could easily get her clothes from a
shopkeeper ignorant of her occupation. In the second case, a man
buys a gun from a gun dealer after telling the dealer that he wants it
in order to kill his mother-in-law, and he does kill her. The dealer
would be guilty of aiding and abetting the murder. This liability
would help to deter-and perhaps not trivially given public
regulation of the sale of guns-a most serious crime. We hohl that
aiding and abetting murder is established by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that tile supplier of the murder weapon knew the
purpose for which it would be used. 20
Unfortunately, Judge Posner provided no guidance as to which
crimes constitute the "particularly grave" crimes for which the usual
strict requirement of purposeful intent should be relaxed. But, his
holding is clear: for "particularly grave" crimes, knowledge suffices. -"
Curiously, for a number of years following Fountain, Judge Posner
and the Seventh Circuit proceeded as if its holding did not exist. For
example, two years after the decision, Judge Posner, citing Peoni,
stated that "[a]iding and abetting in the criminal law requires not only
knowledge of the principal's objective but a desire to help him attain
it,"219 making no distinction between "particularly grave" crimes and
crimes that are not so grave. Aiders and abettors for all crimes must
"desire" to attain the criminal object.
A few years later, Judge Posner repeated the point -- "want" rather
than "know"-in discussing aiding and abetting liability under the
Continuing Criminal Enterprise ("CCE") statute, also known as the
"Drug Kingpin" statute. The statute applies to a supervisor of five or
more persons, who derives substantial income from a continuing
series of narcotics violations. 93 This statute presented the perfect
opportunity to apply Fountain's special rule requiring only knowledge
for "particularly grave" crimes; after all, what is a CCE violation if not
290. Id. (emphasis added).
291. Professor Blakey and Roddy observed that Fountain signified a sharp break
with previous Seventh Circuit precedent and with the Supreme Court's decision in
Nye & Nissen. Blakey & Roddy, supra note 6, at 1394 n.177. But, Fountain's
conclusion that, at least for serious offenses, knowledge suffices was essentially the
same as the Supreme Court's conclusion over a century earlier in Hanauer v. Doane,
79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 342,346-47 (1870). See supra text accompanying notes 111-17.
292. Bosco v. Serhant, 836 F.2d 271,279 (7th Cir. 1987).
293. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1994).
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a "particularly grave" crime? And, if it is a grave crime, knowledge
should be enough.
But, Judge Posner and the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, made it
clear that knowledge is not enough; purposeful intent, even for a CCE
violation, is required. After first quoting Peoni, Judge Posner
emphasized that the aider and abettor is guilty only if he or she
"wants" the enterprise to succeed 29 4:
One who sells a small-or for that matter a large-quantity of drugs
to a kingpin is not by virtue of the sale alone an aider and abettor. It
depends on what he knows and what he wants: Does he want the
kingpin's enterprise to succeed or is the kingpin just another
customer?295
If the seller simply knows but does not want, he or she is guilty only
of selling the drugs to the kingpin, but not of aiding and abetting the
CCE violation. Judge Posner did not even entertain the possibility
that, for this "particularly grave" crime, perhaps knowledge should be
enough.296 He cited Fountain in passing, but made no mention of its
distinction between grave and not-so-grave offenses.29
Subsequent Seventh Circuit cases, generally authored by Judge
Posner, seemed for a while to continue this implicit rejection of
Fountain usually in favor of the purposeful intent approach.298 In
1995, however, Judge Posner returned to the knowledge standard
(but, oddly, without even citing Fountain). In United States v.
294. United States v. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d 1230, 1235 (7th Cir. 1989) (en bane).
295. Id. (emphasis added).
296. Based on Pino-Perez's seeming rejection of Fountain, Professor Blakey and
Roddy concluded that "[alnomalously, Fountain is without effect in Seventh Circuit
jurisprudence." Blakey & Roddy, supra note 6, at 1394. Their conclusion is
surprising; the research for their comments was current through July 15, 1996, id. at
1345 n.aal, so they should have included Judge Posner's subsequent decision in
United States v. Ortega, 44 F.3d 505 (7th Cir. 1995). Although Judge Posner in Ortega
did not cite Fountain, he did once again adopt the knowledge approach. See infra text
accompanying notes 299-303.
297. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d at 1235.
298. See United States v. Zafiro, 945 F.2d 881, 887-88 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.)
(indicating that the defendant must "desire[] the illegal activity to succeed," but
suggesting that in the future it might be better to "jettison talk of desire" and focus
instead on the dangerousness of the defendant's act), aff'd on other grounds, 506 U.S.
534 (1993); United States v. Giovannetti, 919 F.2d 1223, 1229 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner,
J.). In Giovannetti, as part of his reaffirmation of the purposeful intent approach,
Judge Posner went so far as to refashion the well-known "ostrich," or as it is
sometimes called, the "conscious avoidance," jury instruction. Whereas traditionally
the instruction allowed a jury to equate conscious avoidance only with knowledge,
see, e.g., United States v. Gabriel, 125 F.3d 89, 98 (2d Cir. 1997) ("[T]he conscious-
avoidance concept is pertinent.., to the knowledge component of intent, but... a
finding of conscious avoidance could not alone provide the basis for finding purpose
or for finding intent as a whole." (quoting United States v. Beech-Nut Nutrition
Corp., 871 F.2d 1181, 1195-96 (2d Cir. 1989))), Judge Posner, in an effort to retain the
instruction even for the aider and abettor, decided that conscious avoidance could
serve as the equivalent to purposeful intent as well. See Giovannetti, 919 F.2d at 1229.
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Ortega,299 a drug case, Judge Posner found the evidence insufficient to
support the conclusion that the alleged aider and abettor rendered
assistance wanting the drug sale to take place. Reasoning, however,
that wanting was not necessary and that knowledge was enough,
Judge Posner affirmed the conviction:
One who, knowing the criminal nature of another's act, deliberately
renders what he knows to be active aid in the carrying out of the act
is, we think, an aider and abettor even if there is no evidence that he
wants the act to succeed .... Peoni's formula for aiding and
abetting, if read literally, implies that the defendant must to be
convicted have some actual desire for his principal to succeed. But
in the actual administration of the law it has always been enough
that the defendant, knowing what the principal was trying to do,
rendered assistance that he believed would (whether or not he cared
that it would) make the principal's success more likely .... No
more is required to make the defendant guilty of joining the
principal's venture and adopting its aims for his own within the
meaning of Peoni and the cases that follow it?.3o
Ortega is a puzzling re-endorsement of the knowledge approach.
Why didn't Judge Posner discuss Fountain's distinction between
"particularly grave" and not-so-grave offenses? Implicitly (unless he
had abandoned that distinction), Judge Posner was holding that the
one-time sale of drugs in Ortega was a "particularly grave" offense
justifying the application of the knowledge standard, and thereby
lightening the burden on the prosecution. But, this is difficult to
reconcile with his earlier application of the tougher standard of
purposeful intent when the offense was a CCE violation, which
involves a supervisor of five or more persons, who derives substantial
income from a continuing series of narcotics violations. A CCE
violation is obviously more "grave" than a one-time drug sale.
As inexplicable as Ortega's silence is on this issue, the case is a
strong pronouncement in favor of knowledge. And, it is a
pronouncement without any reservation limiting knowledge to
"particularly grave" crimes. On the aider and abettor's mental state,
Judge Posner's view had apparently evolved from knowledge
sometimes to knowledge all the time.
Still, Ortega did not resolve the issue for the Seventh Circuit. Some
subsequent Seventh Circuit cases ignored both Ortega and Fountain,
and casually mentioned, as if alluding to a well-established,
incontrovertible principle of law, that aiding and abetting requires not
only "knowledge" of the crime, but also "intent to further" the
crime.3 1 Other cases cited Ortega, but came to conflicting conclusions
299. 44 F.3d 505 (7th Cir. 1995).
300. Id. at 508.
301. See Damato v. Hermanson, 153 F.3d 464, 473 (7th Cir. 1998) ("intent to
further"): United States v. Woods, 148 F.3d 843, 847 (7th Cir. 1998) ("Of course.
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as to what it signifies: one case read it straightforwardly to require
only knowledge,0 but other cases read it tortuously to require
purposeful intent. 3
One of the subsequent cases that did cite Ortega tried to refashion it
as part of a larger effort to clarify the issue of the aider and abettor's
mental state, but without much success. In United States v. Irwin, 4
the Seventh Circuit attempted to achieve an impossible result: re-
establish purposeful intent as the applicable mental state while
treating all of its prior precedent as consistent with that conclusion. In
Irwin, the government, not surprisingly, argued that knowledge
suffices as the required mental state of the aider and abettor, and that
purposeful intent should not be required.0 5 There certainly was much
in the Seventh Circuit case law to support that position. Nonetheless,
the court, in an opinion authored by Judge Manion, rejected that
position and decided that knowledge alone was not sufficient. That
position also had strong support in the case law. In effect, either
result was justifiable in light of the years of inconsistent case law in the
Seventh Circuit on the issue.
But, in rejecting the knowledge standard, Judge Manion in Irwin
failed to acknowledge the inconsistency running through its cases,
neglected Fountain altogether (failing even to cite it), ignored the
distinction between "particularly grave" offenses and other lesser
offenses, and twisted Ortega to bring it into line with the purposeful
intent approach.
In fact, Judge Manion made quite an astonishing statement in his
rejection of the knowledge approach: "None of our prior cases has
suggested this is the appropriate test."3 6 His assertion that none of
the prior Seventh Circuit cases had adopted the knowledge standard
required a serious reworking of a number of the Seventh Circuit's
prior opinions, especially those of Judge Posner. Purposeful intent,
according to Judge Manion, had been the mental state required of
aiders and abettors all along. The cases that had spoken of the
sufficiency of knowledge, such as Ortega, did not mean to reject
purposeful intent; rather, all they meant to say was that purposeful
knowledge alone is not sufficient to convict Woods of aiding and abetting; the
government must also show intent to further the crime .... "); United States v. Petty,
132 F.3d 373, 377 (7th Cir. 1997) ("intent to further"); United States v. Draves, 103
F.3d 1328, 1332 (7th Cir. 1997) ("intended to help it succeed"); United States v.
Griffin, 84 F.3d 912, 928 (7th Cir. 1996) ("intended to further its success"); United
States v. Garcia, 45 F.3d 196, 199 (7th Cir. 1995) ("a desire to help the activity
succeed").
302. United States v. Pearson, 113 F.3d 758,762 (7th Cir. 1997).
303. United States v. Guerrero-Martinez, 240 F.3d 637, 641 (7th Cir. 2001)
(indicating that the aider and abettor must "want[] the principal to succeed"); United
States v. Irwin, 149 F.3d 565, 572-73 (7th Cir. 1998).
304. 149 F.3d 565 (7th Cir. 1998).
305. Id. at 573.
306. Id.
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intent need not be proven separately. Judge Manion explained:
usually, "when a defendant knowingly renders aid to a criminal
endeavor and the natural consequence of such aid is to further the
crime and help it succeed, the jury is entitled to infer that the
defendant intended by his assistance to further the crime." '  Thus,
proof of the defendant's knowledge permits the jury, under most
circumstances, to infer that the defendant acted not only with
knowledge, but also with purposeful intent. Additional proof of
purposeful intent, above and beyond the inference to be drawn from
the defendant's having acted with knowledge, is necessary only in
those cases where the "assistance was quite minor" so that intent must
be separately proven (e.g., by proof of "a pecuniary interest, a
personal motive, or certainly overheard or recorded comments
indicating a desire for the crime to succeed").- But, in either case-
whether proof of knowledge permitted the inference of intent, or
whether proof of knowledge still had to be supplemented with
additional proof of purposeful intent-purposeful intent had always
been, according to Judge Manion, the mental state required of the
aider and abettor.
It is almost impossible to reconcile Judge Manion's opinion in Irwin
with a careful reading of the extensive Seventh Circuit case law that
preceded it. While many of the earlier cases came out strongly in
favor of purposeful intent, many came out just as strongly in favor of
knowledge. Irwin ignores Fountain, and its distinction between
"particularly grave" offenses that require only knowledge, and
offenses less than "particularly grave" that require purposeful intent.
In short, it is not at all clear that the Seventh Circuit has abandoned
the knowledge standard that Judge Posner championed in Fountain
and Ortega.'
c. Knowledge Is Sufficient When the Aider and Abettor's Assistance Is
Substantial; If the Assistance Is Less Than Substantial, Purposefid
Intent Is Required
Under this approach, in some instances the aider and abettor is
liable if acting with knowledge, while in other instances, he or she
must act with purposeful intent. Contrary, however, to the approach
that Judge Posner took in Fountain, the applicable mental state does
not hinge on whether the offense is "particularly grave," and contrary
to the approach of the Second Circuit in Campisi, the applicable
307. Id. at 572.
308. Id.
309. The Seventh Circuit has since cited Irwin once on this issue with approval. See
United States v. Jaderany, 221 F.3d 989, 992 n.1 (7th Cir. 2000) (indicating that the
aider and abettor is liable if he or she "desired to help" the principal (citing Invin, 149
F.3d at 569-70)), cerL denied, 531 U.S. 1151 (2001).
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mental state does not hinge on whether the act is routine and lawful,
or on whether the aider and abettor had direct contact with the
principal. Rather, the focus is on the extent of the assistance rendered
by the aider and abettor. If the aider and abettor's assistance is
substantial, then the aider and abettor is liable on a showing of mere
knowledge. If the assistance is less than substantial, however, then the
aider and abettor cannot be convicted absent proof of purposeful
intent.
This approach was proposed at one time by the drafters of the
Model Penal Code in a tentative draft, which was quoted with
approval in 1961 by the Supreme Court in Scales v. United States.""
While purposeful intent (acting "with the purpose of promoting or
facilitating the commission of the crime") is certainly sufficient for the
imposition of aiding and abetting liability,3" mere knowledge is also
sufficient if accompanied by a substantial enough act: "A person is an
accomplice of another person in commission of a crime if... acting
with knowledge that such other person was committing or had the
purpose of committing the crime, he knowingly, substantially
facilitated its commission." '312
Scales made no mention of Nye & Nissen's adoption of Peoni's very
different purposeful intent standard. In any event, one year after
Scales, the drafters of the Model Penal Code, in the final version,
abandoned the knowledge standard in favor of the purposeful intent
standard,313 and the Supreme Court has apparently not mentioned the
knowledge approach ever since.
That does not mean that the "knowledge plus substantial
assistance" approach has been entirely jettisoned. In a number of
cases, the Seventh Circuit has come close to endorsing-without
adopting-this substantial act approach. The Seventh Circuit first
hinted at this approach in 1972,'31 and thereafter one district court
310. 367 U.S. 203,225 n.17 (1961).
311. Id. (quoting the Model Penal Code § 2.04(3)(a) (Tentative Draft No. 1,
1953)).
312. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting the Model Penal Code § 2.04(3)(b) (Tentative
Draft No. 1, 1953)); see United States v. Palladino, 203 F. Supp. 35, 40 (D. Mass.
1962).
313. Model Penal Code § 2.06 cmt. at 314-19 & n.47 (1962); see Blakey & Roddy,
supra note 6, at 1388-89 & n.160.
314. See United States v. Greer, 467 F.2d 1064, 1069 (7th Cir. 1972). The focus in
Greer was not so much on the aider and abettor's liability for the initial crime, but
rather on his liability for the principal's subsequent crime, which was a natural and
probable consequence of the first. See infra notes 405-07 and accompanying text
(discussing Greer and the "natural and probable consequences" rule).
Interestingly, in determining whether the aider and abettor's involvement in
the subsequent crime was substantial, the court looked to the old common-law
distinctions between the various participants in a crime, and asked whether the
defendant was physically present during the crime (and therefore, a principal in the
second degree) or not (and therefore, an accessory before the fact). Greer, 467 F.2d at
1069 & n.5. Although it recognized that Congress had abolished these distinctions,
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case in the Seventh Circuit seemed to adopt it.3" 5 Almost twenty years
later, Judge Posner,316 even while advocating his other variations to
the mental state of the aider and abettor, spoke up in favor of it.
Relying on Peoni, he began with the premise (a premise that, as we
have seen, he has not consistently embraced) that the aider and
abettor must act with "a desire to help the activity succeed," and that
"knowledge... [is] not... enough."3"7  But, he then pondered
whether this purposeful intent approach should be abandoned:
To be proved guilty of aiding and abetting, still another element
must be established: that the defendant desired the illegal activity to
succeed. The purpose of this requirement is a little mysterious but
we think it is to identify, and confine punishment to, those forms of
assistance the prevention of which makes it more difficult to carry
on the illegal activity assisted. A clerk in a clothing store who sells a
dress to a prostitute knowing that she will be using it in plying her
trade is not guilty of aiding and abetting.... The sale makes no
difference to her illegal activity.... The boost to prostitution
brought about by selling a prostitute a dress is too trivial to support
an inference that the clerk actually wants to help the prostitute
succeed in her illegal activity. If on the other hand he knowingly
provides essential assistance, we can infer that he does want her to
succeed, for that is the natural consequence of his deliberate act. It
might be better in evaluating charges of aiding and abetting to jettison
talk of desire and focus on the real concern, which is the relative
dangerousness of different types of assistance, but that is an issue for
another day.3
Thus, the knowing provision of substantial or essential assistance is
not yet, standing alone, sufficient. Right now, the substantiality of the
assistance is merely a means of determining desire: one may infer the
existence of desire or purposeful intent when the aider and abettor
knowingly renders assistance that is substantial. In that sense, the
current version of this approach is similar to the approach Judge
Manion took in Irwin, where he attempted to reconcile the knowledge
cases with the purposeful intent cases, and concluded that knowledge
coupled with substantial assistance was a fair basis from which to infer
desire or purposeful intent. Judge Posner, however, has hinted at
"another day" when substantial assistance with knowledge will be
enough, whether or not it gives rise to an inference of desire.
the court stated that "It]he common law characterizations are useful. however, in
determining when a defendant's participation is sufficient to make him an
accomplice." Id at 1069 n.5.
315. See United States v. Miller, 552 F. Supp. 827, 832-33 (N.D. 111. 982), ajf'd sub
nom. United States v. Matook, 729 F.2d 1464 (7th Cir. 1984) (unpublished opinion).
316. See United States v. Zafiro, 945 F.2d 881 (7th Cir. 1991), afrd on other
grounds, 506 U.S. 534 (1993).
317. Id. at 887.
318. Id. at 887-88 (second emphasis added).
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5. The Derivative Approach
Under this approach, the mental state for the aider and abettor is
the same as that for the principal. The mental state for the aider and
abettor is not a constant, but varies with the crime. It may be
purposeful intent, if, under the particular crime charged, the principal
is not guilty unless acting with purposeful intent. It may be
knowledge, bad purpose, or strict liability; for each offense, the aider
and abettor's mental state is derived from that required of the
principal. Put simply, under the derivative approach to aiding and
abetting liability, "aiders and abettors must possess the same criminal
intent as the principals." 319
This derivative approach to the mental state of the aider and
abettor was best explained by the Second Circuit in 1962, sitting en
banc, in United States v. Jones.320 The court recognized that requiring
319. United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 881 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("Even though
he was actually convicted only of aiding and abetting others in their violation of
section 1505, aiders and abettors must possess the same criminal intent as the
principals."), withdrawn in part and modified on other grounds, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (per curiam); id. at 890 n.21 ("Defendants convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2 of
aiding and abetting must have the same intent as defendants convicted under a
principal statute."); accord, e.g., United States v. Ismoila, 100 F.3d 380, 387, 389-90
(5th Cir. 1996) (indicating that the aider and abettor must have "the same criminal
intent as the principal," and then affirming the aider and abettor's convictions
because she had acted with the mental states prescribed by the underlying offenses);
United States v. Beck, 615 F.2d 441, 448-51 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding that "the state of
mind required for the statutory offense must be shown for conviction as an aider and
abettor," and thus, because the principal under the Arms Export Control Act, 22
U.S.C. § 2778, need not know that an export license is required for liability, the same
is true for the aider and abettor; awareness of a legal duty not to export is sufficient)
(citing Peoni); United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455, 481-82 & n.34 (5th Cir. 1978)
(citing Nye & Nissen and Peoni, and then stating that "purposive participation" is
shown when the aider and abettor "possess[es] the same criminal intent as the actual
perpetrator[]"); United States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510, 524-25 (E.D.
Cal.) (finding seller of pesticide liable as aider and abettor for selling pesticide with
knowledge that the buyer would use it unlawfully, and noting that when the mental
state set forth in the statute is "knowingly," the aider and abettor need not act
willfully, but simply with "the same extent of knowledge.., as is required for a
principal"), affd on other grounds, 578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam);
seeUnited States v. Barnett, 197 F.3d 138, 146 (5th Cir. 1999) ("[To convict a
defendant of conspiracy ... the Government must prove at least the degree of
criminal intent necessary for the substantive offense itself. Likewise," to convict a
defendant of aiding and abetting, "the government must prove that the defendant
shared in the criminal intent of the principal." (quotation marks and footnotes
omitted)); United States v. Grey Bear, 828 F.2d 1286, 1292 (8th Cir. 1987) (citing
Peoni and Nye & Nissen, and then stating that "by far the most important element is
the sharing of the criminal intent of the principal" (quotation omitted)), dismissed in
part on other grounds, 863 F.2d 572 (8th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); United States v.
Campa, 679 F.2d 1006, 1010 (1st Cir. 1982) ("The vital element to be proven is that
the aider and abettor shared in the principal's essential criminal intent."). Additional
cases adopting the derivative approach are discussed at length throughout this section
of the Article.
320. 308 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1962) (en banc).
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the same mental state for both the principal and the aider and abettor
stems from the enactment of the aiding and abetting statute, whose
"effect is to erase whatever distinctions may have previously existed
between different classes of principals and between principals and
aiders or abettors. 32'
Jones extended Congress's elimination of distinctions between the
aider and abettor and the principal to the issue of the mental state:
since an aider and abettor is treated as a principal, then the aider and
abettor's mental state must also be the same as the principal's mental
state. The court stated:
[I]f a certain knowledge or intent is required to be proven in order
to convict one of violating a federal criminal statute, the proof to
convict one as an aider and abettor will not be different from that
necessary to convict the violator, except that aiding, abetting,
commanding, inducing, or procuring the commission of the crime
must be proven rather than actual commission."
Before turning to a more detailed examination of this derivative
approach, a note of caution is in order. The phrase "specific intent"
once again returns to confuse the cases. We have seen how "specific
intent" serves as a descriptive label for the purposeful intent
approach,31 and for the very different bad purpose approach."- From
the bad purpose and purposeful intent cases, it has crept into the
derivative cases as well, in part because of the ease with which the
aiding and abetting cases cite one another, having little or no sense
that very different approaches are being employed. Thus, many cases,
in culling and combining pronouncements from the various aiding and
321. Id. at 31.
322. Id. at 31-32. Jones failed to cite a number of earlier Second Circuit cases that
suggested other approaches. For example, it did not cite Peoni, although the Second
Circuit had cited Peoni in an earlier case when struggling with the same issue that it
ultimately resolved in Jones. See United States v. Santore, 290 F.2d 51, 76, 77-78 n.7
(2d Cir. 1960); see also id. at 80 n.1 (Waterman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Jones also did not cite United States v% Campisi, 306 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1962),
which the Second Circuit had decided less than a month before deciding Jones, and
which had suggested a variation of the knowledge approach. See supra text
accompanying notes 266-77. Nonetheless, Jones still should have been, by virtue of its
en banc status, the Second Circuit's determinative pronouncement on the subject of
the aider and abettor's mental state. Jones, however, has not been cited since by the
Second Circuit in support of the derivative approach, and has also been ignored by
subsequent Second Circuit cases suggesting other approaches. See, e.g., United States
v. Scotti, 47 F.3d 1237 (2d Cir. 1995) (employing the purposeful intent approach, and
containing no cite to Jones). Indeed, the Second Circuit has not thereafter explicitly
employed the derivative approach at all, although it has relied on cases from other
circuits that have. See infra note 344. But, as demonstrated below, many cases in
other circuits have adopted the derivative approach in a wide variety of contexts.
323. See supra text accompanying notes 157-60.
324. See supra text accompanying notes 250-54.
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abetting precedents, end up, for example, with both derivative
language and specific intent language.3z
The derivative approach is obviously not properly described as a
"specific intent" approach, at least as that phrase is used by the
purposeful intent or bad purpose approaches. As used under the
latter approaches, "specific intent" denotes a fixed, unvarying mental
state for the aider and abettor, often very different from that of the
principal, while as used under the derivative approach, the term
denotes a mental state that varies to match that of the principal. Most
cases that favorably quote derivative language along with seemingly
inconsistent specific intent language do not make any effort to
reconcile the contradictory language; they simply ignore the
inconsistency and apply either the derivative approach or one of the
specific intent approaches.326 But, a few derivative cases containing
specific intent language explain away that language in the following
startling fashion: there is no difference between acting with specific
intent and acting with the same mental state as the principal. "The
specific intent requirement of the crime of aiding and abetting
requires that the defendant consciously share the principal's
knowledge of the underlying criminal act .... ,"I Put another way,
"[t]he state of mind required by the specific intent element of aiding
and abetting is the same as that required to prove the principal
offense."328
325. See, e.g., United States v. Sayetsitty, 107 F.3d 1405, 1412 (9th Cir. 1997)
(explaining that the mental state for an aider and abettor consists of "(1)... the
specific intent to facilitate the commission of a crime by another, [and] (2) ... the
requisite intent of the underlying substantive offense" (emphasis omitted) (quoting
United States v. Gaskins, 849 F.2d 454, 459 (9th Cir. 1988))). For other cases that
combine a requirement of specific intent with the seemingly inconsistent requirement
that the aider and abettor possess the same intent as the principal, see, for example,
United States v. Salamanca, 990 F.2d 629, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1993), United States v.
Valencia, 907 F.2d 671, 680-81 (7th Cir. 1990), United States v. Garrett, 720 F.2d 705,
713 (D.C. Cir. 1983), and Mack v. United States, 326 F.2d 481, 482, 484 (8th Cir. 1964).
See also United States v. Otero-M6ndez, 273 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 2001) ("For a
specific intent crime, like aiding and abetting, the defendant must have consciously
shared some knowledge of the principal's criminal intent."); United States v. Searan,
259 F.3d 434, 444 (6th Cir. 2001) (stating that the aider and abettor's act must be
"designed to aid in the success of the criminal venture," but then stating that the aider
and abettor is guilty if he or she "had the same mental state as that necessary to
convict a principal of the offense" (citations omitted)); United States v. Smith, 198
F.3d 377, 383, 386 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that the aider and abettor must act with "the
specific intent of advancing the commission of the underlying crime," but then
inexplicably holding that the government had to prove only that the aider and
abettor's participation was "'knowing,' [which is the mental state for the principal,
and] not that he possessed specific intent"), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 864 (2000).
326. See, e.g., Sayetsitty, 107 F.3d at 1412 (employing both derivative and specific
intent language, and then ignoring the derivative language and adopting a purposeful
intent approach).
327. United States v. Loder, 23 F.3d 586, 591 (1st Cir. 1994).
328. United States v. Mangual-Corchado, 139 F.3d 34, 51 (1st Cir. 1998)
(McAuliffe, J., dissenting in part) (citing Loder, 23 F.3d at 591).
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Without expressly saying so, the derivative cases employ the phrase
"specific intent" in an entirely new sense. This third meaning of
"specific intent" applies the phrase to any offense that requires a
mental state beyond the "intention to make the bodily movement
which constitutes the act which the crime requires."3--
What does that mean? Bank robbery (a general intent offense
under any definition) constitutes a general intent offense under this
new definition, because no mental state is necessary beyond
deliberately engaging in the bodily movements that constitute the act
required by the crime: pulling out the gun and grabbing the money.3 -'
No additional mental state, such as an "intent to steal or purloin," is
necessary;33' an alcoholic who robs solely to get caught and returned
to prison for further alcoholism treatment is still guilty of bank
robbery, even though he or she does not intend to keep the money."'
Only if the defendant robs the bank without intending even his or her
"bodily movements," e.g., by sleepwalking 3" would the robber have a
defense to this general intent offense.
But, any offense that requires any mental state beyond deliberately
making the requisite "bodily movements" is a specific intent
offense,334 even if the additional mental state is simple knowledge. -35
Thus, under this definition, and only under this definition, the crime
of receipt of stolen goods is a specific intent offense, because, in
addition to receiving the goods deliberately, the defendant must
possess an additional mental state: knowledge that the goods are
stolen. 36 It does not matter that the additional mental state is only
knowledge, as opposed to purposeful intent or bad purpose.
329. United States v. Sewell, 252 F.3d 647, 649-50 (2d Cir.) (quoting 1 Wayne R.
LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 3.5, at 315 (1986)), cert.
denied, 122 S. Ct. 382 (2001); see Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255,267-70 (2000).
330. See Carter, 530 U.S. at 268.
331. See id. at 267 (contrasting bank robbery. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1994), which
does not require an "intent to steal or purloin," with bank larceny, IS U.S.C. §
2113(b) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), which does).
332. Id at 268 (discussing the facts in United States v. Lewis, 628 F.2d 1276, 1279
(10th Cir. 1980)).
333. Id. at 269.
334. See United States v. Jackson, 213 F.3d 1269, 1291 (10th Cir.) ("'[Sipecific
intent' refers to the 'unique state of mind beyond any mental state required with
respect to the actus reus of the crime."' (quoting Vivian M. Rodriguez, The
Admissibility of Other Crimes, Wrongs or Acts Under the Intent Provision of Federal
Rule of Evidence 404(b): The Weighing of Incremental Probity and Unfair Prejudice.
48 U. Miami L. Rev. 451, 460 (1993) (emphasis omitted))). vacated on other grounds,
531 U.S. 1033 (2000).
335. See United States v. Allen, 247 F.3d 741, 785 (8th Cir.) (holding, in the
alternative, that even if specific intent is required, one who aids and abets a robbery,
aware of the serious risk of death attending his or her conduct, has specific intent with
respect to the resulting death), petition for cert..filed. No. 01-7310 (U.S. Oct. 22.2001).
at www.supremecourtus.gov/docketl01-7310.htm.
336. See United States v. Samaria, 239 F.3d 228, 233 n.2, 240 (2d Cir. 2001)
(describing the crime of receipt or possession of stolen goods, 18 U.S.C § 2315 (1994),
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Under this definition, aiding and abetting requires specific intent
even under the derivative approach, because the aider and abettor
must always337 have a mental state beyond deliberately engaging in the
"bodily movements" necessary for the act of abetting. In our bank
robbery example, while it is enough that the principal know or intend
nothing more than his or her "bodily movement" of entering the bank
and grabbing the money by force, the aider and abettor, by contrast,
must know or intend something beyond the "bodily movement" of
driving the car-he or she must also have some additional mental
state relating to the bank robbery. If the driver deliberately drives to
the bank thinking that the passenger is going to have lunch with the
bank teller, he or she has not aided and abetted the bank robbery
even under the derivative approach. The culpable mental state that
ties the aider and abettor to the bank robbery, a mental state above
and beyond the deliberate commission of the act of driving the car, is
what-under this third meaning of specific intent-makes aiding and
abetting a specific intent offense, even under the derivative approach.
The analysis now turns to a detailed examination of the derivative
approach, and its application in the context of a variety of offenses.
a. The Derivative Approach As Applied to Knowledge Offenses
Once again, both 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 2113(d) provide useful
examples of knowledge offenses.3 8 As indicated previously, § 924(c)
proscribes the use or carrying of a firearm during crimes of violence
and drug trafficking, and § 2113(d) proscribes bank robbery with the
use of a weapon. Although these are knowledge offenses, the
purposeful intent cases require that the aider and abettor act not just
with knowledge, but with purposeful intent, and require the
purposeful intent to cover not just the underlying crime of violence or
drugs (§ 924(c)) or bank robbery (§ 2113(d)), but the principal's use or
carrying of the firearm.339  By contrast, under the knowledge
approach, the aider and abettor would be liable if he or she rendered
an act of assistance with mere knowledge that the principal was
carrying a gun.
as a specific intent offense).
337. The only exception would be for a strict liability offense, where the aider and
abettor, like the principal, would need no mental state beyond deliberately engaging
in the statutorily proscribed act, such as in the case of possession of hand grenades.
See United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 607 (1971) (holding that possession of hand
grenades is a strict liability offense under the National Firearms Act, as codified in 26
U.S.C. § 5861(d) (1964 ed., Supp. V)).
338. See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text (citing cases holding that §
924(c) is a general intent crime, and that, consequently, the requisite mental state for
the principal is knowledge); supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text (same with
respect to § 2113(d)).
339. See supra notes 198-202 and accompanying text (§ 924(c)); supra notes 188-89
and accompanying text (§ 2113(d)).
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The derivative cases also hold the aider and abettor of a § 924(c)
offense or a § 2113(d) offense guilty on a knowledge standard, but
they do so not because of an independent knowledge standard
universally applicable to all aiders and abettors, but because these
offenses are knowledge offenses, and the aider and abettor's mental
state is derived from that of the principal. Adopting this derivative
approach, the Fifth Circuit reasoned as follows in a § 924(c) case:
The defendants were charged with aiding and abetting the use of a
firearm. An aider and abettor must share in the criminal intent of
the principal. To establish the state of mind required for a § 924(c)
conviction, the government must prove that a defendant had
knowledge of the firearm. To convict, the jury was required to find,
therefore, that each defendant as an aider and abettor knew that the
gun was at least available to one of the defendants. "'
340. United States v. Williams, 985 F.2d 749, 755 (5th Cir. 1993) (emphasis added
and citations omitted). Williams is one in a line of Fifth Circuit cases holding that the
§ 924(c) aider and abettor's mental state of knowledge is derived from the principal.
See United States v. Wainuskis, 138 F.3d 183, 188 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that
because "an aider and abettor must share in the criminal intent to use the firearm,"
the applicable mental state is knowledge); United States v. Salazar, 66 F.3d 723, 728
(5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Nelson, 733 F.2d 364, 370-71 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding
that since the standard for the principal is knowledge, "[sjimilarly ... the government
had to prove that [the aider and abettor] knew that [the principal] was carrying a
firearm"); see also United States v. Sorrells, 145 F.3d 744,753 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding
that the aider and abettor's mental state is derived from that of the principal, but
suggesting that Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), changed the mental state
required of the principal in § 924(c) cases, and therefore, derivatively changed the
mental state required of the aider and abettor).
Cases from other circuits also hold that the § 924(c) aider and abettor's mental
state is derived from that of the principal. See United States v. Thomas, 987 F.2d 697,
702 (11th Cir. 1993) ("[T]he government must present evidence proving that [the
alder and abettor] had the 'knowledge required to convict him under section 924(c)."'
(quoting United States v. Hamblin, 911 F.2d 551,558 (11 th Cir. 1990))); United States
v. Powell, 929 F.2d 724, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (indicating that knowledge to a practical
certainty "puts the accomplice on [the same] level with the principal," but justifying
the knowledge standard also on the "natural and probable consequences" doctrine);
see also United States v. Delpit, 94 F.3d 1134, 1152 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that the
aider and abettor "'stepped into [the principal]'s shoes' for purposes of § 924(c)(1),"
and upholding aider and abettor's conviction where he knew that the principal was
carrying the gun (quoting United States v. Simpson, 979 F.2d 1282, 1284-86 (8th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 943 (1993))).
The First Circuit also seems to hold that the § 924(c) aider and abettor's
mental state is derived from that of the principal, although, by its own
acknowledgment, it is "difficult to articulate a precise intent standard for an aider and
abetter." United States v. Otero-Mdndez, 273 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 2001). Thus, there
is some confusion in the First Circuit's cases. Compare United States v. Spinney, 65
F.3d 231, 235, 238-39 (1st Cir. 1995) (concluding that knowledge "to a practical
certainty" is the mental state applicable to the § 924(c) aider and abettor, after
stressing that the aider and abettor must have "consciously shared the principal's
knowledge" (citation omitted)), with id. at 235 (stating that the aider and abettor must
"intendfl to ensure [the endeavor's] success" (citing Nye & Nissen v. United States,
336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949)), and must have "intended to help the principal" (citation
omitted)).
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A Seventh Circuit case put it even more forcefully. It applied the
derivative approach, and held that the aider and abettor of armed
bank robbery need not act with "specific intent" in the purposeful
intent sense of an "inten[t] to aid the principal, ' '""U reasoning as
follows: the court first quoted Judge Learned Hand's "classic
formulation" in Peoni, interpreting it to mean that "[p]roof of specific
intent is not a requirement" 2 (a most extreme statement, given the
numerous contemporaneous contrary cases in the Seventh Circuit
holding that aiding and abetting is a specific intent offense requiring
purposeful intent 3 ). The court then made it clear that the state of
mind of the aider and abettor is derived from that of the principal.
Consequently, the court was prepared to impose specific intent (in the
sense of purposeful intent) on the aider and abettor only when
required of the principal. But, in that case, it was not. Armed bank
robbery is not a specific intent offense. "[T]he state of mind required
for conviction as an aider and abettor is the same state of mind
Some First Circuit cases routinely cite derivative cases from other circuits in
support of knowledge. United States v. DeMasi, 40 F.3d 1306, 1316 (Ist Cir. 1994)
(knowledge to a practical certainty (citing Powell, 929 F.2d at 728)), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 1132 (1995); United States v. Torres-Maldonado, 14 F.3d 95, 103 (1st Cir. 1994)
(knowledge to a practical certainty). But, intent language, nevertheless, seems to
persist in the First Circuit. See United States v. Sullivan, 85 F.3d 743, 748 (1st Cir.
1996) (citing Spinney, 65 F.3d at 238, in support of knowledge to a practical certainty,
but also stating that "[t]he evidence was sufficient to show that Sullivan ... took some
action intending to cause the gun to be used or carried" (emphasis added)); United
States v. Luciano-Mosquera, 63 F.3d 1142, 1150 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing Torres-
Maldonado, 14 F.3d at 103, for the knowledge standard, but also stating: "The
question ... is whether the evidence was sufficient to show that each appellant knew
that a firearm would be involved ... and took some action in relation to the M-16 that
was intended to cause the firearm to be carried during and in relation to the drug
trafficking offense" (emphasis added)).
341. United States v. Reiswitz, 941 F.2d 488, 494 (7th Cir. 1991) (quotation
omitted).
342. Id.
343. See, e.g., United States v. Nacotee, 159 F.3d 1073, 1076 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting
that an aider and abettor "must have had the specific intent to aid in the commission
of the crime"); United States v. Irwin, 149 F.3d 565, 572 (7th Cir. 1998) (concluding
that knowledge alone is insufficient, and requiring also a "desire [or intent] for the
crime to succeed"); United States v. Woods, 148 F.3d 843, 847 (7th Cir. 1998)
("[K]nowledge alone is not sufficient to convict the [defendant] of aiding and abetting
[§ 924(c) and § 2113(d) offenses]; the government must also show intent to further the
crime ...."); United States v. Petty, 132 F.3d 373,377 (7th Cir. 1997) ("[Tlhe essential
elements of aiding and abetting [are]: knowledge of the crime, intent to further the
crime, and some act of help by the defendant."); Bosco v. Serhant, 836 F.2d 271, 279
(7th Cir. 1987) ("Aiding and abetting in the criminal law requires not only knowledge
of the principal's objective but a desire to help him attain it."); see also United States
v. Ortega, 44 F.3d 505, 507 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating initially that "[tihe canonical
definition of aiding and abetting a federal offense, stated by Judge Learned Hand in
United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d. Cir. 1938), and repeated in innumerable
subsequent cases requires not only that the defendant have aided his principal to
commit a crime but also that he have wanted the principal to succeed," but then
concluding that knowledge, even without purposeful intent, is sufficient (citations
omitted)).
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required for the principal offense. Armed bank robbery is a general
intent crime."'
In short, under the derivative approach, the § 924(c) and § 2113(d)
aider and abettor need act only with knowledge (or notice) with
respect to the gun, because knowledge is the mental state sufficient
for liability for the principal.-"5
b. The Derivative Approach As Applied to Strict Liability Offenses and
Strict Liability Elements
i. The Supreme Court's Decision in United States v. Dottenveich: The
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
The real test of the derivative approach is its application to strict
liability offenses. Does it go so far as to hold the aider and abettor
strictly liable like the principal? Perhaps the strongest support for the
derivative position comes from the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Dotterveich.1 Remarkably, Dotterweich is not
generally cited on the issue of the aider and abettor's mental state by
the derivative cases, or for that matter, by any of the other cases
concerned with the aider and abettor's mental state. Yet, it
establishes that aider and abettor liability exists for strict liability
offenses, and that the aider and abettor, like the principal, is liable on
344. Reiswitz, 941 F.2d at 494 (citations omitted); see also United States v.
Sanborn, 563 F.2d 488, 491 (1st Cir. 1977) (stating that knowledge of the gun is the
mental state for the aider and abettor of a § 2113(d) offense, because knowledge is
the mental state required of the principal).
The Second Circuit, which has insisted on the purposeful intent approach for
the aider and abettor when the underlying offense is a violation of § 924(c), see supra
note 198 (citing cases, including Second Circuit cases), has somewhat inconsistently
applied the derivative approach when the underlying offense is a violation of §
2113(d). See United States v. Grubczak, 793 F.2d 458, 463 (2d Cir. 1986) ('[AllI that
need be demonstrated is that the [§ 2113(d) aider and abettor] was on notice of the
likelihood of [the gun's] use." (quotation marks and citation omitted) (citing Sanborn,
563 F.2d at 491)); see also United States v. James, 998 F.2d 74, 81-82 (2d Cir. 1993)
(finding it "indisputable" that the aider and abettor knew that the principal had a gun;
"[u]nder our reasoning in Grubczak and our holding today, this... was sufficient to
support his conviction for armed robbery as opposed to simple robbery"). But see
Grubczak, 793 F.2d at 462 n.1 (noting that dictum in United States v. Wardy, 777 F.2d
101, 106 (2d Cir. 1985), and cases from other circuits, suggest that the aider and
abettor must not only know of the gun, but must also intend to aid the principal in the
use of the gun).
345. See United States v. Allen, 247 F.3d 741.782-83,785 (Sth Cir.) (holding, in the
alternative, that armed bank robbery resulting in death, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e) (1994),
and murder through the use of a firearm in the course of a crime of violence, 18
U.S.C. § 924() (1994 & Supp. II 1996), require no specific intent to kill, and
consequently, the aider and abettor requires no specific intent to kill), petition for cert.
filed, No. 01-7310 (U.S. Oct. 22, 2001), at www'.supremecourtus.gov/docketl0l-
7310.htm.
346. 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
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a strict liability basis, not on the basis of knowledge,
specific/purposeful intent, or any other culpable mental state.
Dotterweich involved violations of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, 7 of which § 301(a) prohibits as a misdemeanor the
"introduction into interstate commerce of any ... drug ... that is
adulterated or misbranded." 8  The statute "dispenses with the
conventional requirement for criminal conduct-awareness of some
wrongdoing. In the interest of the larger good it puts the burden of
acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in
responsible relation to a public danger." 3 9 The shipper of misbranded
or adulterated goods is punishable under the statute even when acting
"without any conscious fraud at all. It was natural enough to throw
this risk on shippers with regard to the identity of their wares. 350
The issue was the liability of Dotterweich, the president and general
manager of a pharmaceutical corporation, for the shipping of the
misbranded and adulterated drugs. He claimed that only the
corporation could be liable.35' As for him, there was "no evidence...
of any personal guilt" on his part.352 There also was "no proof or
claim that he ever knew of the introduction into commerce of the
adulterated drugs in question, much less that he actively participated
in their introduction. Guilt [was] imputed.., solely on the basis of his
authority and responsibility as president and general manager of the
corporation."3 53
The Supreme Court upheld his conviction. The corporation, rather
than Dotterweich, may have been the entity that directly committed
the offense (i.e., the corporation was the principal), but, while "a
corporation may commit an offense.., all persons who aid and abet
its commission are equally guilty. ' '354 The Court specifically cited the
aiding and abetting statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2(a).355 With the enactment of
347. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-95 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
348. 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (1994).
349. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281 (citations omitted).
350. Id. (quotation omitted).
351. See id. at 278-79.
352. Id. at 286 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
353. Id.
354. Id. at 284.
355. Id. at 281. At that time, the aiding and abetting statute was found in section
332 of the Penal Code, as codified in 18 U.S.C. § 550 (1909). The reference in
Dotterweich to that section was clearly to what is now 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1994), the
aiding and abetting subsection, rather than to what is now § 2(b), the causing
subsection, since the latter had not yet been enacted at the time. The causing
subsection was not passed until 1948, five years later. See supra text accompanying
notes 85-88.
At least one case anachronistically viewed Dotterweich as a case of the officer
causing (under § 2(b)), rather than aiding and abetting (under § 2(a)), the commission
of the crime by the corporation. See United States v. Sain, 141 F.3d 463, 475 (3d Cir.
1998).
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that statute, "all those responsible for [the crime are] equally
guilty. 
356
But, in a strict liability offense, how does the factfinder ascertain
whether a particular corporate officer aided and abetted the
corporation in its shipment of the adulterated drugs? Dotteveich
answers that question in the following fashion: "The offense is
committed ... by all who do have such a responsible share in the
furtherance of the transaction which the statute outlaws, namely, to
put into the stream of interstate commerce adulterated or misbranded
drugs. 3
57
In a later case, the Supreme Court explained Dotterweich to mean
that the liability of the corporate officer depends on whether the
officer had, "by reason of his position in the corporation,
responsibility and authority either to prevent in the first instance, or
promptly to correct, the violation complained of, and that he failed to
do so." 358 If the officer had such authority, then even if he or she
lacked purposeful intent or even knowledge, he or she is strictly liable.
Dotterweich has become known for the concept of the "responsible
corporate officer. '359 What has rarely been recognized,' however, is
that the decision amounts to nothing more than an application of the
doctrine of aiding and abetting to a strict liability offense." The aider
and abettor, the responsible corporate officer, need not act with any
culpable mental state, because the principal, the corporation, need
not. Dotterweich adopts the derivative approach.
The Court did recognize, however, that the doctrine of aiding and
abetting requires some modification when applied on a derivative
basis to a strict liability offense. Normally, any act of facilitation, no
matter how insignificant, satisfies the act requirement for aiding and
abetting liability.362 But, for a strict liability offense in the corporate
context, that would mean that every employee who assists in any way
in storing, shipping, or handling the adulterated drugs, is liable even
356. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281.
357. Id at 284.
358. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658,673-74 (1975).
359. See, e.g., id. at 667-73, United States v. Iverson, 162 F.3d 1015, 1023 (9th Cir.
1998).
360. For an example of one case that may have recognized the aiding and abetting
nature of Dotterveich, see Carotene Products Co. v. United States, 140 F.2d 61, 66 (4th
Cir.) (holding officers of corporation liable for aiding and abetting violations of the
Filled Milk Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 61-63, a strict liability offense (citing Dotterveich)). affd
on other grounds, 323 U.S. 18 (1944). See also United States v. Ming Hong, 242 F.3d
528, 531 (4th Cir.) (stating that "a corporation may commit an offense and all persons
who aid and abet its commission are equally guilty" (quoting Dotterveich, 320 U.S. at
284)), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 60 (2001).
361. See Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 618-19 (1949) (concluding
that the theory of aiding and abetting "'is well engrained in the law") (citing cases,
including Dotterveich).
362. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
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when lacking knowledge of the adulteration. In essence, to
compensate for the breadth conferred by the aiding and abetting
doctrine on this strict liability statute, the Court heightened the act
requirement. Instead of permitting liability for even an insignificant
act, the Court required that the aider and abettor be someone in
authority whose very significant act is the failure to exercise that
authority to correct the violation.
Despite that modification, Dotterweich is unequivocally a derivative
case (although subsequent derivative cases, which do not cite it,
clearly fail to realize that). Moreover, despite the fact that it is a
derivative case, it is still somehow consistent with Peoni; at least that
is what the Supreme Court thought. In Nye & Nissen, the Supreme
Court adopted the formulation in Peoni while, at the very same time,
citing Dotterweich with approval. 63
ii. Strict Liability Firearms Offenses
The National Firearms Act, which proscribes the possession of
unregistered firearms even when the defendant is unaware that the
firearms are unregistered,M is another good illustration of the
application of the derivative approach to a strict liability offense.
Convicted aiders and abettors have repeatedly argued on appeal that
they can be liable, even for this sort of strict liability offense, only
upon "a showing of specific intent to aid and abet the commission of a
crime, even where such a showing is admittedly not necessary to
convict a principal of the substantive crime."365 The derivative cases
have repeatedly rejected such claims:
"It would be anomalous to hold that specific intent was a necessary
element of aiding and abetting a crime, but not of the crime itself."
Since the aiding and abetting statute makes an aider and abettor
punishable as a principal, a showing of specific intent should be
required of an aider and abettor only if specific intent is also a
necessary element for liability as a principal 6.3
Because the principal need not be aware of the unregistered nature of
the firearm, the same is true for the aider and abettor.3 67
363. See Nye & Nissen, 336 U.S. at 618-19.
364. See supra text accompanying notes 217-21 (discussing National Firearms Act
and United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971)).
365. United States v. Burkhalter, 583 F.2d 389,391 (8th Cir. 1978).
366. Id. at 391-92 (quoting United States v. Bell, 573 F.2d 1040, 1046 (8th Cir.
1978)). In rejecting the aider and abettor's claim that he could only be convicted if
acting with specific intent, Bell cited Nye & Nissen. Bell, 573 F.2d at 1046.
367. See United States v. Tarr, 589 F.2d 55, 60-61 (1st Cir. 1978); Burkhalter, 583
F.2d at 391; Bell, 573 F.2d at 1045-46; United States v. DeBartolo, 482 F.2d 312, 317
(1st Cir. 1973); see also United States v. Rogers, 652 F.2d 972, 975 (10th Cir. 1981)
(rejecting the argument of defendants, charged with violations of 26 U.S.C. §§
5861(d)-(f), that the government had to prove scienter, and holding instead that the
offenses were strict liability crimes, without discussing the fact that the defendants
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The same is true under this approach for aiders and abettors of
other strict liability firearms offenses. Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), it
is unlawful for a convicted felon to possess a firearm. Knowing
possession alone is not an offense; it is the prior felony conviction that
converts the knowing possession into a felony. But, at least according
to some appellate cases, the defendant need not be aware of his or her
status as a felon .3  (The principal might be unaware that he or she is
a felon because of the mistaken belief that the prior conviction was for
a misdemeanor.) A defendant in knoing possession of the firearm
violates the statute,69 even if he or she is unaware of the crucial
element-the prior felony conviction-that defines the conduct as
criminal. In that sense the offense is a strict liability offense.
What of the aider and abettor, such as one who encourages the
felon to obtain and possess a firearm? According to the derivative
approach, because there is no requirement that the principal know of
his or her status as a felon, "[n]o greater knowledge" is required of the
aider and abettor.370 "[T]he state of mind required for the statutory
offense" is the state of mind required of the aider and abettor."
Stated differently, the defendant may be convicted either as a
principal or as an aider and abettor based on the same mental state. '-
iii. Strict Liability Elements
What is true under the derivative approach for strict liability
offenses is also true for strict liability elements, such as the federal
jurisdictional element.3 73 Because the aider and abettor's mental state
is the same as that of the principal, no mental state is required of the
aider and abettor for such elements when none is required of the
principal:
Because an aider and abettor is punished as a principal, the proof
must encompass the same elements as would be required to convict
any other principal.... Therefore, since it need not be proved that a
were aiders and abettors).
368. See United States v. Canon, 993 F.2d 1439, 1442 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing United
States v. Sherbondy, 865 F.2d 996, 1002-03 (9th Cir. 1988)).
369. United States v. Moore, 936 F.2d 1508, 1527-28 (7th Cir. 1991).
370. Canon, 993 F.2d at 1442. But see United States v. Xavier, 2 F.3d 1281, 1286-87
(3d Cir. 1993) ("[Tlhere can be no criminal liability for aiding and abetting a violation
of § 922(g)(1) without knowledge or having cause to believe the possessor's status as a
felon.").
371. Moore, 936 F.2d at 1527 (quoting United States v. Valencia, 907 F.2d 671,677
(7th Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. Beck. 615 F.2d 441, 449 (7th Cir. 1980))), see
id. at 1528 (examining the mental state required by the underlying statute of the
principal to determine the mental state required of the aider and abettor).
372. See id. at 1528 ("Moore was clearly aware of Miles' use of a gun... the
evidence was sufficient.., to find that Moore was guilty of the firearms offense both
as a principal and/or under an aiding and abetting theory.").
373. See supra text accompanying notes 209-14, 230-34 (giving examples of strict
liability jurisdictional elements).
2002] 1421
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
principal had knowledge or an intention that interstate facilities
were to be utilized, the Government, likewise, need not prove such
knowledge by a defendant charged as an aider and abettor.374
Stated simply, the derivative approach views the aider and abettor as
standing "in the shoes of the principal," thereby requiring no culpable
mental state for the strict liability jurisdictional element.3"
Although the non-derivative approaches also require no mental
state for the jurisdictional element,376 the reason for that is not clear.
Whereas the derivative cases arrive at the conclusion quite smoothly
by looking to the principal, the other approaches are problematic
since they do not look to the principal. Indeed, for strict liability
offenses, as opposed to strict liability elements, these other
approaches entirely ignore the principal, and require a culpable
mental state of the aider and abettor even though none is required of
the principal. The other approaches must explain why a culpable
374. United States v. Vaccaro, 816 F.2d 443, 453-54 (9th Cir. 1987) (quotation
marks and citation omitted) (affirming conviction under the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. §
1952 (1982)), abrogated on other grounds, Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681
(1988). The Sixth Circuit, alone among the circuits, is of the view that the Travel Act
requires proof that a defendant knew, or should have known, of the interstate
element. See United States v. Winters, 33 F.3d 720, 722 (6th Cir. 1994)
(acknowledging, however, that "[a]ll other Circuits that have considered the question
have determined that the Travel Act's interstate requirement is purely jurisdictional
and carries with it no scienter requirement"); United States v. Betancourt, 838 F.2d
168, 174 (6th Cir. 1988) (noting that the Sixth Circuit's approach "has been criticized
in our circuit, and its application significantly relaxed"); United States v. Gallo, 763
F.2d 1504, 1521 n.25 (6th Cir.) ("This court is alone in requiring knowledge of the
interstate nexus as a necessary element in the proof of a Travel Act violation."),
vacated in part on other grounds, 774 F.2d 106 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Prince,
529 F.2d 1108, 1111-12 (6th Cir. 1976). The Sixth Circuit, however, still seems to
apply the derivative approach; apparently, because the "knew or reasonably should
have known" standard applies to the principal, the Sixth Circuit applies it to the aider
and abettor as well. See United States v. Alsobrook, 620 F.2d 139, 143-44 (6th Cir.
1980).
375. United States v. Strauss, 443 F.2d 986, 988 (1st Cir. 1971) (affirming
conviction of aider and abettor under the National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. §
2314, even though he did not know of the interstate nature of the transportation)
(citing Peoni); United States v. Kierschke, 315 F.2d 315, 317 (6th Cir. 1963) (holding
that since the principal need not know of the interstate nature of the transportation,
"[I]ikewise an accused does not have to know that the goods will be transported in
interstate commerce, but it is sufficient if he causes, or aids, abets or induces such
interstate transportation").
The same is true for strict liability elements that are not jurisdictional in
nature. See, e.g., United States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504, 513 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding
that "specific knowledge of a fact need not be proven to convict an aider and abettor,
absent such direction in the statute itself," and concluding that since the principal
need not know the specific interest rate charged by the loansharking operation, such
knowledge is also not required of the aider and abettor); United States v. Falu, 776
F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that since the principal is subject to an enhanced
penalty even if unaware that the sale of drugs took place within 1000 feet of a school,
such knowledge is also not required of the aider and abettor).
376. See supra text accompanying notes 230-38.
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mental state is not necessary for strict liability elements, when it is
required of strict liability offenses.
c. The Derivative Approach As Applied to the Diminished Capacity
Defense
The derivative approach also affects the availability of the
diminished capacity defense. Diminished capacity (e.g., voluntary
intoxication) is a defense to crimes of specific intent (in the sense of
purposeful intent).3" Under the purposeful intent approach, a
voluntary intoxication defense is always available to an aider and
abettor, no matter what the underlying offense, because aiding and
abetting is in and of itself a specific/purposeful intent offense.-" By
contrast, under the derivative approach, aiding and abetting is a
purposeful intent offense only when the underlying crime is a
purposeful intent offense. Thus, a defendant charged with being an
aider and abettor to murder is permitted to raise the defense in
connection with a charge of first degree murder-a specific/purposeful
intent crime-but not in connection with the lesser included offense of
second degree murder, which is a general intent crime3 9 Because
aiding and abetting is not inherently a specific/purposeful intent
offense,8 °
[t]o be guilty of aiding and abetting is to be guilty as if one were a
principal of the underlying offense. Aiding and abetting is not a
separate crime but rather is linked to the underlying offense and
shares the requisite intent of that offense.
... [L]ong ago this court clearly stated -[g]enerally speaking, to
find one guilty as a principal on the ground that he was an aider and
377. See supra text accompanying notes 239-41. It is clear that when the
diminished capacity cases say that the defense can be raised only when the offense at
issue is one of specific intent, they mean purposeful intent (and perhaps bad purpose).
They clearly do not mean specific intent's infrequently used third definition, i.e., a
mental state beyond the "intention to make the bodily movement which constitutes
the act which the crime requires." See supra text accompanying notes 329-37. That
last meaning is so broad, that it encompasses every aider and abettor (except when
strict liability offenses are involved), even under the derivative approach. See supra
text accompanying note 337. Thus, if used in that sense, the defense would be valid in
every aiding and abetting case. But the derivative cases, in assessing the applicability
of the diminished capacity defense, distinguish between aiders and abettors-those
who must act with specific intent (because of the nature of the underlying offense)
may invoke the defense, while those who need act with only general intent (again,
because of the nature of the underlying offense), may not invoke it. Thus, any
definition that concludes that aiding and abetting is always a specific intent offense is
not the definition contemplated by the diminished capacity cases.
378. See supra text accompanying notes 242-49.
379. United States v. Roan Eagle, 867 F.2d 436, 445 (8th Cir. 1989). In applying
the derivative approach, the court cited Peoni. Id. at 445 n.15.
380. See id at 444-45.
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abettor, it must be proven that he shared in the criminal intent of the
principal ... 38
The Eighth Circuit consequently upheld a jury instruction providing
that voluntary intoxication is no defense for an aider and abettor if the
underlying offense is second degree murder, because second degree
murder is not a specific/purposeful intent offense.38
C. The Real Meaning of Peoni: "Natural and Probable Consequences"
This survey of the aiding and abetting cases has demonstrated that
the cases employ six different approaches: the purposeful intent
approach, the bad purpose approach, three variations of the
knowledge approach, and the derivative approach. These approaches,
by requiring different mental states and by determining the
admissibility of evidence of diminished capacity, at times, reach
entirely different conclusions on a given set of facts. Notwithstanding
these deep differences, the cases advocating the various approaches
all ultimately rely on Peoni.
But, they misread Peoni. Despite the countless cases quoting,
citing, and interpreting Peoni, and despite the various irreconcilable
approaches that all speak in Peoni's name, there has been an almost
universal failure to recognize that Peoni is not an ordinary aiding and
abetting case. Rather, it is a "natural and probable consequences"
case that does not even purport to determine the mental state of the
aider and abettor; in fact, it explicitly leaves that question open.
Understanding Peoni requires an understanding of the "natural and
probable consequences" doctrine.
The "natural and probable consequences" doctrine deals with an
aider and abettor's liability for additional crimes committed by the
principal beyond the initial one that the defendant abets. It provides
that once the aider and abettor abets the principal's commission of an
initial crime, he or she is also liable for any consequent crime
committed by the principal, even if he or she did not abet the second
crime, as long as the consequent crime is a natural and probable
consequence of the first crime. "[O]nce a common design is
established, the aider and abettor is responsible not only for the
success of the common design, but also for the probable and natural
consequences that flow from its execution, even if those consequences
were not originally intended. '383 Thus, for example, a prison guard
who aided and abetted prison inmates in their assault of a fellow
381. Id. at 445 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 195 F.2d 673, 675 (8th Cir.
1952)). Displaying an awareness rarely found on this issue in the circuits, the court in
Roan Eagle acknowledged that in some of its earlier cases there might be some
contrary language requiring specific intent. Id. at 445 & n.16
382. Id. at 445.
383. United States v. Walker, 99 F.3d 439, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (emphasis added).
1424 [Vol. 70
WHAT WERE THEY THINKING?
inmate was also liable for their assault of the escorting guard, a
"natural and probable consequence" of the assault on the inmate.""
Another example is where an aider and abettor who took part in the
misapplication of bank funds was also liable for the principals'
subsequent filing of false statements with the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, even though he did not participate in the filing
of the false statements, since the false statements were the "natural
consequences" of the misapplication.-'
As we shall see, with respect to the consequent crime, the doctrine
eliminates the act requirement; even though the aider and abettor
commits no act to assist the consequent crime, he or she is nonetheless
liable based on the act he or she committed to assist the initial offense.
The doctrine also relaxes the required mental state so that once the
defendant commits the initial offense with the requisite mental state-
be it bad purpose, purposeful intent, '  knowledge, or derivative
intent,387 depending on the approach-liability can then be imposed
for the consequent crime based on a lesser mental state. The doctrine,
thus, makes it relatively easy to impose additional liability on the
aider and abettor once he or she has abetted the initial offense.
Most of the circuits have adopted, or at least recognized the
existence of, the "natural and probable consequences" doctrine. -
384. United States v. Vaden, 912 F.2d 780,783 (5th Cir. 1990).
385. United States v. Austin, 585 F.2d 1271, 1277 (5th Cir. 1978).
386. See, e.g., United States v. Andrews, 75 F.3d 552, 556 (9th Cir. 1996). For the
initial crime, Andrews adopted the purposeful intent approach, see hi. at 555
(reasoning that the defendant must "specifically intend[] to facilitate commission" of
the initial crime), but then recognized that for the consequent crime the defendant
could be held liable based on the "natural and probable consequences" doctrine, id. at
556 & n.4. Based on the facts of that case, the Ninth Circuit held that the consequent
crime, second degree murder, was not a natural and probable consequence of the
initial crime, trashing a car.
387. See, eg., United States v. Beck, 615 F.2d 441, 448-51 (7th Cir. 1980). For the
initial crime, Beck adopted the derivative approach, see id. at 449 (stating that for the
initial crime "the state of mind required for the statutory offense must be shown for
conviction as an aider and abettor," and therefore, because the principal under the
Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2778, need not know that an export license is
required, the same is true for the aider and abettor), but for the consequent crime of
filing false export documents, Beck required no more than foreseeability, idi. at 454.
388. D.C. Circuit United States v. Walker, 99 F.3d 439, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1996);
United States v. Powell, 929 F.2d 724,726-27 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v. Jones,
517 F.2d 176, 181 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
Second Circuit: United States v. DeLaMotte, 434 F.2d 289, 293 (2d Cir. 1970).
Third Circuit- United States v. Green, 25 F.3d 206, 209 (3d Cir. 1994)
(recognizing the existence of the doctrine, but not deciding whether to adopt it, since,
in any event, the consequent crime in that case was not foreseeable).
Fifth Circuit- Vaden, 912 F.2d at 783; United States v. Fagan. 821 F.2d 1002.
1012 (5th Cir. 1987); Austin, 585 F.2d at 1277; Russell v. United States, 222 F.2d 197,
199 (5th Cir. 1955).
Sixth Circuit- United States v. Graewe, 774 F.2d 106, 108 n.1 (6th Cir. 1985).
Seventh Circuit- United States v. Moore, 936 F.2d 1508. 1527 (7th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Torres, 809 F.2d 429, 433 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Greer, 467
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That is not surprising, since the doctrine has a close counterpart in the
well-established Pinkerton389 doctrine, applicable to conspirators. 390 In
Pinkerton, the Supreme Court held that a conspirator is liable for any
substantive offenses committed by co-conspirators in the course of,
and in furtherance of, the conspiracy, if those offenses are reasonably
foreseeable, necessary, or natural, even if not committed by, known
to, or intended by the conspirator.391
What precise mental state must the aider and abettor have
regarding the consequent crime for that crime to be deemed a
"natural and probable consequence" of the first? Granted it need not
necessarily be as culpable as the mental state normally required, but
what is the bare minimum? As demonstrated below, the cases differ
on this point; some require no more than foreseeability, others require
knowledge, and still others reject the doctrine entirely, requiring
instead the same act and mental state as those required of aiders and
abettors generally.
F.2d 1064, 1068-69 (7th Cir. 1972); see Beck, 615 F.2d at 453-55 (holding aider and
abettor of illegal export of arms liable also for subsequent false export statements
made to Customs because the statements were foreseeable); United States v. Lozano,
511 F.2d 1, 5 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding aider and abettor of marriage fraud liable also
for subsequent false statement made to the Immigration and Naturalization Service
because the false statement "was easily foreseeable").
Ninth Circuit: Andrews, 75 F.3d at 556; United States v. Castaneda, 16 F.3d
1504, 1512 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d 835, 841 (9th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Short, 493 F.2d 1170, 1172 (9th Cir.), modified, 500 F.2d 676 (9th Cir.
1974); see United States v. Wills, 88 F.3d 704, 720 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding aider and
abettor of bank robbery liable under § 924(c) for principal's use of a destructive
device, because he knew of, or could have foreseen, the use of the device); United
States v. Johnson, 886 F.2d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding aider and abettor of
drug offense liable under § 924(c) for principal's use of a gun, because she "could
have reasonably foreseen" its use).
Eleventh Circuit: United States v. Miller, 22 F.3d 1075, 1078-79 (11th Cir.
1994).
See LaFave & Scott, supra note 2, § 6.8(b), at 590-91 (discussing the doctrine,
but concluding that "general application of the 'natural and probable consequence'
rule of accomplice liability is unwarranted," id. § 6.8(b), at 591); id. § 6.8, at 55 (Supp.
1999).
389. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946). Because aiders and abettors
are also often charged with conspiracy, cases raising the issue of aiding and abetting
liability for consequent crimes are usually resolved by application of Pinkerton rather
than the "natural and probable consequences" doctrine. Thus, there are far fewer
"natural and probable consequences" cases than those applying Pinkerton.
390. See, e.g., Powell, 929 F.2d at 726 (comparing the "natural and probable
consequences" rule with the Pinkerton doctrine); United States v. Rosenberg, 888
F.2d 1406, 1426 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Edwards, J., dissenting in part and concurring
in part) ("At their core, the Pinkerton and the aider-and-abettor doctrines embody
the same principle: a defendant who willingly enters into a confederacy of crime can
legitimately be held accountable for all reasonably foreseeable offenses committed by
his confederates."); LaFave & Scott, supra note 2, §§ 6.8(a)-(b), at 587-91. But see
Greer, 467 F.2d at 1071 (holding that a conspirator's liability for crimes committed by
other co-conspirators is broader than an aider and abettor's liability for the principal's
crimes).
391. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 646-48.
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But, all the "natural and probable consequences" cases are
consistent in one respect. They all seem to treat Peoni as almost
irrelevant, presumably viewing the case as limited to the issue of the
initial crime rather than the consequent crime. In truth, however,
Peoni has much to say on the mental state for consequent crimes, and
the doctrine of "natural and probable consequences" probably best
explains what Peoni really means. Contrary to the way Peoni was
interpreted by later cases and even subsequently by Judge Hand
himself, the case-and its famous formulation-is a narrow one,
limited to consequent crimes and leaving open the question of the
mental state for the initial crime.
The analysis of what Peoni really means begins, then, with an
exploration of the "natural and probable consequences" doctrine.
The analysis then turns to Peoni and demonstrates that Peoni was a
"natural and probable consequences" case that did not establish any
mental state for the ordinary aiding and abetting case.
1. Foreseeability
The broadest application of the doctrine allows for liability
whenever the consequent crime is simply foreseeable. "[T]he
accessory is liable for any criminal act which, in the ordinary course of
events, was the natural or foreseeable consequence of the crime that
he advised or commanded. ' '31 Thus, an aider and abettor who took
part in the hijacking of cargo was also held liable for the principals'
subsequent, foreseeable kidnapping of the driver, even if the aider
and abettor performed no act relating directly to the kidnapping, and
did not know of the kidnapping or intend that it take place.3 3
In United States v. Beck,31 the Seventh Circuit ruled that an aider
and abettor of violations of the Arms Export Control Act3 3 was also
liable for consequent crimes because they were foreseeable. After
first concluding, based on the derivative approach, that Beck acted
with the mental state necessary for the initial crime,311 the court
proceeded to evaluate Beck's liability for the principal's consequent
crime of filing false export documents3'-documents he did not even
know were being prepared.398 The court reinstated Beck's conviction
392. DeLaMotte, 434 F.2d at 293 (emphasis added).
393. See id.
394. 615 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1980).
395. 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1994).
396. That Beck is a derivative case is demonstrated by its holding that, for the
initial crime, the aider and abettor need not know that an export license is required
because the principal need not know. 615 F.2d at 453.
397. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1996).
398. Beck, 615 F.2d at 452. As the Seventh Circuit clarified in a subsequent case,
the issue in Beck was "whether a defendant could be held liable as an aider and
abetter of the crime of making a false statement, even though he had never actually
seen the fraudulent documents at issue in the case." United States v. Ranum, 96 F.3d
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for that consequent crime, holding that an aider and abettor is liable if
he "participates in a plan such that it is foreseeable that false
information will be used in statements made to a government agency
in order to further the plan."3
Had the case applied the same derivative approach that it applied to
the initial crime, it would have required that the defendant know, not
merely foresee, that the false documents were going to be filed. In
holding the defendant liable on a laxer, foreseeability standard for a
consequent crime in which he did not participate, and of which he was
not aware, Beck was clearly relying on the "natural and probable
consequences" doctrine.4 °0
Section 924(c) serves as another example of a situation where some
cases apply the "natural and probable consequences" doctrine on a
foreseeability basis. Under § 924(c), there are always two intertwined
crimes at stake-the underlying crime of violence or drugs, and the
separate § 924(c) firearms offense. The use of the firearm will often
be a natural and probable consequence of the underlying offense of
violence or drugs.40' Consequently, in determining the mental state
required for the aider and abettor to be liable under § 924(c) for the
principal's use of the gun, some cases have treated § 924(c) as
dependent not on ordinary aiding and abetting principles, but rather
on the "natural and probable consequences" doctrine. Following this
line of reasoning, in United States v. Wills,4" the Ninth Circuit stated:
"To support a [§ 924(c)] conviction... there must be sufficient
evidence.., to persuade a rational trier of fact that [the aider and
abettor] knew or could have reasonably foreseen that the destructive
device was going to be used by his accomplice during the perpetration
of the bank robbery."4 3 In another § 924(c) case, the Ninth Circuit
stated, "[t]he evidence supports the inference that she knew about the
1020, 1028 (7th Cir. 1996).
399. Beck, 615 F.2d at 453 (emphasis added).
400. Although Beck did not use the phrase "natural and probable consequences,"
it clearly relied on the doctrine, demonstrated not only by its invocation of a
foreseeability standard, but by its reliance on United States v. Austin, 585 F.2d 1271
(5th Cir. 1978). See Beck, 615 F.2d at 453.
401. "[O]rdinarily, one co-conspirator's use of a firearm will be foreseeable
because firearms are tools of the trade in drug conspiracies." United States v. Dixon,
132 F.3d 192, 202 (5th Cir. 1997) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also, e.g.,
United States v. McKissick, 204 F.3d 1282, 1293 (10th Cir. 2000) (characterizing guns
as "tools of the trade" for drug dealers); United States v. Regans, 125 F.3d 685, 686
(8th Cir. 1997) (same).
402. 88 F.3d 704 (9th Cir. 1996).
403. Id. at 720-21 (emphasis added). Although Wills provides neither reasoning
nor precedent for this statement of law, there can be no doubt that the case rests on
the "natural and probable consequences" doctrine. Its application of reasonable
foreseeability as the culpable mental state for the § 924(c) aider and abettor can be
justified in no other way.
1428 [Vol. 70
WHAT WERE THEY THINKING?
weapon or could have reasonably foreseen [the principal's] possession
of it. '' 1
This broad foreseeability reading of the doctrine of "natural and
probable consequences" has been subjected to some criticism. Some
"natural and probable consequences" cases have argued that a
foreseeability standard results in liability on a showing of mere
negligence rather than criminal intent .4  As a result, one Seventh
Circuit case applied the foreseeability standard in modified form.
Foreseeability is sufficient for liability only when the aider and abettor
is "substantially involved in the chain of events leading immediately"
to that consequent crime.' Otherwise, the aider and abettor must
have either an intent to aid, or at least knowledge of, the consequent
crime. 7 In other words, the stronger the connection of the initial act
to the consequent crime (although normally under the doctrine no act
is required for the consequent crime), the less is required by way of
the mental state.
But, at its broadest, the doctrine imposes liability on the aider and
abettor for the consequent crime so long as the crime was foreseeable,
even if the aider and abettor knew nothing of it, and even if the only
act he or she committed related to the initial crime.
2. Knowledge
Other cases reject foreseeability and permit imposition of liability
for the consequent crime only if the aider and abettor, when abetting
the initial crime, knew that the principal was going to commit the
consequent crime.' In Rattigan v. United States,4 " a purposeful intent
case,410 a § 924(c) aider and abettor was extensively involved in the
underlying crime of drug trafficking, knowing of, and benefiting from,
404. United States v. Johnson, 886 F.2d 1120. 1124 (9th Cir. 1989) (emphasis
added).
405. United States v. Hill, 55 F.3d 1197, 1204 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Greer, 467 F.2d 1064, 1069 (7th Cir. 1972) (citing Model Penal Code § 2.04 cmt.
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 1953). which is currently found in § 2.06 cmt. (1985)); LaFave
& Scott, supra note 2, § 6.8(b), at 590-91; see also United States v. Andrews, 75 F.3d
552, 556 (9th Cir. 1996).
406. Greer, 467 F.2d at 1069.
407. Id.
408. See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 929 F.2d 724. 726-28 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(rejecting foreseeability for § 924(c) liability in favor of knowledge "to a practical
certainty"). While foreseeability is rejected by some "natural and probable
consequences" cases, it is clearly the governing standard under Pinkerton in the
conspiracy context. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 648 (1946).
409. 151 F.3d 551 (6th Cir. 1998).
410. Regarding the initial crime, Rattigan held that the aider and abettor must act
"'with the intent to assist or influence the commission of the underlying predicate
crime," id. at 558, thereby implying a purposeful intent approach. For another
purposeful intent case recognizing the "natural and probable consequences" doctrine,
see Andrews, 75 F.3d at 556. See also supra note 386 (discussing Andrews).
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but performing no act linked to, the principal's use of a gun.411 In
upholding the aider and abettor's § 924(c) conviction, the court stated
that while the aider and abettor must intend to assist the underlying
crime, for the consequent § 924(c) offense, it is sufficient "if the
accomplice knows that the principal is armed. '412  Thus, the case
reduced the mental state for the consequent crime from purposeful
intent to knowledge, and eliminated the need for an act.413
Not all cases applying the "natural and probable consequences"
doctrine, however, dispense with the act requirement. One
purposeful intent case applied the doctrine in reducing the mental
state necessary for the consequent crime to mere knowledge, but still
required that the aider and abettor commit an act assisting the
consequent crime. In United States v. Woods,41 4 in affirming the
conviction for aiding and abetting both the use of a gun in violation of
§ 924(c), and armed bank robbery in violation of § 2113(d), the
Seventh Circuit placed itself squarely in the purposeful intent camp
with respect to the initial offense: "knowledge alone is not sufficient
to convict Woods of aiding and abetting; the government must also
show intent to further the crime. ' 415 But, for the gun component of
the § 2113(d) and § 924(c) violations, the court decided that
411. The court intimated that benefiting from the gun was an adequate substitute
for an act. Rattigan, 151 F.3d at 558; see also Bazemore v. United States, 138 F.3d 947,
950 (11th Cir. 1998) (requiring an act, but then finding that the act requirement was
satisfied because the § 924(c) aider and abettor benefited from the gun); United
States v. Morrow, 977 F.2d 222, 231 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (characterizing the aider
and abettor "as much a potential beneficiary of the firearm being present as was [the
principal]. The firearm was facilitating [the aider and abettor's] drug trafficking
efforts just as it was for [the principal].").
In truth, benefiting from a crime may be a proper basis from which to infer an
aider and abettor's state of mind (one can infer that an aider and abettor who stands
to benefit from a crime has the purposeful desire that it succeed), but it is no
substitute for an act. See Robinson, supra note 16, at 800-01 (arguing that allowing a
benefit to substitute for an act amounts to circular reasoning: "the accomplice is said
to aid and abet the carrying of the firearm because the firearm aids and abets the
accomplice"). It is clear that these cases, in finding the act requirement satisfied by
the receipt of a benefit, are strongly influenced by the fact that violation of § 924(c) is
a consequent crime, for which no act is needed anyway under the "natural and
probable consequences" doctrine.
412. Rattigan, 151 F.3d at 558 (emphasis added); see Wright v. United States, 182
F.3d 458,464-65 (6th Cir. 1999) (discussing Rattigan).
413. See also United States v. Price, 76 F.3d 526, 529-30 (3d Cir. 1996) (aiding and
abetting robbery with knowledge of principal's use of the gun is sufficient for § 924(c)
liability, despite the absence of any act linked to the gun); United States v. Simpson,
979 F.2d 1282, 1285 (8th Cir. 1992) (same). A subsequent Third Circuit case seemed
to re-characterize Price, intimating that the aider and abettor in Price, who did not
carry the gun, and may not have known of the gun in advance, actually did commit
some act that aided and abetted the principal's use of the gun. See United States v.
Garth, 188 F.3d 99, 114 (3d Cir. 1999) ("[Tlhe conduct of Wilson and Garth was so
intertwined that Garth aided and abetted a violation of § 924(c)(1).").
414. 148 F.3d 843 (7th Cir. 1998).
415. Id. at 847; see also id. at 849-50 (citing United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401,
402 (2d Cir. 1938), and Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949)).
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knowledge was enough. Once Woods aided and abetted the robbery
with purposeful intent, the court concluded that he "presumptively
intends the natural and probable consequences of his actions."4 ' This
presumption means that knowledge will always be sufficient. The
"government need not prove that Woods desired that the robbers
would brandish a gun; all it must show is that he intended to further
the robbery, knowing that a gun would be used."4 ' Nevertheless,
while adopting the knowledge version of the "natural and probable
consequences" doctrine, Woods rejected the doctrine's elimination of
the act requirement. Knowledge was sufficient only because the aider
and abettor performed an act of facilitation linked directly to the
consequent crime of using or carrying the firearm."
3. Cases Rejecting the Doctrine
Many courts require both an act and the usual mental state even for
the consequent crime, and simply ignore (and thereby implicitly
reject) the "natural and probable consequences" doctrine. For
example, despite its "natural and probable consequences" cases, the
Ninth Circuit has required, in many other cases, that the aider and
abettor of a § 924(c) or § 2113(d) offense commit an act assisting the
use of the weapon, and also has required that the act be accompanied
by purposeful intent 9.41 Those cases do not even mention the "natural
and probable consequences" doctrine at all in discussing the mental
state of the § 924(c) or § 2113(d) aider and abettor.4"- By requiring
416. Id. at 847 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Walker, 99 F.3d 439, 443
(D.C. Cir. 1996)).
417. Id. at 847-48 (emphasis added) (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d)). The court
then applied the same concept to § 924(c). "Our discussion regarding Woods'
knowledge of the use of a dangerous weapon under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) applies with
equal force to the issue of whether Woods knew that a firearm would be used or
carried in the commission of a violent crime" under § 924(c). Id. at 848. See generally
Robinson, supra note 16 (discussing the split between those § 924(c) cases requiring
of the aider and abettor specific intent with respect to the gun. and those cases
requiring only knowledge).
418. Woods, 148 F.3d at 848.
419. See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text (citing Ninth Circuit § 2113(d)
cases); supra note 198 and accompanying text (citing § 924(c) cases, including Ninth
Circuit cases).
420. Thus, United States v. Nelson, 137 F.3d 1094, 1103-05 (9th Cir. 1998), and
United States v. Bancalari, 110 F.3d 1425, 1429-30 (9th Cir. 1997)-Ninth Circuit cases
requiring that the aider and abettor commit an act directly related to the gun with
purposeful intent-do not even mention United States v. Johnson, 886 F.2d 1120, 1124
(9th Cir. 1989), and United States v. Wills, 88 F.3d 704 (9th Cir. 1996)-the Ninth
Circuit's earlier "natural and probable consequences" cases which permit liability on
the basis of foreseeability. Curiously, one judge, Judge Rymer, was a member of both
the Wills panel and the Nelson panel.
Similarly, the earlier case of United States v. Dinkane, 17 F.3d 1192, 1196 (9th
Cir. 1994), which requires that the aider and abettor commit an act directly related to
the gun component of § 2113(d) with purposeful intent, also ignores the "natural and
probable consequences" doctrine and the holding in Johnson, see Dinkane. 17 F3d at
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both an act and purposeful intent even for the firearm component,
these cases treat the § 924(c) and § 2113(d) violations not as
consequent crimes, but as distinct, independent crimes, for which an
aider and abettor's liability must be proven in the same manner as for
any other crime.421
Thus, an occasional case to the contrary notwithstanding, 2
requiring both an act and purposeful intent even for the weapon
component amounts to a wholesale rejection of the "natural and
probable consequences" doctrine.
4. Peoni Revisited
Thus far, we have seen that the "natural and probable
consequences" cases relax the mental state required for the
consequent crime, while the cases that reject the doctrine require the
1195-97, and is itself ignored by Wills, see Wills, 88 F.3d 704.
421. Even under this approach, which treats the consequent crime no differently
than the original crime, an aider and abettor, who also happens to be a conspirator,
can still be convicted for the consequent crime without purposeful intent-indeed,
even without knowledge-under a Pinkerton theory, see Pinkerton v. United States,
328 U.S. 640 (1946), so long as the use or carrying of the firearm by a co-conspirator
was done in the course of, and in furtherance of, the conspiracy, and was reasonably
foreseeable. See, e.g., United States v. Pimentel, 83 F.3d 55, 58 (2d Cir. 1996); United
States v. Masotto, 73 F.3d 1233, 1240-41 & n.4 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v.
Johnson, 886 F.2d 1120, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 1989). The § 924(c) cases do not explain
why, on the one hand, they apply Pinkerton to conspirators, and yet, on the other
hand, ignore the "natural and probable consequences" rule for aiders and abettors.
Perhaps, the difference lies in the broader reach of the crime of conspiracy. See
United States v. Greer, 467 F.2d 1064, 1071 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding that a
conspirator's "liability is not as circumscribed as the liability of an accomplice," and
that "conspirators are held liable for setting up a structure which becomes the
continuing focal point for crimes").
422. In one case, discussing § 2113(d) aider and abettor liability, the Ninth Circuit,
somewhat inconsistently, professed adherence at the same time to both the "natural
and probable consequences" doctrine and the rule that the aider and abettor must
purposefully abet not just the robbery, but also the use of the firearm. See United
States v. Short, 493 F.2d 1170, 1172 (9th Cir.), modified on other grounds, 500 F.2d 676
(9th Cir. 1974). Apparently Short was of the view that the doctrine relaxes the
requirements for aiding and abetting liability only for consequent crimes that are
clearly distinct from the initial offense. Since the gun component of armed robbery is
not a distinct offense, but merely an aggravating element of the underlying bank
robbery offense, see, e.g., United States v. Beierle, 77 F.3d 1199, 1200 (9th Cir. 1996)
(explaining that unarmed robbery is a lesser included offense of § 2113(d) armed
bank robbery); Dinkane, 17 F.3d at 1196 (same), it follows that the usual aiding and
abetting principles, rather than the "natural and probable consequences" rule, govern
liability for the gun. See Short, 493 F.2d at 1172. If this were true, however, it is
unclear whether the court's view in Short that the aider and abettor must also aid and
abet the use of the gun would still be its view today. Although the court's view
assumes that an ordinary aider and abettor must aid and abet every element of the
offense, that is no longer true in the Ninth Circuit. See Woods, 148 F.3d at 849 n.2
(noting that "[e]ven the Ninth Circuit appears to be pulling back" from the view that
an aider and abettor must aid and abet every element of the offense); see also supra
note 14.
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same mental state as that required for the initial crime. What virtually
none of the cases discuss is the possibility that the aider and abettor's
mental state for the consequent crime should be stricter, not laxer,
than that required for the initial crime. In other words, if the aider
and abettor commits an act only with respect to the first offense, and
commits no act directly abetting the consequent offense, then perhaps
it makes sense to compensate for this lack of an act by imposing a
heightened mental state for the second offense. For example, while
the aider and abettor would be liable under the knowledge approach
for the initial crime on the basis of knowledge, he or she would be
liable for a consequent crime, for which he or she committed no act,
only on the basis of purposeful intent.
There is good reason to believe that this is exactly what Peoni really
did. Contrary to the way it is almost universally understood, Peoni
did not speak to the mental state required for the initial crime.
Remember, in Peoni, the defendant was charged with aiding and
abetting the possession of counterfeit bills not by the purchaser, but
by the purchaser's purchaser. His only act-the sale of the counterfeit
bills to the first purchaser-was an act that abetted the initial crime-
the first purchaser's illegal possession. Significantly, however, he was
not charged with that offense (probably for venue reasons), but rather
with the consequent crime, the possession by the next purchaser in
line.
The government argued that because Peoni "knew" that the first
purchaser was likely to resell the bills "to another guilty possessor, the
possession of the second buyer was a natural consequence of Peoni's
original act, with which he might be charged."" - The government was
clearly invoking the "natural and probable consequences" doctrine for
what was a consequent crime.
Judge Learned Hand reviewed the history of aiding and abetting
liability, and concluded that Peoni, in selling the counterfeit currency
to the first purchaser, had not aided and abetted the possession by the
second purchaser. Although Peoni may have known, or had reason to
know, that the purchaser would sell the bills to a "second possible
passer,"424 that was "of no moment to him."" - In ruling that Peoni
was not liable for the consequent crime absent a "purposive
attitude,"4 6 Judge Hand did not rule on whether this "purposive
attitude" was also necessary for liability for the initial crime. On the
contrary, Judge Hand noted that the question of whether the lesser
mental state with which Peoni acted-knowledge-would be sufficient
to hold him liable for the initial crime was still very much open."
423. United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401,402 (2d Cir. 1938) (emphasis added).
424. Id. at 403.
425. Id at 402.
426. Id.
427. Id. at 403 (discussing, but not deciding, whether knowledge was sufficient to
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But, that was not the issue in the case; the issue in the case was the
liability for consequent crimes, not initial ones:
Perhaps [Peoni] was [the immediate purchaser's] accessory.... Be
that as it may, nobody, so far as we can find, has ever held that a
contract is criminal, because the seller has reason to know, not that
the buyer will use the goods unlawfully, but that some one further
down the line may do so. 42S
By rejecting knowledge and requiring purposeful intent for liability
for a crime committed "further down the line," Peoni's holding
represents a strong rejection of the doctrine that the aider and abettor
is criminally responsible for any crime that is the natural and probable
consequence of the first.429 Indeed, Peoni goes to the opposite
extreme. For consequent crimes, instead of reducing the mental state
required and making the imposition of liability easier, Peoni heightens
the mental state, making the imposition of liability harder. Even if
knowledge is the standard for the initial crime, only purposeful intent
will suffice for the consequent crime. The heightened mental state
compensates for the absence of a requirement for an act directly
assisting in the commission of that consequent offense.
Of all the cases attempting to ascertain the ordinary aider and
abettor's mental state, only United States v. Campisi430 realized that
Peoni did not address that issue, but rather the issue of the mental
state for a consequent crime. Indeed, it was by limiting Peoni to
consequent crimes that Campisi was able to conclude that the aider
and abettor's mental state for the initial crime, in most circumstances,
is simple knowledge.431 Virtually none of the other cases that have
adopted approaches other than the purposeful intent approach have
ever made a similar effort to reconcile their approaches with Peoni.
Only Campisi realized that Peoni's purposeful intent approach applies
only to the narrow class of cases dealing with consequent crimes, and
does not govern the ordinary aiding and abetting case.
Nonetheless, Peoni has long been viewed as the seminal aiding and
abetting case. The reason for that probably lies in Judge Hand's
subsequent application of Peoni's purposeful intent standard to the
ordinary aider and abettor,432 and the Supreme Court's adoption of
the Peoni formulation in Nye & Nissen,433 which also involved an
render Peoni liable as the aider and abettor of the first purchaser's possession).
428. Id.
429. See United States v. Jones, 517 F.2d 176, 181 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (noting the
tension between the natural and probable consequences doctrine and Peoni).
430. 306 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1962).
431. For an extensive discussion of Campisi's approach to ordinary aiding and
abetting liability, see supra text accompanying notes 266-77.
432. See supra text accompanying notes 134-36.
433. 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949); see supra text accompanying notes 145-46. A third
reason may be that Peoni, although it left open the issue of the ordinary aider and
abettor, concluded that purposeful intent is required for the consequent crime by the
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ordinary aider and abettor. Thus, while Peoni itself is not a true
aiding and abetting case, it has almost universally been viewed as the
case to have conclusively determined the aider and abettor's mental
state.
III. THE MENTAL STATE OF THE CAUSER
As we have previously seen, 18 U.S.C. § 2 provides for imputed
liability not only for anyone who aids and abets pursuant to § 2(a), but
also for anyone who "causes" pursuant to § 2(b)."- The causing
subsection typically steps in where the accomplice acts through an
innocent intermediary, and where, because there is no guilty principal,
the doctrine of aiding and abetting does not apply.435 While the case
law dealing with the aider and abettor is far richer and more extensive
than that dealing with the causer, the causing cases have spawned
disparate views as to the appropriate mental state. In general, the
current case law regarding the mental state of the causer generally
echoes the divisions in the case law of the aider and abettor, with
some cases employing purposeful intent, others bad purpose, others
knowledge, and yet others a derivative mental state.
In at least two key respects, however, the analysis of the mental
state of the causer differs from that of the aider and abettor. First, the
causing subsection contains the word "willfully"; it provides that
whoever "willfully" causes a criminal act to be done is guilty as a
principal. The aiding and abetting subsection, by contrast, does not
contain the word "willfully," or any of the other adverbs (e.g.,
knowingly, intentionally, deliberately, recklessly, etc.) typically
denoting a specific mental state.
What does "willfully" imply for the mental state of the causer?
And, what, if anything, does its absence in the neighboring aiding and
abetting subsection imply for the aider and abettor? Should the
statute be read to mean that only the causer need act "willfully," while
the alder and abettor need not? Does the presence of the word
"willfully" in § 2(b) help in determining which interpretation of Judge
Hand's Peoni formulation is correct? The cases take a variety of
approaches to these questions.
Second, the analysis of the causer's mental state also differs from
that of the aider and abettor in another respect: the federal
jurisdictional element. For the principal, this element is generally one
of strict liability that requires no culpable mental state!' For the
aider and abettor, all the post-Peoni cases, no matter what their
very words of the aiding and abetting statute itself. See supra text accompanying note
281.
434. See supra text accompanying notes 61-67. 85-95 (summarizing the history of §
2(b)).
435. See supra text accompanying notes 61-67.
436. See supra text accompanying notes 206-16.
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general approach, similarly treat the jurisdictional element as one of
strict liability. None requires that when aiding and abetting the
transportation of stolen goods across state lines, for example, that the
aider and abettor know or desire that the transportation be
interstate.437 In applying their respective approaches to various
offenses, the aiding and abetting cases ignore the jurisdictional
element entirely, or just unthinkingly treat it in the same way as in
cases where the defendant is a principal.
By contrast, while the aiding and abetting cases ignore the element,
the causing cases are preoccupied with it;438 in fact, this element may
be the one most frequently discussed in the causing cases. For some
odd reason, the causing cases usually treat the jurisdictional element
in the same way as they do all other elements of a crime, which means
that the purposeful intent approach requires that the causer
purposefully intend the jurisdictional element, and the knowledge
approach requires that the causer know of the jurisdictional
element.439
A. Initial Judicial Efforts at Ascertaining the Mental State of the Causer
1. The Case Law Prior to the 1948 Enactment of the Causing
Provision
Until 1948, there was no general causing statute; rather, individual
substantive statutes sometimes contained causing language within
their provisions. One example is the National Stolen Property Act,44
which both before and after 1948 gave rise to numerous causing cases.
Until 1948, the statute, which prohibits the interstate transportation of
stolen property, applied to "whoever shall transport or cause to be
transported" stolen property across state lines.44' When Congress
enacted the causing subsection in 1948, and by its terms, made it
437. See supra text accompanying notes 229-34.
438. Indeed, a recent student comment was devoted exclusively to those cases
dealing with the causer of the interstate transportation element of the National Stolen
Property Act, and the different views as to whether a culpable mental state is required
for that element. See Gonzalez, supra note 95.
439. A few cases have noted that the jurisdictional element illustrates a difference
in mental state between the aider and abettor and the causer, though without any
explanation as to why there should be a difference. See, e.g., United States v. Cowden,
545 F.2d 257, 263 (1st Cir. 1976); United States v. Strauss, 443 F.2d 986, 988 (1st Cir.
1971) (rejecting argument of the defendants, who were convicted as aiders and
abettors under § 2(a), that the government should have been required to prove that
they knew or foresaw the interstate transportation of the stolen goods, but
commenting that "[tjhis argument might have some merit had they been convicted
under 18 U.S.C. § 2(b)").
440. The Act is currently codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 10, 2311, and 2314-15 (1994).
441. United States v. Sheridan, 329 U.S. 379, 381 n.5 (1946) (emphasis added)
(quoting section 3 of the National Stolen Property Act, which was then codified at 18
U.S.C. § 415 (1939), and is now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1994)).
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universally applicable, it eliminated the individual causing language of
the National Stolen Property Act and other similar statutes as
unnecessary."2 The 1948 version of the causing subsection, however,
did not yet contain the word "willfully." Three years later, in 1951,
while making other, unrelated amendments to § 2, Congress added
the word "willfully" to the causing subsection without any legislative
history explaining why." 3
Prior to 1948, the absence of a general causing statute did not mean
that the concept of the causer was absent. By case law, the concept
was universally applicable to federal criminal offenses everi pre-1948,
and the pre-1948 cases already began demonstrating the differences
that now characterize the varying approaches to the mental state of
the causer.
Early Supreme Court cases used language that seems arguably to
suggest a purposeful intent approach. For example, in a 1917 mail-
fraud case, 4 the Court found the defendant guilty as a causer,
because he had "deliberately calculated" that his actions would bring
about the fraudulent mailing by an innocent dupe."4 Twenty years
later, the Court affirmed the conviction of a bank teller for causing an
unwitting bank bookkeeper to make false entries in the records of the
bank, finding that the entries were "the intended and necessary result
of respondent's deliberate action in withholding the deposit tickets."'
Again, the key fact was that the crime was not known, but intended."7
442. United States v. Franklin, 586 F.2d 560. 565 n.9 (5th Cir. 1978) (indicating that
with the enactment of the causing subsection, the causing language was deleted from
18 U.S.C. § 2314): United States v. Chiarella, 184 F.2d 903, 909 (2d Cir. 1950) (L
Hand, J.) (quoting the Reviser's note to the effect that with the enactment of § 2(b),
the word "cause" was deleted from various provisions), modified off other grounds,
187 F.2d 12 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 341 U.S. 946 (1951): Gonzalez, supra
note 95, at 647-48 (discussing the deletion of the causing language from § 2314).
443. See supra text accompanying note 95.
444. United States v. Kenofskey, 243 U.S. 440 (1917).
445. Id. at 443. Professor Blakey and Roddy also understood Kenofskey as
employing a purposeful intent approach. See Blakey & Roddy, supra note 6. at 1412-
13. In a subsequent decision, however, the Supreme Court read Kenofskey as holding
that knowledge or reasonable foreseeability of the mailing is enough. See Pereira v.
United States, 347 U.S. 1. 8-9 (1954).
446. United States v. Giles, 300 U.S. 41,49 (1937) (emphasis added).
447. The court in King v. United States, 364 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1966), read
"intended" in Giles as meaning purposeful intent. See id. at 239-40 (noting that Giles
emphasized that the defendant there acted with both "knowledge and purposive
action": "Throughout the opinion in Giles, the Court continually emphasizes that the
prohibited false entries were the planned and intended result of deliberate action
which the defendant took in order to bring them about"). Other courts, however,
describe Giles in ways that intimate that they view it as requiring only knowledge. See,
e.g., United States v. Rapp, 871 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1989) (reversing conviction, where
there was no proof that the defendant had directed the filing of the false affidavits, or
that the defendant had known that the false affidavits would be filed, in contrast to
the facts in Giles, where the defendant "specifically knew" that false entries would
result), abrogated on other grounds, United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 486 n.3
(1997); Brickey v. United States, 123 F.2d 341, 346 (8th Cir. 1941) (upholding the
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Other cases, however, embraced other approaches to the mental
state of the causer. For example, one pre-1948 case under the
National Stolen Property Act (which then contained its own causing
language) employed the knowledge approach, while another case
involving the same statute employed the derivative approach. Both
cases applied their respective approaches even to the jurisdictional
element.
In a knowledge case, United States v. Sheridan,"8 the defendant
negotiated out-of-state forged checks, knowing that the checks would
subsequently move interstate to be presented to the bank on which
the checks were purportedly drawn." 9 He was charged with causing
the banks to transport the checks interstate. He argued that he could
not be a causer if he simply knew of, but was indifferent to, the
subsequent interstate transportation.450
The Supreme Court recognized that the defendant might not have
desired the interstate transportation, since the transportation would
adversely affect him by resulting in disclosure of the scheme once the
check was returned unpaid.451  Nonetheless, the Court held the
defendant liable for causing the interstate transportation of the
checks, because "[c]ertainly he knew the checks would have to be sent
[from Michigan] to the Missouri bank for collection." 45
Sheridan apparently adopts the knowledge approach.453 The
defendant's knowledge that the checks were to be sent interstate was
a sufficiently culpable mental state to make the defendant a causer.
Moreover, for the causer, Sheridan applies the knowledge standard
even to the jurisdictional interstate element, despite the fact that
conviction of a bank president for the making of false entries when he embezzled
funds, and then signed reports that were presented to him, which "he knew or should
have known" contained false entries) (citing Giles); United States v. Brennan, 832 F.
Supp. 435, 446 (D. Mass. 1991) (entering a judgment of acquittal, where there was no
proof that the bank officer had known that his setting aside of a customer's checks,
backed by insufficient funds, would result in false entries in the bank's records, and
contrasting the facts with those in Giles, where defendant "knew" that false entries
would necessarily result), affid, 994 F.2d 918 (1st Cir. 1993).
448. 329 U.S. 379 (1946).
449. Id. at 380-83, 391.
450. Id. at 382.
451. Id. at 388. However, the Court also recognized that the defendant may have
desired the interstate transportation, because it was "intended to provide an interval
for escape before that disclosure would be made." Id.
452. Id. at 391 (emphasis added). The Court concluded that knowledge was
enough, despite the phrase in the statute's forged check provision requiring "unlawful
or fraudulent intent." Id. at 386 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3 (1939)). The legislative history
clearly indicated that this additional language did not heighten the mental state
beyond that applicable in an ordinary stolen goods case, id. at 389-90, where the
statute did not have such language, id. at 381-82 n.5.
453. Sheridan, in employing a knowledge approach, was arguably inconsistent
with Kenofskey, see supra note 445 and accompanying text, which used purposeful
intent language. See Blakey & Roddy, supra note 6, at 1412-13 (arguing that the cases
are inconsistent).
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knowledge is required of neither the principal nor the aider and
abettor (no matter what the approach), for whom the federal
jurisdictional element remains a strict liability element. Obviously,
given that this case pre-dated the causing subsection, "willfully" had
nothing to do with Sheridan's adoption of the knowledge approach, or
with the extension of the knowledge approach to the jurisdictional
element.
The opinion is also significant in one other respect. Contrary to the
distinction made time and time again in the cases between knowledge
and purposeful intent, the Court in Sheridan intimated that
knowledge is the rough equivalent of intent: because the defendant
knew that the interstate transportation of the forged checks was
inevitable, "it would follow he intended the paying bank to send the
checks there for that purpose. He knew they must cross state lines to
be presented. One who induces another to do exactly what he
intends ... hardly can be held not to 'cause' what is so done." 4
This blurring of knowledge and purposeful intent was pretty
unusual. Although the Supreme Court has, in a number of cases
outside the accomplice context, come close to equating the concept of
knowledge with the concept of intent,455 this offhand comment in a
causing case was most certainly not consistent with the distinction that
the courts, including the Peoni court, have viewed as crucial in the
accomplice context.
In any event, Sheridan's requirement of a culpable mental state-
knowledge-for the causer was ignored by the Second Circuit in a
subsequent derivative case, which held on similar facts that knowledge
is simply not required for the causer, at least for the jurisdictional
element. Not even citing Sheridan, the Second Circuit in United States
v. Tannuzzo456 upheld the conviction of a causer, even though there
was no evidence showing that he was aware that the stolen goods
would be transported interstate.45 Tannuzzo did not require that the
454. Sheridan, 329 U.S. at 391 (emphasis added).
455. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 404 (1980). In Bailey, the Court
stated:
Perhaps the ... most esoteric... distinction.., is that between the mental
states of "purpose" and "knowledge."... In the case of most crimes, the
limited distinction between knowledge and purpose has not been considered
important since there is good reason for imposing liability whether the
defendant desired or merely knew of the practical certainty of the results.
Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). see United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 445 (1978) ("Generally this limited distinction between
knowledge and purpose has not been considered important since there is good reason
for imposing liability whether the defendant desired or merely knew of the practical
certainty of the results." (quotation marks and citation omitted)); infra note 609.
456. 174 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1949) (Augustus Hand, J.). Although the case was
decided in 1949, it dealt with conduct that took place in 1946, and applied the pre-
1948 version of the National Stolen Property Act, which then had the self-contained
causing language. See id. at 179-80.
457. Id. at 179. "The most that can be said against him is that he was only
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causer know of the interstate transportation, because the underlying
"offense does not require proof of knowledge on his part that the
stolen goods were to be transported in interstate commerce. It only
requires that he knew that the goods had been stolen and that he
caused them to be thus transported. 458
This was classic derivative language. The court looked first to the
elements of the offense as applied to the principal, and determined
that because knowledge of the jurisdictional element is not required
of the principal, such knowledge is also not required of the causer.
Although the court's rationale was inconsistent with Sheridan, it did
make some sense. The statute provided that "whoever shall transport
or cause to be transported" is guilty of the offense.45 9 The statute
equated causing with actual transportation. As Tannuzzo pointed
out, it had already been well established that the actual transporter
need not know of the interstate nature of the transportation.""
Requiring a culpable mental state of the causer when one is not
required of the actual transporter would have done violence to the
statute's equation of the two. Tannuzzo felt no need to distinguish
between the actual perpetrator and the causer, and in citing cases in
support of its conclusion that the causer need not possess a culpable
mental state for the jurisdictional element, Tannuzzo did not limit
itself to causing cases. 461 In other words, in adopting a derivative
approach, all Tannuzzo had to do was look to the mental state of the
principal, and that is precisely what it did.
In short, even prior to the enactment of the causing subsection,
there was already clear evidence of different approaches: the
Supreme Court's language in its early causing cases seemed to suggest
a purposeful intent approach, while in Sheridan it employed a
knowledge approach. In marked contrast to what cases had done with
the aider and abettor, Sheridan extended the notion of a culpable
mental state even to the strict liability jurisdictional element. The
Second Circuit in Tannuzzo used the derivative approach, requiring
no culpable mental state when none was required of the principal.
interested in obtaining a good price and would have been willing to have the furs sold
to an out-of-state buyer had that disposition been brought to his attention." Id. at 180.
458. Id.
459. Sheridan, 329 U.S. at 381-82 n.5 (quoting statute).
460. Tannuzzo, 174 F.2d at 180.
461. Id. (citing United States v. Sherman, 171 F.2d 619, 623 (2d Cir. 1948) (L.
Hand, J.) (holding that a principal charged with receiving stolen goods need not know
that they were stolen while moving in interstate commerce), Rosen v. United States,
271 F. 651, 654-55 (2d Cir. 1920) (same), and Kasle v. United States, 233 F. 878, 882
(6th Cir. 1916) (same)). Tannuzzo also cited Loftus v. United States, 46 F.2d 841, 847
(7th Cir. 1931), which dealt with a defendant who was charged with both the
substantive offense of transporting and receiving stolen automobiles in interstate
commerce, and conspiracy to commit such offense. None of the cases cited by
Tannuzzo involved defendants who were charged as causers.
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2. The Post-1948, Pre-"Willfully" Case Law
a. Judge Learned Hand's Cases
Congress added the causing subsection, 18 U.S.C. § 2(b), in 1948,
and added "willfully" to that provision three years later in 1951. In
1950, Judge Learned Hand confronted a case requiring him to apply
the new, pre-"willfully" version of § 2(b). He was not happy with the
drafting of the new subsection. What particularly irked him was that
the new causing subsection failed to specify a mental state. "
Although that was also true (and still is true) for the adjacent aiding
and abetting subsection, Judge Hand had no doubt that an aider and
abettor is guilty only with a culpable mental state. According to Judge
Hand, the verbs in the aiding and abetting subsection-"aid," "abet,"
"counsel," "command," "procure," and "induce" 
-- in themselves
imply some sort of culpable mental state. "All the words used -even
the most colorless, 'abet'-carry an implication of purposive
attitude."'  Thus, in his view, because the verbs of the aiding and
abetting subsection already connote a culpable state of mind, that
subsection does not need "willfully" or some similar adverb to
prescribe a culpable mental state.
The verb "causes" of the causing subsection, on the other hand,
does not imply a culpable mental state, which was too troubling a
conclusion for Judge Hand to accept. Although a literal reading of
the pre-"willfully" version of § 2(b) might have suggested that a
causer is criminally liable even without any culpable mental state, it
was "very hard to believe that the [causing subsection] really intended
so drastically to enlarge criminal liability, though it must be conceded
that it is difficult to see what it meant, if it did not mean just that.""
Judge Hand was not prepared to accept the notion that "such baffling
language was intended to have so revolutionary a consequence. ' 15
Judge Hand therefore concluded that Peoni's mental state for the
aider and abettor under § 2(a) must also be imported into § 2(b); the
causer, no less than the aider and abettor, must "in some sort
associate himself with the venture .... participate in it as in something
that he wishes to bring about .... seek by his action to make it
succeed."'  Whatever differences that may exist between the causer,
on the one hand, and the aider and abettor, on the other (that the
aider and abettor, for example, is required to assist a guilty principal,
462. See United States v. Chiarella, 184 F.2d 903, 909-10 (2d Cir. 1950) (L Hand,
J.), modified on other grounds, 187 F.2d 12 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 341 U.S.
946 (1951); see also Blakey & Roddy, supra note 6, at 1411.
463. United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401,402 (1938).
464. Chiarella, 184 F.2d at 909.
465. Id. at 910.
466. Id. at 909 (quoting Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949)).
2002] 1441
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
while the causer may act through an innocent intermediary;467 and that
the aider and abettor is liable for any act of facilitation, while the
causer is liable only if he or she "causes" the commission of the
offense46), there are no differences regarding their requisite mental
states.
Judge Hand's own subsequent causing cases confirm this equation
between the aider and abettor and the causer. In his view, the
uniform standard was purposeful intent, and he applied the
purposeful intent standard to the causer even before Congress added
the word "willfully." His cases also make it clear that he believed that
this uniform purposeful intent standard should apply even to the
jurisdictional element.
In United States v. Paglia,469 yet another causing case under the
National Stolen Property Act, the defendant was charged with causing
the interstate transportation of counterfeit checks by cashing them in
Cleveland knowing that they would be sent by the banks in due course
to New York.4 ° The case arose under the pre-"willfully" version of
the causing statute,47' yet Judge Learned Hand applied the purposeful
intent standard. He determined that the causer must "make the
venture his own; the crime must be a fulfillment in some degree of an
enterprise which he has adopted as his; his act must be in realization
of his purpose. '472 This was essentially identical to his formulation in
Peoni.
In applying the purposeful intent approach to the causer, Judge
Hand did not distinguish between the jurisdictional element and other
elements of the crime. Although Judge Hand had himself already
held, some three years earlier, that the principal need not be aware of
the federal jurisdictional component,4 1 Paglia dealt with a causer, not
a principal. Unlike the principal, the causer, according to Judge
Hand, was required to have purposeful intent even for the
jurisdictional element. Because there was no indication that the
defendant wanted the counterfeit checks to travel to New York, there
could be no criminal liability, even though the defendant "knew, or at
least... had every reason to suppose, that the result would be [the
checks'] return to New York. '474 The transportation of the checks was
467. See supra text accompanying notes 61-67, 85-87.
468. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15, 107-08.
469. 190 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1951), overruled by United States v. Taylor, 217 F.2d 397
(2d Cir. 1954) (L. Hand, J.).
470. Id. at 448.
471. Paglia was decided on July 19, 1951, while "willfully" was added to the
causing subsection as a part of the amendments enacted later that year on October 31,
1951. See supra notes 90, 94 and accompanying text.
472. Paglia, 190 F.2d at 448; see Blakey & Roddy, supra note 6, at 1412.
473. United States v. Sherman, 171 F.2d 619, 623 (2d Cir. 1948) (L. Hand, J.)
(holding that the defendant, who was charged with receiving stolen goods, only had to
know that they were stolen, not that they had moved in interstate commerce).
474. Paglia, 190 F.2d at 448.
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"a matter of entire indifference to Paglia; indeed, it would have suited
his purposes better, had they been lost or destroyed as soon as he got
the money, for that would have made detection more difficult. ' 75
Paglia is significant in four respects. First, it applies a purposeful
intent standard to the causer. Second, it confirms the conclusion that
Judge Hand made no distinction between the mental state of a causer
and that of an aider and abettor. He freely cited aiding and abetting
cases, including Peoni and Nye & Nissen, in applying the purposeful
intent standard to the causer.476 Moreover, he did so even prior to the
addition of the word "willfully" to the causing subsection.
Third, from Paglia it is clear that Judge Hand believed that his
purposeful intent standard is universally applicable not only to both
the aider and abettor and to the causer, but also to every element of
the crime-even to a jurisdictional element that normally requires no
mental state on the part of the principal. The causer must not simply
know, but want, to bring about every element, including the
jurisdictional component.
In applying the purposeful intent approach even to the causer's
strict liability jurisdictional element, Paglia constitutes the most far-
reaching extension of the purposeful intent approach. Presumably,
because Judge Hand was of the view that the mental states of the
causer and the aider and abettor are the same, he would have required
purposeful intent for the jurisdictional element not just of the causer,
but also of the aider and abettor. As we have seen, however, almost
no post-Peoni case has gone that far.4"
Fourth, what is true for a strict liability element, such as the
interstate element, would presumably be true for a strict liability
offense. It is fair to infer from Paglia that Judge Hand would have
applied a purposeful intent mental state to all causers and all aiders
and abettors, even those involved in a strict liability offense.
Paglia's extension of the purposeful intent approach even to the
jurisdictional element was wholly inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's earlier decision in Sheridan ,47 in which the Court determined
that knowledge was sufficient. Paglia was also inconsistent with the
Second Circuit's decision in Tannuzzo,479 which had applied a
derivative approach to conclude that because no mental state was
required of the principal for the jurisdictional element, none was
required of the causer.
In 1954, Judge Hand confessed error, acknowledging that his
purposeful intent position was inconsistent with Sheridan (but not
475. Id.
476. Id. at 448 & n.5.
477. See supra notes 229-34 and accompanying text.
478. United States v. Sheridan, 329 U.S. 379 (1946).
479. United States v. Tannuzzo. 174 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1949).
2002] 1443
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
mentioning Tannuzzo). In United States v. Taylor,480 Judge Hand
ruled on facts very similar to those in Paglia: a defendant who cashed
counterfeit checks in Cleveland, and thereby caused them to be
transported interstate to New York for redemption, and who "must
have known" that the interstate transportation would take place, was
guilty of causing a violation of the National Stolen Property Act.48'
Despite his previous extension in Paglia of the purposeful intent
approach to the jurisdictional element, in Taylor, he held that mere
knowledge of the interstate component was sufficient. Somehow
Judge Hand had missed Sheridan when deciding Paglia. Sheridan
"was authoritative upon us when we decided United States v.
Paglia,... but unfortunately, although it had been rendered more
than four years before, we did not learn of it. We now recognize our
error, and overrule our decision."'
Nonetheless, Judge Hand was still of the view that the causer's
culpable mental state applies even to the jurisdictional element.
Judge Hand's only modification, in deference to the Supreme Court in
Sheridan, was to reduce the mental state for the jurisdictional element
a notch to knowledge. That is still a very different standard for the
causer than for the actual perpetrator, for whom the jurisdictional
element requires no mental state at all. And, presumably, because of
his unified view, he would have required knowledge of the
jurisdictional element for the aider and abettor, too. Finally, nothing
in Taylor indicated that he had changed his view that purposeful
intent continues to be the accomplice's mental state for all the other
elements of a crime.
b. The Supreme Court's Decision in Pereira v. United States
The Supreme Court's decision in Sheridan, which forced Judge
Hand to modify his view on the mental state required of the causer for
the jurisdictional element, was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in
Pereira v. United States,483 a case involving both the National Stolen
Property Act 4 4 and the mail-fraud statute.485 The Court in Pereira
held that under the pre-"willfully" version of 18 U.S.C. § 2(b),486
480. 217 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1954) (L. Hand, J.) (overruling Paglia).
481. Id. at 398 (citation omitted); see Blakey & Roddy, supra note 6, at 1412.
482. Taylor, 217 F.2d at 399. Puzzlingly, in acknowledging his previous failure in
Paglia to cite Sheridan and its principle of knowledge or reasonable foreseeability,
Judge Hand made no mention of his similar failure to cite the previous Second Circuit
decision in Tannuzzo, which held that the causer needs no mental state whatsoever
for the federal jurisdictional element.
483. 347 U.S. 1 (1954).
484. By that point, the statute had been re-codified as 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1994).
485. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994).
486. Although Pereira was decided in 1954, the criminal conduct at issue in
Pereira took place in 1951 prior to the October 21, 1951 amendment that added the
word "willfully" to § 2(b). Thus, although the case explicitly relies on § 2(b), it omits
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knowledge (or its rough equivalent, reasonable foreseeability)4'v was
sufficient, at least for the jurisdictional element.4s
Once again, the defendant caused the mailing and interstate
transportation of a fraudulently obtained check by presenting it at a
bank in one state, which, in turn, mailed the check to the bank in
another state on which the check was drawn. '  With respect to the
causing of the mail fraud violation, the Court stated: "Where one
does an act with knowledge that the use of the mails will follow in the
ordinary course of business, or where such use can reasonably be
foreseen, even though not actually intended, then he 'causes' the mails
to be used."49 With respect to the causing of the violation of the
National Stolen Property Act, the Court stated:
When Pereira delivered the check, drawn on an out-of-state bank, to
the El Paso bank for collection, he "caused" it to be transported in
interstate commerce. It is comnmon knowledge that such checks
must be sent to the drawee bank for collection, and it follows that
Pereira intended the El Paso bank to send this check across state
lines.49'
Thus, the Supreme Court once again allowed for liability based on
knowledge, and seemed to require it even for the jurisdictional
element, thereby setting the causer apart from both the principal and
the aider and abettor.
Pereira's import, however, is not entirely certain. First, although it
very much seems to be a knowledge case, Pereira, like Sheridan, also
the word "willfully" from its analysis altogether. See Pereira, 347 U.S. at 8 (citing §
2(b)). "The word 'willfully' was not mentioned in Pereira...." United States v.
Leppo, 177 F.3d 93, 97 (1st Cir. 1999).
487. Of course, knowledge and reasonable foreseeability are not exactly the same.
See United States v. Bentz, 21 F.3d 37, 40 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Theoretically... the two
methods of proving causation are distinct. Under Pereira, the ordinary course of
business prong requires knowledge, whereas reasonable foresecability is an objective
test."); United States v. Rapp, 871 F.2d 957, 964 (llth Cir. 1989) (holding that even
though defendant "set in motion" the fraudulent bank loan application, and even
though the subsequent submission of false affidavits by co-conspirators was
"reasonably ... foresee[able] as a natural consequence of the conspiracy." defendant
still did not cause the submission of the false affidavits, because he had no knowledge
that the affidavits had to be executed and submitted to obtain the loan), abrogated on
other grounds, United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 486 n.3 (1997). Indeed, this
Article's analysis of the "natural and probable consequences" rule demonstrates that
some cases reduce the mental state required of the aider and abettor for the
consequent crime to knowledge, while others reduce it further to foreseeability. But,
for causing liability, the cases generally seem to equate the two, as demonstrated in
the quote below from Pereira. See infra text accompanying note 490.
488. Pereira, 347 U.S. at 8-10.
489. Id at 5, 8.
490. Id. at 8-9 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Kenofskey, 243 U.S. 440
(1917)).
491. Id. at 9 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Sheridan, 329 U.S. 379
(1946)).
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uses intent language: "it follows that Pereira intended the El Paso
bank to send this check across state lines.'492
Second, Pereira, like Sheridan, deals only with the jurisdictional
element. As shown below, some cases, therefore, limit Pereira's
knowledge approach to such an element, and some cases limit it even
further to the specific jurisdictional element of mailing in a mail fraud
prosecution. Other cases, however, view it more generally as
establishing knowledge or reasonable foreseeability as the mental
state not just for the jurisdictional elements that happened to be at
issue there, but for the causing of all elements.
If Pereira does stand generally for the knowledge approach, it could
not have derived the knowledge standard from the word "willfully"
(as it was a pre-"willfully" case), but instead, must have derived the
standard from something intrinsic to the concept of causing.493 A
subsequent case crystallized the reasoning in the following fashion:
Every enlightened system of jurisprudence... must have rules or
guidelines to determine when a person will no longer be held
responsible for a result "caused in fact" by his act or omission.
... We would hesitate to endorse the principle that a causal
relationship could be found... [iln the absence of some evidence
that [the defendant] intended, knew, or could have reasonably
foreseen that the innocent persons to whom he entrusted the bonds
would take them across state lines ....494
Finally, the precise import of Pereira is uncertain also because, as
shown below, it can be read not to adopt any mental state at all; some
cases interpret it to mean that knowledge is sufficient but not
necessary.
Whatever Pereira's conclusion, it did not rely on "willfully." What
is perhaps most interesting is that many of the subsequent, post-
"willfully" cases rely on Pereira without any analysis as to whether
Congress's subsequent addition of the word "willfully" changed
Pereira's conclusion.
492. Id. (emphasis added).
493. This is similar to Judge Learned Hand's reasoning in Chiarella, where he was
not prepared to accept the proposition that the new causing statute would impose
liability without some sort of culpable mental state (although in his case, that mental
state was purposeful intent rather than knowledge or foreseeability). See supra text
accompanying notes 462-66.
494. United States v. Scandifia, 390 F.2d 244, 249 (2d Cir. 1968), vacated on other
grounds, 394 U.S. 310 (1969); see King v. United States, 364 F.2d 235, 240 (5th Cir.
1966) ("In the context of a criminal statute, the word 'causes' has a somewhat
different meaning than that imparted to it in other areas of the law.... [A] criminal
purpose or intent must accompany the causal nexus before conviction for a crime can
be had.").
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Before turning to the post-Pereira, post-"willfully" causing cases,
however, the analysis turns to an examination of Congress's addition
in 1951 of the word "willfully."
B. What Was Congress's Reason for Adding the Word "Willfidly"?
The obscure background to Congress's addition of the word
"willfully" in 1951 to the causing subsection necessarily renders any
conclusions about its implications for that subsection, let alone the
neighboring aiding and abetting subsection, tentative at best.
Nonetheless, the presence of the word "willfully" in the causing
subsection, contrasted with its absence in the aiding and abetting
subsection, seems to give rise to an obvious inference: Congress must
have intended that the mental state for the causer be different from
that of the aider and abettor; otherwise, Congress would not have
added the word only to the causing subsection and not the aiding and
abetting subsection.
Even that seemingly easy inference, however, may be an erroneous
one. In fact, what little information that exists seems to suggest the
exact opposite: that the word was added by Congress not to
differentiate between the two types of accomplices, but rather to
confirm Judge Learned Hand's repeated efforts to equate them. The
word was needed to bring the causing subsection in line with the
aiding and abetting subsection, which had no need for the word
because its verbs-"aid," "abet," "counsel," "command," "induce,"
and "procure"-sufficiently convey the concept of "willfully."
A determination of precisely what Congress intended in 1951, when
it added "willfully" to the causing subsection, requires an
understanding of the state of accomplice jurisprudence at the time of
the amendment. Although before 1951 different approaches to the
mental state of the aider and abettor had already emerged, no one
seemed conscious of the fact that there were disparate approaches,
and hence, of any need to legislatively clarify the aider and abettor's
mental state. Judge Hand had repeatedly and comfortably
interpreted the aiding and abetting subsection as containing a culpable
mental state,495 despite the absence of "willfully," or any similar
adverb typically used to prescribe a mental state.46 By contrast, Judge
Hand had struggled mightily with the 1948 version of the causing
subsection, criticizing it for its failure to prescribe a culpable mental
state. He had judicially implanted the mental state of the aider and
abettor into the causing subsection, and tried to establish a uniform
standard of purposeful intent for both.4" Although there is no
relevant legislative history, it seems that in 1951 Congress added the
495. See supra text accompanying notes 124-36.
496. See supra text accompanying note 463.
497. See supra text accompanying notes 462-82.
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word "willfully" to 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) in response to these precise
concerns of Judge Hand.498 Congress's purpose in adding the word
"willfully" was not to change the causer's mental state from what it
was pre-1951, or to distinguish it from the aider and abettor, but
simply to confirm Judge Hand's pre-1951 view that the causer must
act with some sort of culpable mental state (which the pre-1951
subsection, at least on its face, did not require), and that the mental
state applicable is the same as for the aider and abettor: "willfulness."
The conclusion that the 1951 amendment merely confirmed the pre-
1951 state of the law-that the causer, like the aider and abettor, had
to act "willfully" -was articulated by the Second Circuit some fifteen
years later. When a district judge mistakenly quoted the pre-1951
version of § 2(b) in instructing the jury, the court on appeal concluded
that the absence of the word "willfully" made no difference:
As far as we are advised, even before the 1951 amendment the
definition of a "principal" as one who "aids, abets, counsels,
commands, induces or procures" the commission of a federal crime
or "causes" an act to be done that would be a federal crime "if
directly [done] by him or another" has uniformly been interpreted as
meaning one who did these acts "wilfully" or "knowingly. 499
There is one wrinkle, however. While Judge Hand thought that the
uniform mental state was "willfulness" in the sense of purposeful
intent, the last word in this quote seems to suggest that "willfully"
means only "knowingly," not purposeful intent. This raises the
question again of precisely what "willfully" means. To say Congress
added "willfully" to confirm that a causer requires a culpable mental
state, and that the culpable mental state is the same as that of the
aider and abettor is one thing, but it is quite another thing to say that
Congress went as far as to also adopt Judge Hand's stance that that
mental state is purposeful intent.
The determination of precisely which culpable mental state
Congress meant is complicated by its choice of "willfully," which
Congress had to know is a word of multiple meanings and does not
always mean purposeful or specific intent. Well before the addition of
the word in 1951, the Supreme Court had pointedly stressed that
"willful, as we have said, is a word of many meanings, its construction
often being influenced by its context.""5 ' Those pre-1951 "many
498. See 1 Nat'l Comm'n on Reform of Fed. Crim. Laws, Working Papers 154 n.2
(1970) ("Upon the basis of criticism by Judge Learned Hand in United States v.
Chiarella the word[] 'willfully'... [was] inserted" by Congress in the 1951
amendments (citation omitted)); see also Blakey & Roddy, supra note 6, at 1411 &
n.256; Gonzalez, supra note 95, at 648 n.110.
499. Wapnick v. United States, 355 F.2d 136, 138 (2d Cir. 1966) (emphasis added).
500. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497 (1943); see also United States v.
Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394-95 (1933), overruled on other grounds by Murphy v.
Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964). That "willfully" is a "word
of many meanings" continues to hold true. See Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184,
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meanings" encompassed almost the full gamut of mental states. On
one extreme, the Supreme Court, in cataloguing the interpretations of
"willfully," included the highly culpable mental state of acting with a
"bad purpose" or "without ground for believing [the conduct to be]
lawful." 501 (As we have seen, acting with a bad purpose and an intent
to violate the law is identical to one of the meanings of "specific
intent."5 z) On the other extreme, in 1925, Judge Hand himself had
interpreted "willfully" to mean a much less culpable mental state:
"The word 'willful,' even in criminal statutes, means no more than
that the person charged with the duty knows what he is doing. It does
not mean that, in addition, he must suppose that he is breaking the
law.""53 That mental state excludes only someone who acts
accidentally or unwittingly, but includes anyone who acts deliberately,
whether or not he or she possesses some purpose to achieve a certain
result or an awareness that the conduct violates the law. In 1948,
relying on this broad definition of "willful,"' the D.C. Circuit upheld
a conviction for "willful default in failing to answer [a lawful
congressional] subpoena. '"505
Such ambiguity0 6 in a word that appears so often in the law was,
and is, highly problematic. 7 Indeed, a few years after its addition in
191 (1998) (quoting Spies); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 141 (1994) (same).
501. Murdock, 290 U.S. at 394. Acting with an intent to violate the law or with bad
purpose continue to be commonly used as meanings of "willfully," both in the context
of § 2(b), see, e.g., United States v. Curran, 20 F3d 560 (3d Cir. 1994), and in other
contexts, see, e.g., Bryan, 524 U.S. at 191-92 & nn.12, 13; Ratz1af, 510 U.S. at 137-38,
141-42; Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192,200-01 (1991) (quoting Murdock).
502. See supra text accompanying notes 250-54.
503. Am. Surety Co. of N.Y. v. Sullivan, 7 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1925) (L Hand,
J.). This understanding of "willfully" as meaning to act deliberately or intentionally
also continues to be commonly used, both in the context of § 2(b), see, e.g., United
States v. Gabriel, 125 F.3d 89, 101 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that "willfully" in § 2(b)
means intentionally, and rejecting the argument that "willfully" requires an intent to
violate the law) (quoting American Surety); United States v. Hollis. 971 F.2d 1441,
1451 (10th Cir. 1992) (interpreting "willfully" in § 2(b) as not requiring an intent to
violate the law), and in other contexts, see, e.g., Cheek, 498 U.S. at 2009 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment) ("One may say, as the law does in many contexts, that
'willfully' refers to consciousness of the act but not to consciousness that the act is
unlawful."); Browder v. United States, 312 U.S. 335, 341 (1941) (holding that the
phrase "willfully and knowingly" as used in a statute making it a crime to use
passports obtained by false statements "can be taken only as meaning deliberately
and with knowledge and not something which is merely careless or negligent or
inadvertent" (quotation omitted)); United States v. Georgopoulos, 149 F.3d 169, 171
(2d Cir. 1998) (holding that the word "willfully" as used in a statute prohibiting labor
union officials from accepting payoffs, 29 U.S.C. § 186(d)(2) (1994), does not require
proof of "bad purpose or unlawful intent").
504. Dennis v. United States, 171 F.2d 986, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (quoting Judge
Hand's definition in American Surety), affd, 339 U.S. 162 (1950).
505. Id. at 989 (emphasis added).
506. See United States v. Hayden, 64 F.3d 126, 128 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating that
"willfully" can be plausibly understood to mean either a mere purpose to commit a
prohibited act or a purpose to violate the law); United States v. Phillips, 19 F.3d 1565,
1576-77 (11th Cir. 1994) (same), amended, 59 F.3d 1095 (11 th Cir. 1995).
2002] 1449
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
1951 to the causing subsection, Judge Hand described the word
"willfully" as "dreadful," "awful," and "one of the most troublesome
words in a statute that I know."50 8
So, which of the many meanings of "willfully" did Congress intend
when adding the word to the causing provision? If Congress was
merely confirming some sort of culpable, pre-1951 approach, the
question is: "Which one?" Perhaps, Congress was thinking not of
Judge Hand's purposeful intent approach, but of the Supreme Court's
knowledge approach in Sheridan. 9 Perhaps, Congress was thinking
of the derivative approach in Tannuzzo.51° "Willfully" was consistent
with all the approaches, even Tannuzzo's derivative approach; under
that approach, "willfully" in § 2(b) simply means intentionally or
deliberately so that whenever a causer acts intentionally or
deliberately (and not by mistake or accident), he or she is derivatively
liable with the same culpable mental state as the principal.", As we
shall see, there is no agreement on which culpable mental state-
knowledge, purposeful intent, bad purpose, or a derivative mental
state- Congress intended.
In sum, before the addition of the word "willfully," Judge Hand had
criticized the causing subsection for its absence of a culpable mental
state, and had remedied the problem by importing the purposeful
intent standard of the aider and abettor. Congress, in adding the word
"willfully" to the causing subsection, simply intended to confirm
Judge Hand's view that the causer must also act with a culpable
mental state, and apparently his view that the mental state is the same
as that of the aider and abettor. But, by using the word "willfully,"
with its many possible meanings, it is not clear that Congress was
confirming that the uniform standard should be purposeful intent.
In any event, because "willfully" was apparently not intended to
change the standard-whatever it may have been-that had applied to
the causer before 1951, it makes sense that even post-"willfully" cases
freely look to pre-"willfully" cases-primarily the Supreme Court's
decision in Pereira-to determine the causer's mental state.
507. Cases continue to struggle with the meaning of "willfully." See, e.g., United
States v. George, 266 F.3d 52, 58-60 (2d Cir. 2001) (deciding that "willfully" in 18
U.S.C. § 1542 (1994), which makes it a crime "willfully and knowingly" to make a
false statement in a passport application, must impose some additional mental state
beyond "knowingly," and concluding that it requires "purpose").
508. Hayden, 64 F.3d at 129 n.5 (quoting Model Penal Code and Commentaries §
2.02, at 249 n.47 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985), which, in turn, quotes
ALl Proceeding 160 (1955)).
509. United States v. Sheridan, 329 U.S. 379 (1946); see supra text accompanying
notes 448-53.
510. United States v. Tannuzzo, 174 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1949).
511. That is the derivative approach to the mental state of the causer, as
articulated by the Second Circuit in United States v. Gabriel, 125 F.3d 89 (2d Cir.
1997). See infra text accompanying notes 557-63.
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C. The Current Approaches to the Mental State of the Causer
Given the history of 18 U.S.C. § 2(b), it is no surprise that the
current state of the law with respect to the mental state of the causer
and the meaning of "willfully" in § 2(b) "does not run straight.' 2
The causing cases exhibit even more inconsistencies than the aiding
and abetting cases, complicated, moreover, by the word "willfully" in
the causing subsection, and by the extension of the culpable mental
state even to the jurisdictional element.
1. The Purposeful Intent Approach
Under this approach, the causer is not liable unless acting with
purposeful intent to bring about the crime. As a general rule, this
approach parallels the purposeful intent approach in the aiding and
abetting context. But, because of the word "willfully," and because of
the extension of purposeful intent even to the jurisdictional element,
the parallel is not a precise one.
"Willfully" obviously plays no role in the aiding and abetting
context; the aiding and abetting purposeful intent cases have adopted
that approach without it. This is not so with the causing cases. For
example, one causing case, in adopting the purposeful intent
approach, turned to the word "willfully," and combined it with
general agency principles. Section 2(b) makes the principal the agent
of the causer, but the causer does not willfully make the principal an
agent simply by knowing or foreseeing what it is that the principal will
do. "Section 2(b) does... have overtones of agency, and, in our
judgment, the willful causation to which it refers must be purposeful
rather than be based simply upon reasonable foreseeability."I"
In contrast to the aiding and abetting cases, the causing cases that
adopt the purposeful intent approach extend it even to the
jurisdictional element. Thus, under this approach, defendants charged
with selling stolen cars to out-of-state customers, and thereby causing
the interstate transportation of stolen cars in violation of the Dyer
Act,514 are liable only if they desire the interstate transportation;
knowledge or foreseeability is insufficient."5
But, what of Pereira,16 Sheridan,5" and Taylor"'-causing cases
that required no more than knowledge or foreseeability for the
512. Blakey & Roddy, supra note 6, at 1410-11.
513. United States v. Berlin, 472 F.2d 13. 14 (9th Cir. 1973) (emphasis added).
514. 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1994).
515. Berlin, 472 F.2d. at 14-15. On the facts of the case, the court in Berlin
concluded that the defendants purposefully desired the interstate transportation, and
therefore, affirmed the convictions. See United States v. Leppo, 177 F.3d 93, 96-97
(1st Cir. 1999) (collecting cases and discussing Berlin).
516. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954); see supra text accompanying notes
483-94.
517. United States v. Sheridan, 329 U.S. 379 (1946); see supra text accompanying
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jurisdictional element? The purposeful intent approach limits them to
their facts: knowledge or reasonable foreseeability suffices for
liability when the contraband is checks, unlike liability for cars, which,
by contrast, requires purposeful intent. "Since interstate automobile
transportation is now commonplace, [reasonable foreseeability] would
seem to render every sale of a stolen car a federal offense."5" 9
Consequently, a defendant willfully causes the movement of cars
interstate only when acting with purposeful intent. On the other
hand:
[S]tolen securities or forged travelers checks under 18 U.S.C. § 2314,
involve considerations not present in cases dealing with tangible
stolen property. The cashing of a check or the sale of securities
initiates a series of commercial operations-an established course of
action without the existence of which a sale could not be
accomplished and payment would not be forthcoming. Pereira v.
United States, 347 U.S. at 9 .... It is the thief who, in order to
secure his money, invokes the entirety of the normal course of
commercial operations, and it can hardly be said that this invocation
was not purposeful or intended. What need not be specifically
intended-but need only be reasonably foreseeable-is that those
operations may, in a particular case, entail interstate transportation.
Such is not the case in the ordinary sale of tangible...
property. 520
In other words, because a stolen car or other "personal property [is]
apt to cross state lines quite apart from any concern, purpose, or
interest of the seller, ' '12 ' the usual mental state of purposeful intent
applies. This is not so with checks. Thus, under this approach, the
causer must always act with purposeful intent, even with respect to the
jurisdictional element of strict liability, except in the case of checks,
which necessarily trigger the use of the interstate commercial
infrastructure. 22
This approach is flawed in a number of respects. The distinction
between checks and cars is simply unsustainable, and is a forced result
of the effort to reconcile this approach with the earlier cases requiring
only knowledge or foreseeability. In addition, while this approach
relies, in part, on the word "willfully," one of its flaws is its failure to
recognize that Congress may well have added the word "willfully" to
notes 448-53.
518. United States v. Taylor, 217 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1954) (L. Hand, J.); see supra
text accompanying notes 480-82.
519. Berlin, 472 F.2d at 14.
520. Id. at 15 (citations omitted).
521. United States v. Leppo, 177 F.3d 93,97 (1st Cir. 1999) (summarizing Berlin).
522. The First Circuit in Leppo, a case also involving the causing of the interstate
transportation of stolen film, reviewed the split in the circuits in this regard, and
determined that whatever the standard, on the facts before it, the evidence was
sufficient to sustain a conviction even under the purposeful intent standard. Id. at 97.
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equate the causer with the aider and abettor. But, by requiring a
culpable mental state for the jurisdictional element, and especially a
mental state as culpable as purposeful intent, this approach increases,
rather than eliminates, the differences between the causer and the
aider and abettor, for whom such an element continues to be a strict
liability element.
2. The Bad Purpose Approach
Under this approach, the causer must act "voluntarily and
purposely, with a specific intent to do something the law forbids; that
is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law."' 2'
Generally, the bad purpose cases, like the purposeful intent cases,
derive their mental state from the word "willfully.' - -4
One causing case went even beyond bad purpose. In United States
v. Curran,"- the Third Circuit decided that the word "willfully" in 18
U.S.C. § 2(b), at least in some contexts, requires a mental state even
more culpable then a general bad purpose to disobey the law. The
defendant there, by using nominee contributors, caused certain
campaign treasurers to file false contributor lists with the Federal
Election Commission in violation of the false statements statuteY"
The Third Circuit reversed the convictions. First, it held that the
district court had erred in essentially permitting the jury to convict the
causer if it found that the causer had acted with the mental state
applicable to the principal; in other words, the Third Circuit rejected
the derivative approach:
When proceeding under section 2(b) in tandem with section 1001,
the government must prove that a defendant caused the
intermediary to make false statements. The intent element differs
from that needed when the prosecution proceeds directly under
section 1001. The prosecution must not only show that a defendant
had the requisite intent under section 1001 (deliberate action with
knowledge that the statements were not true), but must also prove
that he "willfully" caused the false representations to be made.
"Willfulness" in this context is an important component of section
2(b), and it is necessary that the term be understood. 27
The court in Curran then decided that the "willfully" component of
§ 2(b), at least in the context of the election laws, requires that the
523. United States v. Markowski, 772 F.2d 358. 364 (7th Cir. 1985): see United
States v. Stern, 858 F.2d 1241, 1247 (7th Cir. 1988) (adopting a derivative approach,
but noting that Markowski had approved the quoted section as an instruction to the
jury).
524. See, e.g., Markowski, 772 F.2d at 364.
525. 20 F.3d 560 (3d Cir. 1994).
526. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
527. Curran, 20 F.3d at 567-68.
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prosecution prove not only the usual state of mind required for a §
1001 offense, but, in addition, that the defendant was aware of the
wrongfulness and unlawfulness of his conduct. 28 But, even that, while
necessary, was insufficient. "Nor was it adequate to simply charge the
jury that to find intent it could consider whether defendant knew that
he was doing 'something unlawful' or that he was doing 'something
wrong' in some general way.529 Rather, the defendant also had to be
aware of the precise reporting requirements at issue, and must have
specifically sought to frustrate them. Thus, the government had to
prove that "[the] defendant knew of the treasurers' reporting
obligations, that he attempted to frustrate those obligations, and that
he knew his conduct was unlawful. 530
Curran arrived at this heightened bad purpose approach by
borrowing the meaning of the word "willfully" from an entirely
different context, one that had nothing to do with causers or aiders
and abettors. We have already seen that "willfully" has different
meanings in different contexts. 31 In Ratzlaf v. United States,532 the
Supreme Court held that the word "willfully" in the structuring
statute533 imposed on the government the burden of proving that a
structuring defendant knew not only that his or her conduct was
unlawful, but also that he or she was violating a known legal duty.5
The Third Circuit in Curran noted that "we find nothing in [Ratzlaf's]
discussion of willfulness that would confine the rationale to the
currency reporting statute, '535 implying that what was true for the
528. Id. at 570.
529. Id.
530. Id. at 569. The court stated:
In sum, the government had the burden of proving that defendant was aware
that the campaign treasurers were bound by the law to accurately report the
actual source of the contributions to the Commission, that the defendant's
actions were taken with the specific intent to cause the treasurers to submit a
report that did not accurately provide the relevant information, and that
defendant knew that his actions were unlawful.
Id. at 570-71.
531. See supra notes 500-08 and accompanying text.
532. 510 U.S. 135 (1994).
533. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5322, 5324 (1994) (preceding the amendment in 1994, which
deleted the word "willfully" from § 5324); see supra note 150.
534. Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 138; see Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 192, 194-95
(1998) (discussing Ratzlaf).
535. United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 568 (1994). Curran also noted that it
was relying on Ratzlaf because of the similarity between the structuring context in
Ratzlaf and the election law context in the case, id. at 569, thus intimating a basis for
limiting its holding to the election context. See United States v. Gabriel, 125 F.3d 89,
100-01 (2d Cir. 1997) (discussing Curran and the scope of its holding). Indeed, one
year after Curran, the Third Circuit readily acknowledged that in other contexts
"willfully" could also indicate a less culpable mental state. It need not always imply a
purpose to violate the law; sometimes it simply means a purpose to commit an act that
happens to be prohibited. See United States v. Hayden, 64 F.3d 126, 128 (3d Cir.
1995).
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word "willfully" in Ratzlafs structuring statute was true for the word
"willfully" generally, including its meaning in § 2(b).5-
In borrowing from the structuring context-one of but two areas in
which the Supreme Court has recognized this heightened bad purpose
mental state537-and thereby concluding that a causer must know not
only that in some generalized sense he or she is violating the law, but
also know of the specific statutory duty that gave rise to the
unlawfulness, Curran adopted what may well be the most rigorous
mental state imposed by the criminal law.5" Curran has gone one step
further than even the most extreme bad purpose aiding and abetting
cases, which require only a generalized bad purpose to disobey the
law.
5 39
All this presupposes that Congress added the word "willfully" to
heighten the mental state of the causer to this extraordinarily rigorous
level. But, the history of § 2(b) suggests that "willfully" was added in
1951 only because Judge Hand was afraid that the section might
otherwise be interpreted to require no mental state at all.-' In other
words, it was added to require some culpable mental state, but not
necessarily the extreme mental state required by Curran. Indeed, as
we have seen, Congress was probably indicating its approval of Judge
Hand's importation of the aider and abettor's standard into the
causing subsection;"4 but no aiding and abetting case, not even any of
the bad purpose cases, has ever required of the aider and abettor a
heightened bad purpose-not in 1951 and not since. Curran
misinterpreted "willfully," because it was unaware of Congress's
reason for adding it to the statute.
536. It is unclear whether Curran's conclusion that Raizlafs interpretation of the
word "willfully" is valid in all contexts remains good law after Bryan. Bryan seems to
read Ratzlaf narrowly, citing it as an exception rather than as a case stating a general
rule for "willfully" everywhere. The structuring statute in Ratziaf and certain
criminal tax statutes, see Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991), require more
than a general awareness of unlawfulness, because they "involved highly technical
statutes that presented the danger of ensnaring individuals engaged in apparently
innocent conduct." Bryan, 524 U.S. at 194. The Court, thus, arguably limited the
heightened bad purpose approach to these two unusual contexts.
537. See Bryan, 524 U.S. at 194 (citing criminal tax cases as the other instance); see
supra note 536.
538. See supra text accompanying notes 148-51 (discussing the various criminal
mental states).
539. See supra Part II.B.3. Of course, if the mental state required of the principal
is specific knowledge of the precise legal duty violated, then some of the aiding and
abetting cases might also require the same for the aider and abettor. However,
Curran requires such a mental state of the causer even when it is not required of the
principal. See 20 F3d at 566-68.
540. See supra text accompanying notes 462-68; supra note 498 and accompanying
text.
541. See supra note 498 and accompanying text; see also supra text accompanying
note 499.
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In addition to this problem, how does Curran explain the Supreme
Court's decisions in Sheridan and Pereira, which provide that, at least
in some circumstances, mere knowledge or reasonable foreseeability
suffice? True, these were pre-"willfully" cases, but as we have seen,
"willfully" was the standard that applied before the word itself was
formally added to the statute.54 Indeed, pre-"willfully" cases like
Pereira are freely cited by current cases in determining the
appropriate mental state. Moreover, although Pereira and Sheridan
deal with the jurisdictional element, they can be read to ground their
mental state in the very concept of causing, which applies equally to
all elements of a crime. 43 Unfortunately, Curran does not address
these issues at all.
3. The Knowledge Approach
The most straightforward reading of the Supreme Court's decisions
in Sheridan and Pereira is that simple knowledge or reasonable
foreseeability is the mental state required of the causer. Furthermore,
knowledge or reasonable foreseeability applies to all elements; this
approach makes no distinction between non-jurisdictional and
jurisdictional elements. Thus, the causer of interstate transportation
of stolen or counterfeit goods must know or reasonably foresee the
interstate transportation.' Likewise, the causer of an interstate
transmission of a threat to injure another person545 must "at least
reasonably foresee[] that his statement would be transmitted in
interstate commerce by others. '546 A defendant who did not "ha[ve]
knowledge.., or, at least, reasonable grounds to know, that his
conduct involves, or will result in, such commerce" does not cause the
interstate transportation of stolen goods.547
The same is true for non-jurisdictional elements, as is illustrated by
a series of false statement cases. A causer whose actions result in the
making of a false statement to the government is guilty under this
approach, even when it is clear that he or she is indifferent to the false
statements, so long as the resulting false statements are "understood
542. See supra text accompanying note 499.
543. See supra text accompanying note 494.
544. See, e.g., United States v. Cowden, 545 F.2d 257, 263 (1st Cir. 1976): United
States v. DeKunchak, 467 F.2d 432, 436 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Masters, 456
F.2d 1060, 1062 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Scandifia, 390 F.2d 244, 249 (2d Cir.
(1968), vacated on other grounds, 394 U.S. 310 (1969); Wapnick v. United States, 355
F.2d 136, 139 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Gordon, 253 F.2d 177, 182 (7th Cir.
1958); see also United States v. Leppo, 177 F.3d 93, 96-97 (1st Cir. 1999).
545. See 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (1994).
546. United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1022 (2d Cir. 1976).
547. Nicolopoulos v. United States, 332 F.2d 247, 248 (1st Cir. 1964) (reversing
conviction for interstate transportation of stolen firearms in violation of 15 U.S.C. §
902(g) (currently codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994)) (citing Pereira and Sheridan)).
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and foreseen."'  Thus, a union official, who submitted a false report
to the union, was guilty of causing the subsequent submission of false
statements by the union to the government, because the official knew
that the union's accountant would rely on his false report in filing a
required form with the Department of Labor. 49
On the other hand, because knowledge is the key mental element
under this approach, where the causer does not realize that his or her
false statement will result in a subsequent false entry in government
books and records, such causer cannot be said to have caused, within
the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2(b), that false entry to be made. An
interesting example is the forfeiture case that the United States
brought to obtain title to the weapons used in the assassination of
President John F. Kennedy."' Under the firearms laws then in effect,
the government could obtain forfeiture of a weapon only if it had
been involved in a violation of the Federal Firearms Act."' Because
the assassination itself was not a violation of that particular Act, the
government sought forfeiture on the grounds that the assassin, Lee
Harvey Oswald, had violated the Act when he used a false name in
purchasing the weapons.
The problem was, however, that the firearms statute at the time did
not place any criminal prohibition on the purchaser; 52 rather, it placed
the obligation solely on the dealer, requiring the dealer to maintain
accurate records showing the name and address of the purchaser. The
government sought to circumvent this problem by contending that
Oswald violated the Act by causing, pursuant to § 2(b), the dealer to
keep false books in violation of the Act. 3
The Fifth Circuit found that Oswald was not the cause of the false
entries, because the government failed to prove that Oswald knew
that his use of a false name would cause a false entry in the records
that the dealer was required to keep:
[T]here is no basis for a finding that Oswald knew or had reasonable
grounds to know that the firearms dealers from whom he ordered
548. United States v. Murph, 707 F.2d 895, 896 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that the
defendant, who sold fraudulent tax returns to a "tax return discounter," caused the
discounter to submit the returns thereafter to the IRS for a refund, because such
submission was "understood and foreseen," even though, once he made the sale, the
defendant "had no interest in whether the return was ever filed or not" (citing
Pereira)); see United States v. Hebeka, 89 F.3d 279, 282-83 (6th Cir. 1996) (discussing
Murph).
549. United States v. Nolan, 136 F.3d 265, 272 (2d Cir. 1998): see also United
States v. Fairchild, 990 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the defendant had
acted "with the knowledge" that false statements would be made to the government);
Brickey v. United States, 123 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1941) (finding that the defendant had
known or reasonably could have foreseen that false statements would result).
550. King v. United States, 364 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1966).
551. Id. at236 (citing what was then 15 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1950)).
552. Id.
553. Id. at 238-39.
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the weapons here involved were required to keep records... and
that his use of a fictitious name would result in the making of a false
entry therein. Absent such a showing, the lower court's finding that
he willfully caused the Federal Firearms Act to be violated cannot
stand. Since no violation of the Act was proved, the weapons are
not subject to forfeiture, and the judgment of the District Court
must be reversed. 55
Thus, if a defendant does not know or foresee that his or her false
statement will make its way into a setting where false statements are
so barred, he or she does not cause the subsequent false statements to
be made. But, if he or she knows or can foresee, under this approach,
that is enough.
The knowledge or foreseeability standard as applied to the causer
seems to be the most straightforward application of Sheridan and
Pereira, which upheld liability when the causer knew or reasonably
foresaw that the bad checks at issue would travel interstate. Simply
stated, one causes a result when the result is known or reasonably
foreseeable at the time one acts.
This apparent simplicity, however, belies a number of problems.
For example, what effect did the addition of the word "willfully"
have? If it was designed only to confirm that the mental state of the
causer is the same as that of the aider and abettor, then the causer,
like the aider and abettor, should not have to act with knowledge or
any other mental state when it comes to the jurisdictional element.
Moreover, even putting aside the jurisdictional element, the
knowledge approach, when applied to the causer, is problematic-in
fact, more so than when applied to the aider and abettor. In Peoni,
Judge Learned Hand rejected the knowledge approach (in the
"natural and probable consequences" context) in favor of purposeful
intent for a sensible reason: if knowledge or reasonable foreseeability
determines liability, that might create an endless chain of liability for,
say, the first utterer of counterfeit bills, who could then be prosecuted
for every subsequent possession wherever that possession takes
place."' As sensible as this reasoning was, however, the problem that
it addressed was somewhat illusory, since liability of an aider and
abettor is limited to situations where there is a guilty principal.
Aiding and abetting liability would not have indefinitely followed the
bills; as soon as they were passed to an innocent owner, the expansion
554. Id. at 241. Although the court spoke of the defendant as having "willfully"
caused the offense, it seems pretty clear that the case did not view the word as having
changed prior law. In fact, it relied heavily on United States v. Giles, 300 U.S. 41
(1937), see King, 364 F.2d at 23840, which was decided long before the addition of
"willfully" in 1951 to the causing subsection, and even before the 1948 enactment of
the causing subsection itself.
555. See United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401,402 (2d Cir. 1938).
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of the original utterer's aiding and abetting liability would have come
to a halt.
In the causing context, however, Judge Hand's question applies
with more force: does a defendant who utters counterfeit bills cause
their possession by every single person along the chain? Does a
defendant who sells a car that he or she knows to be stolen cause its
interstate transportation every time it subsequently crosses state
lines? This problem of unlimited liability under a knowledge or
reasonable foreseeability standard is more acute for the causer,
because the causer is guilty even when acting through an innocent
intermediary. Because a causer who utters a counterfeit bill obviously
knows or foresees its movement across the country (even across the
world), he or she is guilty for each subsequent possession, whether the
possessor (the principal) is aware of the bills' counterfeit nature or
not. Thus, unlimited liability, as serious a problem as it was under the
knowledge approach in Peoni, is even more of a problem under the
approach when applied to the causer.
4. The Derivative Approach
a. Generally
The derivative approach as applied to the causer is virtually the
same as that applied to the aider and abettor: the mental state
applicable is that derived from the principal."
Probably the most emphatic proponent of the derivative approach
as applied to the causer is the Second Circuit in United States v.
Gabriel,15 where the defendant-like the defendant in Curran-was
charged with causing the making of a false statement to the
government in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. The court explicitly
rejected Curran's bad purpose approach, holding that the
government's reliance on 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) did not mean that "the
government is... required to prove a knowing violation of the law."' s5
Ratzlaf and the word "willfully" in the structuring statute, relied
upon by Curran, were "of little aid in interpreting section 2(b). 55'
Ratzlaf "did not hold that the government had to prove a knowing
556. See United States v. Hock, 960 F.2d 153, No. 90-50061, 1992 WL79295, at **1
(9th Cir. Apr. 21, 1992) (unpublished opinion). The court stated:
It makes little sense to alter the level of intent required to sustain a
conviction, depending on whether the person was in fact a principal or
instead someone who aided or caused the commission of the crime.
Instead... the proof should encompass the same elements as would be
required to convict a principal.
Id
557. 125 F3d 89 (2d Cir. 1997).
558. Id. at 102.
559. Id.
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violation of the law every time a statute used the term 'willful.'
Rather, [Ratzlaf] stated that '[w]illful ... is a word of many meanings,
and its construction is often... influenced by its context."' 5 Because
the structuring statute involves regulatory reporting violations that are
not "obviously 'evil' or inherently 'bad,' 561 it made sense for Ratzlaf
to interpret "willfully" in that context to allow liability only if the
defendant engages in a knowing violation of the law. It did not make
sense, however, to import that meaning into § 2(b), which applies to
virtually any criminal statute:
[T]he government need not prove a knowing violation of the law
under [§ 2(b)]. The principal reason for our conclusion is simple.
The general rule in criminal cases is that the government need not
prove a knowing violation of the law-we see no reason that
Congress would change that rule simply because a person caused an
innocent intermediary to act.5 62
But, in rejecting the bad purpose approach, Gabriel had to explain
what, then, "willfully" means in § 2(b). "The most natural
interpretation of section 2(b) is that a defendant with the mental state
necessary to violate the underlying section is guilty of violating that
section if he intentionally causes another to commit the requisite
act."563 In other words, if the causer acts intentionally (as opposed to
by mistake or accident) and, while acting intentionally, has the same
mental state required of the principal, then the causer has acted
"willfully."
Gabriel was adopted by the D.C. Circuit, which also rejected
Curran and concluded that a defendant is a causer if he or she
intentionally commits an act with the mental state of the underlying
offense. 4
The Second Circuit in Gabriel, however, made no comparison
between the causer and the aider and abettor, despite the historical
equation of the two concepts made by the Second Circuit's own Judge
Learned Hand. Nor did the D.C. Circuit in adopting Gabriel's
holding. The Third Circuit in Curran arrived at its own interpretation
of "willfully" and § 2(b) without making any such comparison. Had
the Second Circuit in Gabriel made the comparison, it would have
been forced to grapple with the inconsistency between its mental state
for the causer and its mental state for the aider and abettor. Just two
years before its decision in Gabriel, the Second Circuit had rejected
560. Id. at 100 (quoting Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 141 (1994)).
561. United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 568 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Ratzlaf, 510
U.S. at 146).
562. Gabriel, 125 F.3d at 101. The court added in a footnote that "[w]e assume but
need not decide that if the underlying statute requires a knowing violation of the law,
the government would have to establish that element." Id. at 101 n.9.
563. Id. at 101 (first emphasis added).
564. United States v. Hsia, 176 F.3d 517,521-22 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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the derivative approach for the aider and abettor, holding that aiding
and abetting is a specific intent offense requiring purposeful intent,
regardless of the mental state applicable to the underlying offense.,",
The result: according to the Second Circuit, the causer, who,
according the statute, must act "willfully," has a mental state that
varies depending on the mental state of the principal. Paradoxically,
the aider and abettor, whose mental state is not explicitly prescribed
by statute, has a fixed mental state: purposeful intent. But, it makes
little sense to require purposeful intent for the accomplice whose
subsection lacks the word "willfully," and to vary the mental state for
the accomplice whose subsection contains it.
This chameleon-like understanding of the word "willfully" in § 2(b)
is all the more puzzling in light of an earlier interpretation by the
Second Circuit of that very word in that very section, which intimated
that the word inherently connotes a measure of culpable intent, and
thereby "provides adequate protection for individuals who might
unwittingly stumble into a violation of federal law."'
b. Strict Liability Elements
The derivative approach applies to strict liability elements, such as
the jurisdictional element, just as it applies to other elements. If the
principal need not know of the interstate nature of the transportation
of the stolen goods, then the causer need not know.' This is true
565. See United States v. Scotti, 47 F.3d 1237 (2d Cir. 1995); supra text
accompanying notes 161-68 (discussing Scotti); see also United States v. Samaria, 239
F.3d 228, 234-35 (2d Cir. 2001) (collecting recent Second Circuit cases stating that
aiding and abetting requires specific intent).
566. United States v. Heyman, 794 F.2d 788, 792 (2d Cir. 1986). In interpreting
"willfully," the court in Heyman cited Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside,
Hoffman Estates, Inc, 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982), for the proposition that "a scienter
requirement may mitigate a law's vagueness," and then Boyce Motor Lines v. United
States, 342 U.S. 337, 342 (1952), for the proposition that the requirement of "culpable
intent" protects a regulation from attack on its fairness. If Gabriel's interpretation is
right, however, then "willfully," at least in § 2(b), adds essentially no scienter or
culpable intent beyond that already contained in the underlying statute.
567. In holding that no mental state is necessary for the jurisdictional element,
some cases do not even focus on whether the defendant at issue was a causer rather
than a principal, or on the possibility that such a distinction might be significant. See,
e.g., United States v. Mastrandrea, 942 F.2d 1291, 1294 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that
the defendant need not have known of the jurisdictional element, but without
discussing the defendant's status as a causer as opposed to a principal); United States
v. Kibby, 848 F.2d 920, 922-23 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Kelly, 569 F.2d 928,
933-35 (5th Cir. 1978). Other cases do directly address the defendant's status as a
causer, still coming, however, to the same result based on the reasoning that the
mental state of the causer is derived from that of the principal. See, e.g., United States
v. Lack, 129 F.3d 403, 410 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Auerbach, 913 F.2d 407,
410 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Stern, 858 F.2d 1241, 1247 (7th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Blackmon, 839 F.2d 900, 908 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Scarborough,
813 F.2d 1244, 1245-46 (D.C. Cir. 1987); United States v. Lennon, 751 F.2d 737, 741
(5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Hayes, 739 F.2d 236, 238 (6th Cir. 1984); United
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despite the presence of the word "willfully" in the causing statute.56,
Thus, the Seventh Circuit, applying the derivative approach, rejected
the argument made by a causer that, because of the presence of
"willfully" in § 2(b), he could not be convicted of causing the
interstate transportation of stolen goods unless the government
proved that he had known that the transportation of the stolen goods
would be interstate. The court stated:
Under § 2(b), it is illegal to cause someone else to do what if done
personally would be a violation of federal law. Thus, an accomplice
under § 2(b)-one who causes an illegal act to be done-stands in
the shoes of the actor.... Since... it is not necessary that the
person who uses an interstate facility to further an illegal business
know such a facility operates interstate, it follows that an
accomplice, standing in the shoes of such an actor, need not have
knowledge of the interstate character of the facility used.5 69
The same analysis applies to both the causer and the principal. For
both:
Since interstate transportation is merely the linchpin for federal
jurisdiction and bears no relationship, in terms of culpability, to the
underlying criminal acts which are the objects of § 2314, it follows
that the government should not have to prove that the interstate
transport was in any way reasonably foreseeable.57 0
But, if it is so clear that even for the causer the jurisdictional
element is a strict liability element, why did the Supreme Court in
Sheridan57 and Pereira572 require knowledge or foreseeability? The
States v. Ludwig, 523 F.2d 705, 707 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Kierschke, 315
F.2d 315, 317 (6th Cir. 1963); see also United States v. Leppo, 177 F.3d 93 (1st Cir.
1999) (summarizing causing cases where the underlying offense is 18 U.S.C. § 2314);
Blakey & Roddy, supra note 6, at 1414 & n.279.
568. See Lack, 129 F.3d at 409-10; Stern, 858 F.2d at 1247.
569. Stern, 858 F.2d at 1247; see also United States v. Greatwood, 187 F.3d 649, No.
98-10079, 1999 WL 451766, at **1 (9th Cir. June 29, 1999) (unpublished opinion);
United States v. Michaels, 796 F.2d 1112, 1118 (9th Cir. 1986) (recognizing the
argument that "willfully" in § 2(b) requires a culpable mental state for the interstate
transportation element as "a clever argument, [but one that] is founded on the
erroneous assumption that the specific inclusion of § 2(b) in the indictment somehow
alters the nature of the offense .... In fact, the specific inclusion of § 2(b) is
insignificant").
570. Ludwig, 523 F.2d at 707; see Scarborough, 813 F.2d at 1245-46 (citing
Ludwig); see also Blackmon, 839 F.2d at 907-08 (holding that although the
defendants, who caused an innocent third party to make a fraudulent interstate wire
transfer, must have foreseen the wire transfer, the interstate nature of the wire
transfer need not have been foreseen for liability, because "the only purpose of the
'interstate' requirement is jurisdictional").
571. United States v. Sheridan, 329 U.S. 379 (1946); see supra text accompanying
notes 448-53.
572. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954); see supra text accompanying notes
483-91.
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answer is, according to the derivative approach, that it did not. The
Pereira line of cases involves a:
fraudulently obtained check... drawn on a bank in one state and
deposited by the accused in a bank in another state. In such cases,
the courts have noted the inevitability of the transport of the check
in interstate commerce, and have discussed the evident
foreseeability that the accused's act would take on an interstate
character.573
But, the fact that the interstate transportation element happened to be
reasonably foreseeable does not imply that foreseeability was
necessary:
The discussion of imputed knowledge in these cases should not be
read... as authority for the proposition that there is a requirement
of reasonable foreseeability under the statute. The issue is not
squarely presented when the facts of the case show reasonable
foreseeability in any event? 4
That conclusion-that the Pereira line of cases does not mandate a
culpable mental state for the causer's jurisdictional element-does
not, however, apply to the crime of mail fraud, which also was at issue
in Pereira." Indeed, because of Pereira, all the cases concede that
knowledge or foreseeability is required for the mailing component of
the mail fraud statute. 6 The reason that these cases can ignore
Pereira when it comes to the causer of a violation of the National
Stolen Property Act, while they cannot similarly ignore it when it
comes to the mail fraud statute (although the case involved both
statutes), lies in an important difference between the respective
jurisdictional elements of the two statutes:
A final basis for [defendant's] argument is that "cause" under the
mail fraud statute.., requires knowledge or reasonable
573. Ludwig, 523 F.2d at 708.
574. Id.; see United States v. Lack, 129 F.3d 403,410 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Pereira,
but still holding that the interstate travel element of the crime need not have been
foreseeable by the causer); United States v. Newson, 531 F.2d 979, 981 (10th Cir.
1976) (same); see also United States v. Leppo, 177 F.3d 93, 95-97 (1st Cir. 1999)
(collecting cases, and discussing the word "willfully" and Pereira, but finding it
unnecessary on the facts before it to decide what mental state applies to the causer of
a jurisdictional element); Gonzalez, supra note 95, at 653-55 (suggesting that Pereira
did not decide the issue of what mental state is required for the interstate element,
because on the facts of that case it was clear that the defendant had acted with a
culpable mental state).
575. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994).
576. See, e.g., United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 399 (1974); United States v.
Godwin, 272 F.3d 659, 667 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v. Reyes, 239 F.3d 72. 736
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 2618 (2001); United States v. Peterson, 223 F.3d 756,
760 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 1149 (2001); United States v. Rhodes, 177
F.3d 963, 966 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Serang, 156 F.3d 910, 914 (9th Cir.
1998); United States v. Brown, 147 F.3d 477, 488 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Tocco, 135 F.3d 116, 124-26 (2d Cir. 1998).
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foreseeability that the mails will be used in commission of the fraud,
and that therefore "cause" under section 2314 should as well.
[Defendant] overlooks, however, the different purposes underlying
the statutes. [S]ection 2314 is aimed at the evils of theft, fraud, and
counterfeiting and not at the regulation of interstate transportation.
Suppression of movement of the fruits of theft and fraud is only the
means to the end of suppressing theft and fraud themselves.... On
the other hand, the purpose of the mail fraud statute is to prevent
the use of the mails to facilitate schemes to defraud .... Because
interstate commerce is a means to an end for section 2314 and
prohibiting unlawful use of the mails is the end of the mail fraud
statute, it is perfectly reasonable that only the mail fraud statute
requires... foreseeability. 57
In other words, the same standard applicable to the principal
applies to the causer. For those unusual statutes, such as the mail
fraud statute, where the jurisdictional element (i.e., the mailing) is not
a strict liability element, but one that must be reasonably foreseeable
by the principal, the jurisdictional element must be reasonably
foreseeable by the causer as well. The National Stolen Property Act,
on the other hand, requires no mental state of the principal, and
therefore, requires none of the causer.
In sum, under the derivative approach, strict liability elements are
treated no differently for the causer than other elements of a crime.
The mental state required of the causer is always the same as that
required of the principal. Thus, no mental state is required of the
causer for the jurisdictional element where no mental state is required
of the principal. If, however, a culpable mental state is required of the
principal for a jurisdictional element, such as foreseeability of the
mailing in a case of mail fraud, then that same mental state is also
required of the causer.
IV. A CRITIQUE OF THE VARIOUS APPROACHES
The rather extensive review of the history of 18 U.S.C. § 2, Peoni,
the case law interpreting the aiding and abetting subsection, and the
case law interpreting the causing subsection, yields a number of
conclusions, summarized below and then discussed at greater length.
First, contrary to the generally held view that the federal cases have
all adopted Peoni's purposeful intent approach, the cases actually
employ six approaches: purposeful intent, bad purpose, three forms
of knowledge, and derivative.
Second, although Peoni and other cases authored by Judge Learned
Hand use purposeful intent language, Peoni itself does not adopt any
approach at all with respect to the ordinary aider and abettor; rather,
577. United States v. Lennon, 751 F.2d 737, 741 (5th Cir. 1985) (quotation marks
and citations omitted).
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Peoni only deals with the "natural and probable consequences"
doctrine.
Third, in enacting § 2 Congress sought to eliminate, not create,
distinctions in mental state between the principal and the aider and
abettor, and between the principal and the causer.
Fourth, Congress sought to eliminate differences in mental state not
only between the principal and the accomplice, but also between the
two types of accomplices. The addition of the word "willfully" to the
causing subsection but not to the aiding and abetting subsection was
not meant to distinguish between the aider and abettor and the
causer, but to equate them.
Fifth, the mental state for the strict liability jurisdictional element,
inexplicably, is often treated differently depending on whether the
accomplice is a causer, who is typically required to possess a culpable
mental state, or an aider and abettor, who is not.
Sixth, phrases like "specific intent" and "willfully" are quite
ambiguous, and, at times, have misled those courts trying to ascertain
the mental states of the aider and abettor and the causer.
Seventh, relatively few cases, especially the post-Peoni cases that
treat the issue of mental state as conclusively resolved, deal with the
issues of fairness and public policy in attempting to ascertain the
appropriate mental standard. Rather, most simply resort to stare
decisis, and employ the purportedly well-established standard, only to
reach conflicting results.
In light of these propositions, which approach is "right"? Which
approach did Judge Hand really adopt? Which approach did the
Supreme Court adopt? Which approach did Congress intend? Which
approach yields the most consistent, most desirable, and fairest
results? Should the aider and abettor and the causer be governed by
the same approach?
A. Judge Hand's View: The Purposefid Intent Approach
For the aider and abettor, there is little doubt that Judge Hand
embraced the purposeful intent approach. In Peoni, he held that the
defendant must "in some sort associate himself with the venture, ..
participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring about, ... seek
by his action to make it succeedY The defendant must act with a
"purposive attitude." 9
True, we have seen how Peoni, upon closer examination, is not as
clear as it seems. The other approaches, not just the purposeful intent
approach, also cite it in support of their respective mental states,
demonstrating how hard it is to define precisely what Peoni, standing
578. United States v. Peoni. 100 F.2d 401,402 (2d Cir. 1938).
579. Id.
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alone, really means. Furthermore, we have seen that Peoni is really
not an aiding and abetting case at all; it leaves open the question of
the aider and abettor's mental state, addressing instead the question
of "natural and probable consequences. "580
Nonetheless, an examination of all of Judge Hand's cases reveals
quite clearly what his view was. Peoni does not stand alone. In cases
other than Peoni, Judge Hand repeatedly rejected the competing
knowledge approach. 81 Similarly, in cases other than Peoni, he
repeated his famous formulation in ways that unmistakably convey
purposeful intent. The aider and abettor "must in some sense
promote the[] venture himself, make it his own, have a stake in its
outcome."5" The aider and abettor "must make the venture his own;
the crime must be a fulfillment in some degree of an enterprise which
he has adopted as his; his act must be in realization of his purpose."5'3
"[W]e have uniformly held that the prosecution must prove the
accused to have associated himself with the principals in the sense that
he has a stake in the success of the venture. ' '514
Thus, although Peoni may not be Judge Hand's definitive aiding
and abetting case, when it is read together with Judge Hand's other
cases, it is clear that Judge Hand was a strong proponent of purposeful
intent.
Purposeful intent was the mental state that Judge Hand applied not
only to the aider and abettor, but also to the causer. When he
examined the pre-"willfully" version of the causing provision, and
found that it did not prescribe a mental state, he borrowed the
purposeful intent approach from the aider and abettor. 85 He thus was
of the view that the mental state applicable to the aider and abettor
should apply to the causer. He was one of the very few judges who
took the very sensible step of equating the two.
Not only did he apply the purposeful intent approach to both the
aider and abettor and the causer, he extended the approach even
further to encompass the strict liability jurisdictional element.
Consequently, he reversed a causer's conviction for interstate
transportation of counterfeit checks, when the defendant only knew
of, but did not desire, the interstate component of the
580. See supra Part II.C.4.
581. See United States v. Chiarella, 184 F.2d 903, 909 (2d Cir. 1950) (L. Hand, J.),
modified on other grounds, 187 F.2d 12 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 341 U.S. 946
(1951); United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J.), affd, 311
U.S. 205 (1940); see supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
582. Falcone, 109 F.2d at 581; see supra note 135 and accompanying text.
583. United States v. Paglia, 190 F.2d 445, 448 (2d Cir. 1951); see supra note 137
and accompanying text.
584. United Sates v. Di Re, 159 F.2d 818, 819 (2d Cir. 1947) (L. Hand, J.), af'tl,
332 U.S. 581 (1948); see supra note 135.
585. See supra text accompanying notes 462-66.
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transportation. 86 Moreover, it was clear from his opinion that he
would have applied this conclusion equally to the aider and abettor.
According to Judge Hand, both accomplices must always act vith
purposeful intent, even with respect to the jurisdictional element.
He retreated from his application of purposeful intent to the
jurisdictional element only when confronted with Supreme Court
precedent that he had inadvertently missed; but then, in conformity
with that opinion, he simply reduced the required mental state a notch
to knowledge or reasonable foreseeabilitys1a
In adopting the purposeful intent approach, however, Judge Hand
failed to take into account the reason behind the enactment of the
federal aiding and abetting statute: the elimination of distinctions
between the accomplice and the principal. Instead, he created new
distinctions between the accomplices and the principal. Under his
purposeful intent approach, the accomplice must generally act with
purposeful intent, except for the jurisdictional element, which still
requires knowledgeYs9 The principal, on the other hand, must act with
whatever mental state is prescribed by statute, which usually means no
mental state at all for the jurisdictional element. These gaps between
the accomplice and principal are plainly inconsistent with
congressional intent.
B. The Supreme Court's View: The Knowledge, Purposefid Intent, and
Derivative Approaches
The Supreme Court in Nye & Nissen v. United States" adopted
Judge Hand's Peoni formulation, quoting it verbatim, apparently
without realizing that in Peoni Judge Hand had left open the question
of the aider and abettor, and limited himself to the issue of "natural
and probable consequences.""59 Today, Nye & Nissen, no less than
Peoni, is viewed as the case that resolved the issue in favor of
purposeful intent.592 As often as they cite Peoni, the purposeful intent
cases cite Nye & Nissen.5 93
586. See supra text accompanying notes 469-77.
587. See supra text accompanying note 476.
588. See supra text accompanying notes 480-82.
589. Although many subsequent cases have agreed with Judge Hand when the
accomplice is a causer, none have so held when the accomplice is an aider and
abettor. Virtually all the subsequent aiding and abetting cases have treated the
jurisdictional element as a strict liability element.
590. 336 U.S. 613 (1949).
591. See supra Part II.C.4.
592. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26: supra note 40 and accompanying
text.
593. A Westlaw key cite search of the headnote in Nve & Nissen that incorporates
the quote of Peoni, conducted on February 5,2002. yielded 429 cases. Although cases
adopting other approaches have also cited Nye & Nissen, a significant number of the
429 cases would be purposeful intent cases. See also supra note 30 (estimating the
number of cases that have endorsed the Peoni formulation quoted in N.Ye & Nissen to
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But, the Supreme Court has not limited itself to the purposeful
intent approach; in fact, in other cases it has explicitly adopted some
of the other approaches. For example, roughly eighty years before its
decision in Nye & Nissen, the Supreme Court in Hanauer v. Doane"'4
relied on the knowledge approach in concluding that a vendor who
sold military supplies, knowing that the purchaser would convey them
to the Confederacy, was guilty of treason.595
Then, some six years before Nye & Nissen, the Court in United
States v. Dotterweich596 relied on the derivative approach in concluding
that the president of a corporation was strictly liable for aiding and
abetting its shipment of misbranded and adulterated drugs.
Four years later, and a mere two years before Nye & Nissen, the
Court returned to the knowledge approach in Bozza v. United
States,597 when it held that a defendant assisting in the operation of an
illegal distillery was guilty of aiding and abetting the defrauding of the
United States, because he knew that the goal of the distillers was to
evade taxes.
Finally, twelve years after Nye & Nissen, the Court in Scales v.
United States5 98 quoted with approval a draft of the Model Penal Code
that allowed for liability based on mere knowledge when the act of
facilitation is substantial.
Thus, the Supreme Court, at one time or another, has adopted the
purposeful intent approach, the knowledge approach, and the
derivative approach, and never really discarded any of them. For
example, Nye & Nissen, while quoting Peoni's purposeful intent
formulation, cites the derivative case of Dotterweich with approval. 9
Even after Nye & Nissen, the Supreme Court has cited Dotterweich
with approval.'
be over a thousand).
594. 79 U.S. 342 (1870); see supra text accompanying notes 111-17.
595. Hanauer, 79 U.S. at 347.
596. 320 U.S. 277 (1943); see supra text accompanying notes 346-63.
597. 330 U.S. 160 (1947); see supra text accompanying notes 139-42.
598. 367 U.S. 203 (1961); see supra text accompanying notes 310-13.
599. Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 618-19 (1949) (citing
Dotterweich); see supra text accompanying note 363.
600. See United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609 (1971) (citing Dotterweich).
Relying, in part, on Dotterweich, the Court in Freed upheld the convictions, including
the conviction on the conspiracy count, on a strict liability basis. It did so because the
underlying substantive offense was a strict liability offense. See United States v. Feola,
420 U.S. 671, 688 (1975) (describing that in Freed "[wie held that actual knowledge
that the grenades were unregistered was not an element of the substantive offense
created by Congress and therefore upheld the indictment both as to the substantive
offense and as to the charge of conspiracy"). Freed is therefore fairly read as
extending the derivative approach to the conspirator based, in part, on Dotterweich.
This extension of Dotterweich's derivative approach took place long after Nye &
Nissen, and suggests that the derivative approach retains its vitality even after Nye &
Nissen.
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The only approach that the Supreme Court has never adopted for
the aider and abettor is the bad purpose approach.
For the causer, it is also not clear precisely which mental state the
Supreme Court has adopted. The Supreme Court's primary causing
case is Pereira,"' which dealt with the causing of the jurisdictional
elements of both the mail fraud statute ' and the National Stolen
Property Act. 3 Pereira seems to suggest that knowledge is enough,
but, as we have seen, the full import of the case is uncertain," - and it is
cited not only by knowledge cases, but also by purposeful intent cases
and derivative cases.' Ultimately, the case may not sustain much
beyond the simple proposition that, in negotiating a bad out-of-state
check, one causes its transportation interstate.
All the Supreme Court's cases-both the aiding and abetting cases
and the causing cases-fail to include one critical component of
analysis. Despite the fact that as early as 1926 the Supreme Court
wrote of Congress's desire to eliminate the distinctions between the
aider and abettor and the principal,.0 7 the Court-like Judge Hand-
has never considered Congress's intent when discussing the
accomplice's mental state. Even in Dotterweich, where the Court
utilizes the derivative approach (which epitomizes the elimination of
such distinctions), it does not refer to this intent of Congress.
C. Congressional Intent: The Derivative Approach
As we have seen, in enacting 18 U.S.C. § 2, Congress sought to
abolish the antiquated distinctions between the accomplice and the
principal that so bedeviled the common law. Only the derivative
approach achieves this goal.
The other approaches accomplish the very opposite: they
effectively multiply the distinctions between the accomplice and the
principal. Because each of the non-derivative approaches imposes its
independent mental state regardless of that of the principal, the
mental states of the principal and the accomplice will often diverge
dramatically. That is not what Congress intended.
This divergence also complicates, rather than simplifies, the jury's
task, and such complication of the jury's task is also contrary to
601. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954).
602. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994).
603. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1994).
604. See Pereira 347 U.S. at 9 ("When Pereira delivered the check, drawn on an
out-of-state bank... for collection, he "caused" it to be transported in interstate
commerce. It is common knowledge that such checks must be sent to the drawee
bank for collection.... (emphasis added)); supra text accompanying notes 490-91.
605. See supra text accompanying notes 492-94.
606. See supra text accompanying note 520 (purposeful intent approach); supra
notes 573-74 and accompanying text (derivative approach).
607. See Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10. 19 (1980) (quoting Hammer v.
United States, 271 U.S. 620, 628 (1926)): supra text accompanying note 83.
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Congress's intent. If the jury is instructed to apply purposeful intent
to an accomplice in a case involving a knowledge offense, for example,
then the jury-because the accomplice will be guilty only with
purposeful intent, while the principal will be guilty based on mere
knowledge6°S-will have to determine whether the defendant is an
accomplice or a principal to know which mental state to apply.609 But,
Congress did not want the jury to have to make that determination;
that is why Congress originally provided that an accomplice "is a
principal," and continues to provide that an accomplice "is punishable
as a principal, '610 and that is why the cases developed the "no
distinction" rule,6 1 which, as we have seen, permits the jury to convict
without making that determination. 611
The non-derivative approaches also necessarily resurrect the
intricate common-law distinctions that were at the very heart of what
Congress sought to eliminate.1 3 Once a jury, to determine which
mental state applies, has to determine whether the defendant is an
accomplice or a principal, the only way to do so is to fall back on the
old common-law distinctions.
608. See United States v. Scotti, 47 F.3d 1237, 1247 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding, in the
context of a knowledge offense, that "because aiding and abetting required proof of
Rodriguez's purpose to bring about the crime, it is more difficult to prove than
principal liability"); supra text accompanying notes 161-69.
609. Outside the accomplice context, the Supreme Court has indicated that
knowledge and purposeful intent are generally interchangeable. See United States v.
Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 404 (1980) (criminal antitrust); United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 444 (1978) (escape from prison); supra note 455. But, that
equation of the two mental states does not necessarily apply to the accomplice. First,
the distinction between knowledge and purposeful intent is so firmly established in
the law of the accomplice that a pronouncement by the Supreme Court in another
context cannot be automatically extended to the accomplice. Second, the Supreme
Court itself has indicated that this equation of the two mental states does not apply to
"inchoate offenses such as attempt and conspiracy, where a heightened mental state
separates criminality itself from otherwise innocuous behavior." Bailey, 444 U.S. at
405. Presumably, that also holds true for the accomplice, who also engages in what
often is-apart from the criminal mental state-innocuous behavior. See United
States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 192 F.3d 926, 929 (9th Cir. 1999) (indicating that aiding
and abetting, like the crime of attempt, requires a heightened mental state of specific
intent to compensate for the uncertainty as to what precisely was intended by
someone who did not actually commit the offense (quoting United States v.
Sayetisitty, 107 F.3d 1405, 1412 (9th Cir. 1997))), vacated on other grounds, 231 F.3d
1188 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
610. We have seen that "is a principal" was the language in the original 1909 aiding
and abetting subsection, and "is also a principal" was the language in the original 1948
causing subsection. Congress changed those phrases to "as a principal" in 1951 for
unrelated reasons that did not reflect any desire to change its goal of eliminating the
distinctions between the accomplice and the principal. See supra text accompanying
notes 80-93.
611. See supra Part I.B.
612. See supra text accompanying notes 99-103.
613. See supra text accompanying notes 71-84 (discussing the old common-law
distinctions, and their abolition with the enactment of the aiding and abetting statute).
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Making those distinctions is not only the precise task that Congress
sought to abolish, it is also an impossible task; it is easy to see why
Congress sought to eliminate the necessity of undertaking such a task.
For example, assume two defendants are involved in a theft. One
masterminds the theft, prepares the fraudulent paperwork, and then
gives the paperwork to the second defendant, the driver, who simply
picks up the stolen goods at the shipping dock:
[T]he distinction between aiders and abettors and principals in cases
such as this is to a great extent semantic. Is the driver of the truck
the principal because of his physical contact with the stolen goods?
Or, should he be viewed as the aider and abettor because the plan
for taking the goods was conceived by another person? Conversely,
is the man who engineered the theft the principal, or rather the aider
and abettor?614
The answers to these questions may define which mental state to
apply, and thereby define liability.
Or, assume a case of Hobbs Act extortion, defined as "the obtaining
of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use
of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear."61  As part of a
prearranged plan, one of the defendants makes the threat to the
victim (thereby inducing the victim's consent through the "wrongful
use of... threatened force, violence, or fear"), while, on the next day,
the other defendant picks up the money ("obtains[] ... property from
another"). Who is the principal, and who is the aider and abettor?
Again, the answer may determine which mental state to apply, and
thereby define liability.
But, Congress, in enacting § 2, and "abolish[ing] the distinction
between principals and accessories,"6 '6 intended to eliminate the need
to engage in such an exercise:
18 U.S.C. § 2... defines a principal for purposes of the federal
criminal code, and its effect is to erase whatever distinctions may
have previously existed between different classes of principals and
between principals and aiders or abettors.1 7
Any approach requiring different mental states of the principal and
the accomplice for the same offense "introduce[s] new distinctions
between principals and aiders and abettors, precisely the result § 2
was designed to avoid. ' 618  Thus, only the derivative approach
comports with Congress's intent.
614. United States v. Bryan, 483 F.2d 88, 95 (3d Cir. 1973) (en banc); see also supra
note 102; supra text accompanying notes 99-102.
615. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1994).
616. Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 19 (1980) (quoting Hammer v. United
States, 271 U.S. 620, 628 (1926)).
617. United States v. Jones, 308 F.2d 26,31 (2d Cir. 1962) (en banc).
618. Id. at 33.
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Finally, it is clear that Congress sought to eliminate distinctions not
only between the accomplice and the principal, but also between the
two types of accomplices.619 Yet, distinctions between the aider and
abettor and the causer, often unrecognized, still abound. The
jurisdictional element, as it frequently does, serves as a good example:
the non-derivative cases routinely impose a culpable mental state on
the jurisdictional element when the accomplice is a causer, but not an
aider and abettor, whom they treat, in this respect, like the
principal. 60 Thus, according to the knowledge cases, while a causer
must know or reasonably foresee that the principal will transport the
stolen goods out of state,6"' the aider and abettor need not.62
An even more pronounced distinction between the aider and
abettor and the causer is made by the Second Circuit, which, in its
more recent cases, has (usually, but not always) applied the
purposeful intent approach to the aider and abettor,623 but the
derivative approach to the causer. 4
These distinctions between the mental state of the causer and that
of the aider and abettor are inconsistent with Congress's intent to
equate both the aider and abettor and the causer to the principal.
Congress did so originally, by including the phrase "is a principal" in
both of § 2's accomplice provisions.6' Although Congress amended
that language in 1951 for unrelated reasons, it intended that the new
phrase "punishable as a principal" continue to make the same point.626
That language equates the accomplices not only to the principal, but
also to each other; the two accomplices, each deemed a principal,
should be treated the same.
"[1]s a principal" or "punishable as a principal" is not the only
language in § 2 that is inconsistent with the distinctions made by the
non-derivative approaches between the causer and the aider and
abettor. "Willfully" is also inconsistent with those distinctions. We
have seen how, in response to Judge Learned Hand's concerns over
the absence in the causing subsection of any language implying a
culpable mental state, Congress added "willfully" to the causing
619. See supra Part III.B. There are two obvious exceptions to the equation of the
accomplices: the nature of the act ("cause" versus "aid" and "abet," etc.), see supra
text accompanying notes 14-15, 104-08; and the nature of the principal (innocent
versus guilty), see supra text accompanying notes 61-67, 85-88.
620. See supra text accompanying notes 448-53, 469-92, 514-22, 544-47 (causer);
supra text accompanying notes 229-34 (aider and abettor).
621. See supra text accompanying note 544.
622. See supra text accompanying note 230.
623. See supra note 159 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying notes
161-69 (discussing Scotti).
624. See supra text accompanying notes 557-63 (discussing Gabriel).
625. See supra text accompanying notes 80-93; supra note 610. The causing
subsection actually provided, when originally enacted in 1948, "is also a principal."
See supra text accompanying notes 87-89.
626. See supra text accompanying notes 90-93.
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subsection to bring the causer's mental state into line with that of the
aider and abettor.627 Indeed, the Second Circuit recognized over
thirty-five years ago that the mental state for both the aider and
abettor and the causer had always been uniformly the same, both
before and after the addition of the word in 1951.2-
Even if "willfully" was intended by Congress to distinguish
between, rather than equate, the subsections, the Second Circuit's
application of the derivative approach to the causer and the
purposeful intent approach to the aider and abettor still makes little
sense. Since the word "willfully" is present only in the causing
provision, not the aiding and abetting provision, presumably, it is the
causer who must act with the more culpable mental state. Yet, the
Second Circuit's distinction will often impose the more culpable
mental state not on the causer, but on the aider and abettor; in cases
of knowledge offenses, the causer, governed by the derivative
approach, will be liable based on only knowledge, while the aider and
abettor, governed by the purposeful intent approach, will not be liable
unless acting with purposeful intent. The subsection lacking the word
"willfully" ends up imposing a more culpable mental state than the
subsection containing "willfully."
Once again, the derivative approach achieves what Congress
intended. Under the derivative approach, both the aider and abettor
and the causer derive their mental state from the principal. When
purposeful intent is the mental state for the principal, it is the mental
state for both the alder and abettor and the causer. Similarly, when a
jurisdictional element is a strict liability element for the principal, it is
a strict liability element not only for the aider and abettor, but also the
causer. The jury need not determine whether a participant was an
accomplice as opposed to a principal. In this respect, Congress's
intent that the aider and abettor and the causer be treated
indistinguishably is satisfied.
D. The Approach Without a Sponsor: The Bad Purpose Approach
Our review of Judge Learned Hand's view, the Supreme Court's
views, and Congress's intent, reveals the origins of all the approaches
save one: the bad purpose approach. When confronted with the old
dispute between knowledge and purposeful intent, Judge Hand chose
purposeful intent. The Supreme Court adopted the knowledge,
purposeful intent, and derivative approaches. Congress presumably
wanted only that approach consistent with its goal of abolishing the
distinctions between the principal and the accomplice, i.e., the
derivative approach. But, how did the bad purpose approach
originate?
627. See supra Part III.B.
628. See supra text accompanying note 499.
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For the causer, the answer is relatively simple. Its governing
provision, 18 U.S.C. § 2(b), contains the word "willfully." As we have
seen, one of the many meanings of "willfully" is acting with a bad
purpose-a specific intent to violate the law;6 9 indeed, this is the
meaning that, "as a general matter," the word carries.630 Thus, it is
understandable that many cases blithely assume that Congress added
"willfully" to introduce the mental state of bad purpose. But, those
cases, in making that assumption, do so unaware that "willfully" was
added by Congress in 1951 not to introduce some new mental state or
change the causer's mental state from what it had been pre-"willfully,"
but only to confirm the pre-"willfully" efforts to equate the causer's
mental state to that of the aider and abettor.631
Any effort to determine what Congress intended in adding
"willfully" depends, therefore, not only on the meaning of the word,
but also on which mental state the cases had applied to the aider and
abettor at the time. Since all the other approaches are consistent with
"willfully" (even, as we have seen, the derivative approach632), and all
the other approaches had already been applied at one time or another
to the aider and abettor, there is no basis for assuming that Congress
meant bad purpose when it added "willfully" to the causing
subsection.
A failure to recognize the real reasons for the addition of "willfully"
can lead to troubling results. For example, the Third Circuit in
Curran6 33 concluded that "willfully" implied not just bad purpose, but
a heightened form of bad purpose-i.e., not just a general awareness
that one is violating the law, but an awareness of the precise legal duty
being violated.6
For the causer, then, the origin of the bad purpose approach is
relatively uncomplicated. The far more difficult question is how the
bad purpose approach made its way into the aiding and abetting case
law. After all, the word "willfully" appears neither in § 2(a) nor in
Judge Hand's famous aiding and abetting formulation. Nonetheless,
"willfully" still seems to be the culprit. Despite its absence from §
2(a), the courts frequently use the word in opinions and instructions to
the jury when defining the precise contours of the aider and abettor's
mental state.635 They use it not necessarily in the bad purpose sense,
629. See supra note 501 and accompanying text.
630. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
631. See supra Part III.B.
632. See supra text accompanying notes 511, 557-63.
633. United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560 (3d Cir. 1994).
634. See supra text accompanying notes 525-39.
635. See, e.g., United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 971 (1988) (appendix to
concurring opinion of Stevens, J.) (quoting jury instructions); United States v. Vallo,
238 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Whitney, 229 F.3d 1296, 1303
(10th Cir. 2000), which quoted United States v. Anderson, 189 F.3d 1201, 1207 (10th
Cir. 1999)), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 2205 (2001); United States v. Palmer, 203 F.3d 55,
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but, at least in some instances, merely to stress that the aider and
abettor is not guilty unless he or she "willfully" associates and
"willfully" participates in the venture-in the sense that the defendant
must act knowingly, intentionally, and deliberately, as opposed to
accidentally or unwittingly (e.g., while sleepwalking)." This is one of
the other meanings of "willfully" that we have seen before.'
But, the word is ambiguous. As we have seen, the ambiguity in a
word that appears so often in the law led Judge Hand to describe the
word as "dreadful," "awful," and "one of the most troublesome words
in a statute that I know."63s What seems to have happened is that, in
the context of the aider and abettor, one of its meanings-
"deliberately"-was displaced by the othervise inapplicable bad
purpose meaning. Thus, even though "willfully" does not appear in
the aiding and abetting subsection, its use in the efforts to explain that
the aider and abettor must act deliberately created an opening
through which its bad purpose meaning entered and then altered the
mental state required of the aider and abettor.639
Adding to the confusion created by "willfully" is the phrase
"specific intent." We have seen how the aiding and abetting cases
66 (1st Cir.), cert denied, 530 U.S. 1281 (2000); United States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860,
869 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Thomas, 11 F.3d 620, 631 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting
jury instructions with approval); United States v. Bosch, 914 F.2d 1239, 1248 (9th Cir.
1990) (quoting what it described as the "standard" jury instruction); United States v.
Broadwell, 870 F.2d 594, 607 n.32 (11th Cir. 1989) (quoting jury instruction with
approval); United States v. Palella, 846 F.2d 977, 982 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting United
States v. Aguirre Aguirre, 716 F.2d 293, 298 (5th Cir. 1983)); United States. v.
Pflaumer, 774 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985) (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (quoting jury
instructions); United States v. Gomez, 733 F.2d 69, 73 (8th Cir. 1984); Pattern Jury
Instructions of the District Judges Association of the Eleventh Circuit, Criminal
Cases, special instruction no. 6 (1985) (quoted in O'Malley et al., supra note 39, §
18.01); Sand et al., supra note 39, instruction no. 11-2.
636. See, e.g., United States v. Wiseman, 172 F.3d 1196, 1217 (10th Cir. 1999)
(finding that aider and abettor acted "knowingly," and upholding the conviction
relying on the "willfully" language quoted from United States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860,
869 (10th Cir. 1995)); United States v. Bey, 736 F.3d 891, 896 (3d Cir. 1984)
(explaining, in the context of aiding and abetting, that "'willfully' generally connotes
the doing of a voluntary, deliberate or intentional act").
637. See supra notes 503-05 and accompanying text. In that sense, the word simply
denotes the first of the two mental states applicable to the accomplice: the first is that
he or she act deliberately and intentionally, not by mistake or while sleepwalking. See
supra text accompanying note 17. It is the accomplice's second mental state that is
the focus of this Article-namely, once the accomplice commits an act deliberately,
what must the accomplice know or intend regarding the underlying offense?
638. United States v. Hayden, 64 F.3d 126, 129 n.5 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Model
Penal Code § 2.02 cmt. at 249 n.47 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985),
which quotes ALI Proceeding 160 (1955)); see supra text accompanying note 508.
639. Bey, in support of its definition of "willfully" as "a voluntary, deliberate or
intentional act," 736 F.2d at 896, cites United States r. Poinponio, 429 U.S. 10 (1976)
(per curiam), following a "see" signal. But, Pomponio uses "willfully" in the very
different bad purpose sense. See Pornponio, 429 U.S. at 12-13 (defining "willfully" to
mean "intentional violation of a known legal duty," and equating that formulation to
"bad faith or evil intent," or "evil motive" (quotations omitted)).
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employ that phrase in at least three different ways.640 Like the
ambiguity in the word "willfully," inherent in the phrase "specific
intent" is an "ambiguity" that has generated a "good deal of
confusion." 1 Indeed, because of the phrase's multiple meanings, its
use has been subjected to "richly deserved criticism,"' 2 and the
Supreme Court643 and appellate courts have strongly recommended
that district courts, in their jury instructions, avoid the "'specific
intent'/'general intent' quagmire. "I
Here, too, once "specific intent" was used in one sense, it created an
opening for its other meanings. Apparently, the phrase "specific
intent" was originally used in the aiding and abetting context to mean
purposeful intent. Although designed to convey only that precise
meaning, the phrase "specific intent" eventually brought along with it
some of its other meanings. One of the unintended meanings was bad
purpose, or the intent to violate a known legal duty.
A few courts have been sensitive to that misinterpretation of the
phrase, and have rejected efforts by aiders and abettors to define
"specific intent" in a way that requires an intent to disobey the law.
Thus, one court speaking in the context of the aider and abettor's
mental state stated that "[w]here knowledge that an act is against the
law is not an essential element of the offense, an instruction requiring
640. See supra text accompanying notes 157-60 (purposeful intent approach), 250-
54 (bad purpose approach), 323-37 (derivative approach).
641. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394,403 (1980).
642. United States v. Golitschek, 808 F.2d 195, 201 n.2 (2d Cir. 1986); see United
States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1195-96 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that "the
distinction between specific intent and general intent 'has been the source of a good
deal of confusion"' (quoting Bailey)); United States v. Laughlin, 26 F.3d 1523, 1527
(10th Cir. 1994) ("[I]nstruct[ion] in terms of 'specific intent' has been disfavored by
the courts because of the confusion and ambiguous nature of such an instruction.");
United States v. Rawlings, 982 F.2d 590, 592 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("[Clourts have
criticized [specific intent] as too general and potentially misleading to a jury.");
United States v. Barclay, 560 F.2d 812, 818 (7th Cir. 1977) ("We recognize that many
commentators have regarded these jurisprudential concepts as awkward and
unhelpful.").
643. See Liporata v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 433 n.16 (1985) (noting criticism
of specific intent instructions, and suggesting that jury instructions be tailored to the
mental state of the particular statute involved).
644. United States v. Ruiz, 932 F.2d 1174, 1182 (7th Cir. 1991). In United States v.
Markowski, 772 F.2d 358 (7th Cir. 1985), the court commented that:
[D]istinctions among [the various mental states] tax the greatest interpreters.
The piling of explanation on explanation in an effort to clarify what intent
means may have the opposite effect. We have therefore held that with rare
exceptions.., a court need not elaborate for the jury on the differences
between general and specific intent.
Id. at 364-65; see United States v. Dougherty, 763 F.2d 970, 973-74 (8th Cir. 1985)
(agreeing that better approach is not to instruct the jury on specific intent, but rather
to instruct on the precise mental state applicable to the individual offense); United
States v. Brown, 739 F.2d 1136, 1143 (7th Cir. 1984) ("distinction between specific and
general intent tends to confuse juries").
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a finding of specific intent to disobey the law is not proper."" Many
other courts, however, have not been so alert.
In sum, the combination of the ambiguous phrase "specific intent"
and the equally ambiguous word "willfully" led many cases to apply a
mental state never envisioned by Judge Hand, the Supreme Court, or
Congress-purposeful desire to violate the law. Once it is clear that
this mental state, among the strictest known to the law, is not
compelled by the word "willfully," then there is no justification for
imposing it and thereby ignoring one of the long-established rules of
criminal law: "The general rule that ignorance of the law or a mistake
of law is no defense to criminal prosecution is deeply rooted in the
American legal system."'
E. Fairest Results
Putting aside what Judge Learned Hand, the Supreme Court, or
Congress intended, which approach yields the fairest, most sensible
results? Is there any sense in distinguishing between the aider and
abettor and the causer? The analysis turns to the latter question first.
1. The Aider and Abettor and the Causer Should Be Governed by the
Same Mental State
We have seen that unlike many others, Congress and Judge Hand
sought to subject the aider and abettor and the causer to the same
mental state. Fairness and consistency dictate the same.
Most circuits have not thought of comparing the two accomplices,
but instead have simply developed two unconnected lines of cases that
often reach different conclusions. Thus, as we have seen, by
developing two unconnected lines of cases, the Second Circuit has
concluded that the derivative approach applies to the causer, while the
purposeful intent approach applies to the aider and abettor. That is
not only contrary to what Judge Hand and Congress envisioned, it
645. United States v. Gutberlet, 939 F.2d 643, 647 (8th Cir. 1991); see also United
States v. Arambasich, 597 F.2d 609, 613 (7th Cir. 1979) ("Use of the phrase 'purposely
intending to violate the law' may be erroneously interpreted by jurors, for example, to
require that the defendant know his act violates a criminal statute, which is ordinarily
unnecessary...."). Similarly, outside the aiding and abetting context, the courts have
rejected claims that "specific intent" requires a finding of "bad purpose." United
States v. Rawlings, 982 F.2d 590, 593 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (not "all federal crimes of
specific intent ... require proof of 'bad purpose"').
646. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991) (citations omitted); see
Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 149 (1994) (recognizing the "venerable
principle that ignorance of the law generally is no defense to a criminal charge"
(citations omitted)); United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 612 (1971) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) ("If the ancient maxim that 'ignorance of the law is no excuse' has any
residual validity, it indicates that the ordinary intent requirement-mens rea-of the
criminal law does not require knowledge that an act is illegal, wrong, or
blameworthy.").
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also yields unfair results. It means that the liability of two similarly
situated accomplices who commit identical acts with identical mental
states can differ. When the principal is an innocent intermediary, then
the accomplice is a causer and, therefore, governed by the derivative
approach. When the principal is a guilty participant, however, then
the accomplice is an aider and abettor and, therefore, governed by the
very different purposeful intent approach.
An example illustrates the illogic in having the accomplice's liability
depend on the culpability of the principal. A drug dealer within the
Second Circuit, who orders a member of his ring to shoot a drug rival,
is guilty of assault for having commanded or induced the shooting.
Because the Second Circuit applies the purposeful intent approach to
aiders and abettors, the drug dealer is guilty only if he acted with
purposeful intent. If, however, instead of ordering the shooting, he
lies to his confederate, persuading him that he must shoot the rival in
self-defense, then the drug dealer, having acted through an innocent
intermediary, is not an aider and abettor, but a causer. Because the
Second Circuit applies the derivative approach to causers, the drug
dealer is guilty even if acting without purposeful intent, since assault is
not a purposeful intent offense. 647
These different mental states can lead to different results. The
diminished capacity defense, for example, is relevant if the offense is a
specific/purposeful intent offense, but not if it is a general intent
offense. 8 Thus, the Second Circuit, in applying one approach to the
aider and abettor and another to the causer, would allow the drug
dealer to raise as a defense that he was drunk only if the shooter was a
culpable principal, but not if the shooter shot in self-defense. But
what justification is there for this distinction? There is no reason that
the guilt of the accomplice (the drug dealer) should depend on the
vagaries of the state of mind of the principal (the shooter).
Presumably, the drug dealer does not know, and does not care,
whether the shooter whom he "commanded" or "induced" (in the
language of § 2(a)) or "caused" (in the language of § 2(b)) acted
innocently or with culpable intent, yet that factor could determine the
accomplice's mental state, the availability of the voluntary
intoxication defense, and, thus, his liability.
What makes even less sense is distinguishing between the aider and
abettor and the causer with respect to the strict liability jurisdictional
element. Imagine that a fence instructs his new errand boy to
transport stolen goods from point A to point B, both in New York,
along a specific back road. Neither the fence nor the errand boy
realize that the road briefly meanders into, and out of, New Jersey
along its route. If the errand boy knows of the stolen nature of the
647. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
648. See supra text accompanying notes 23949, 377-82; supra note 377.
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goods, then he is a guilty principal, and therefore, the fence is an aider
and abettor for having commanded, induced, or procured the crime.
Both are guilty despite their lack of awareness of the interstate nature
of the route, since knowledge of the interstate element is required
neither of the principal nor the aider and abettor. But, if the errand
boy is simply an innocent intermediary, then the fence is not an aider
and abettor, since aiding and abetting liability implies a guilty
principal. Instead, because the boy acts with an innocent state of
mind, the fence is a causer. But, as a causer, he is guilty only if he
knows or intends (depending on the approach) the jurisdictional
element. Because he is unaware of the interstate route, he is not
liable.
This result is obviously indefensible. Distinguishing between the
causer and the aider and abettor yields unjustifiably different results
for accomplices who commit the same act with the same mental state.
Different results should depend on the accomplice's own mental state
and act, not on whether the principal through whom the accomplice
acts is a culpable actor or an innocent intermediary.
Thus, the aider and abettor and the causer should be governed by
the same mental state. If not, then at the very least, the causer should
be treated like the aider and abettor when it comes to the strict
liability jurisdictional element; regardless of the approach, there
should be no culpable mental state required of an accomplice when it
comes to strict liability elements.
The next question is: assuming the same standard applies to both
the causer and the aider and abettor, which of the various
approaches-purposeful intent, knowledge, or bad purpose-is the
fairest, most sensible approach?
2. Advantages of the Derivative Approach: Fewest Anomalous
Results; Conformity with Congressional Intent; Equal Treatment of
All Participants
Of the various approaches, the derivative approach works the most
straightforwardly. The derivative approach generally avoids
anomalous, unfair distinctions between the principal and the
accomplice. Whenever the principal needs no culpable state of mind,
the same holds true for both the aider and abettor, and the causer.
Given the many situations where it wvill be almost impossible to
untangle who is a principal, who is an aider and abettor, and who is a
causer, it makes sense to apply the same mental state. Once the same
mental state applies, it becomes very easy to apply the "no
distinction" rule and to instruct the jury that it need not determine
whether a given participant acted as a principal or an accomplice.
The other approaches increase the likelihood of unfair results. In
particular, the purposeful intent and bad purpose approaches end up
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protecting those who deserve protection the least. The terms
"counsel," "command," "induce," and "procure" (contained in §
2(a)), and "cause" (contained in § 2(b)), clearly encompass
participants standing very high on the moral culpability ladder. But,
because they are still accomplices, under the purposeful intent or bad
purpose approaches, they cannot be convicted unless acting with a
mental state that is often significantly harder to prove than the mental
state of the principal. Even under the knowledge approach, the
accomplice will, at times, be liable only with a more culpable mental
state if the underlying offense is a strict liability offense.
For example, threatening the President via the mail is a federal
criminal offense. 9 Because this offense is one of only general intent,
a defendant who mails a letter containing an obvious threat, but who
intends no harm, is still guilty. Specific intent to injure the President is
not an element.60 Assume that one defendant conceives of a plot to
threaten the President, composes and writes a letter containing an
obvious threat, and then persuades his friend, who aware of its
contents, does nothing more than mail the letter. Presumably, only
the sender of the letter is the principal, since the statute proscribes the
"deposit[ing] for conveyance in the mail" any threatening letter,
which is precisely what the friend did. The writer of the letter, even
though far more culpable, is not a principal, but an "inducer" or
"procurer" who is liable by application of the aiding and abetting
statute.
If the governing standard is not the derivative approach but, say,
the purposeful intent approach, then, because the writer is an aider
and abettor, while the sender is a principal, they will be governed by
very different mental states. The writer must act with purposeful
intent, while the sender is liable based only on general intent, in
accordance with the underlying statute. If neither has the intent to
injure or frighten the President, the friend who volunteered to mail
the letter is still liable, but the writer is not. Or, if both got drunk
together, voluntary intoxication would be a defense for the writer but
not the sender.
The same sort of problem arises under the bad purpose approach.
The added requirement that the accomplice act with the purpose to
violate the law, or with knowledge that the principal is violating the
law, can lead to disturbing results, especially for offenses where the
unlawfulness of the conduct is not readily obvious.6 1  In the
structuring context, an owner of a cash business who sends an
employee to the bank with the weekly proceeds, and instructs the
649. See 18 U.S.C. § 871 (1994).
650. United States v. Johnson, 14 F.3d 766, 768 (2d Cir. 1994) (collecting cases, and
noting that that is the view of a majority of, but not all, the circuits).
651. Such offenses are commonly referred to as malum prohibitum offenses. See,
e.g., Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223,236 n.9 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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employee to structure the deposit to avoid generating a currency
transaction report, may be acting without any awareness of the
unlawfulness of structuring. Fortunately, for the owner, because she is
not a principal but an accomplice (i.e., she "commanded" or "caused"
her employee to commit the offense), under the bad purpose
approach, she is not guilty of structuring unless, at the very least, she
realizes that her conduct violates the law, and perhaps, in addition,
she acts with that purpose.52 On the other hand, the hapless
employee who actually carries out the structuring, and therefore, acts
as a principal rather than an aider and abettor is guilty as long as he
acts to evade the reporting requirement, even if he innocently believes
his dividing one deposit into two is a perfectly legitimate way to do so.
All three non-derivative approaches-bad purpose, purposeful
intent, and knowledge-yield a problematic result in the following
example: a weapons dealer leaves instructions for an employee to go
pick up hand grenades from a seller. Both the owner and the
employee mistakenly believe that the hand grenades are properly
registered. Although possession of unregistered grenades is a strict
liability offense, 53 the mistaken belief constitutes a defense for the
owner, who falls within the scope of the aiding and abetting statute,
and therefore, is liable only when acting with bad purpose, purposeful
intent, or at least knowledge that the grenades were not registered. "
By contrast, the employee, as a principal, is strictly liable.
In all these cases, application of the derivative approach eliminates
the divergence in mental states. That leads to a consistency of
treatment and avoids situations where the more culpable party can
hide behind a difficult-to-prove mental state.
3. Advantage of the Purposeful Intent and Bad Purpose Approaches:
Protection of the Marginal Participant
If the derivative approach seems to be the most consistent with
Congress's desire to eliminate distinctions, why, then, do the
purposeful intent and bad purpose approaches distinguish between
the participants by requiring a heightened mental state of the
accomplice in cases of knowledge or general intent crimes? Most of
the purposeful intent or bad purpose cases provide no reasoning; they
simply cite earlier cases. Peoni provides some explanation, but it
rests, at least in part, on a Sixth Amendment venue concern-a
defendant who utters a counterfeit note, if liable as an aider and
abettor based on simple knowledge, may well end up being hauled
into court in every district where any possession along the future chain
652. See supra text accompanying notes 255-61.
653. See supra text accompanying notes 217-21.
654. See supra text accompanying notes 222-26.
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of transmission takes place 655-that is not valid in the vast majority of
cases.
The Ninth Circuit has offered some measure of explanation for the
purposeful intent approach. Aiding and abetting:
involve[s] a degree of uncertainty regarding the defendant's purpose
to commit the underlying crime-an uncertainty that is not present
in the case of a principal who actually commits the crime. Because
of that uncertainty, it is reasonable to require proof of a specific
intent that would not be required of one who completed the
crime.65
6
To put it another way, given the minimal nature of the act element
of aiding and abetting, it makes sense to require a heightened mental
state to insure that liability will not be imposed too easily. Without
either purposeful intent or bad purpose, marginal participants will be
liable for some very serious offenses. For example, consider the
application of the knowledge approach to a gas station attendant who
pumps gas for a customer, knowing that the customer will drive off to
commit first degree murder, a specific intent offense.657 Under the
knowledge approach, pumping with mere knowledge equals
murder.658 That is pretty harsh. It also makes little sense: "it would
be altogether incongruous that a person could be convicted as an aider
or abettor, whom 18 U.S.C. § 2 makes 'punishable as a principal,'
without proof of an element essential to convicting the principal
himself."659
The derivative approach also fails to afford protection to some
marginal participants, although it does somewhat better than the
knowledge approach. Because the principal requires specific intent to
kill for first degree murder, the gas station attendant who has only
knowledge, but not specific intent, is not liable under the derivative
approach. Similarly, the secretary who alters an invoice at his boss's
655. See supra text accompanying note 133.
656. United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 192 F.3d 926, 929 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting
United States v. Sayetsitty, 107 F.3d 1405, 1412 (9th Cir. 1997)), vacated on other
grounds, 231 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). This is essentially an adaptation of
the very similar argument that the Supreme Court has made in requiring a heightened
mental state for an attempt offense. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 405
(1980) (explaining that attempt crimes require a "heightened mental state," i.e.,
specific intent, "to separate criminality from otherwise innocuous behavior"); supra
notes 183, 226, 249, 609 (comparing aiding and abetting to an attempt offense).
657. See supra text accompanying notes 270, 379.
658. That result would not apply if one adopts the variation to the knowledge
approach that more than knowledge is required in cases of routine, lawful sales, see
supra Part II.B.4.a, or the variation that knowledge is only enough when the act of
assistance is substantial, see supra Part II.B.4.c. It would apply, however, if one
adopts an unqualified knowledge approach, or the variation that allows for
knowledge for "particularly grave" offenses. See supra text accompanying notes 286-
91.
659. United States v. Santore, 290 F.2d 51, 81 (2d Cir. 1960) (Friendly, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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instructions, but does not want to defraud the customer, is not liable
under the derivative approach, because the secretary's knowledge is
no substitute for the requisite specific intent to defraud.' But, one
still obtains difficult results under the derivative approach when the
crime is second degree murder, assault, or bank robbery, which are
general intent offenses."6  Under the derivative approach, the
attendant is guilty of aiding and abetting those crimes by pumping the
gas. A cab driver is guilty of bank robbery by driving the robber to
the bank. A gun dealer is guilty of assault by selling a gun to someone
who is about to commit an assault. Their knowledge of what the
respective principals are about to do is a sufficiently culpable mental
state, because those crimes are knowledge crimes. Finally, although
first degree murder is a specific intent offense for which the gas
station attendant is not liable, the attendant is still liable for any lesser
included offense that is not a specific intent offense, such as second
degree murder.' 6
By contrast, the bad purpose and purposeful intent approaches
protect the marginally involved participant who would be swept in as
an accomplice by the easily triggered knowledge and derivative
approaches. Because the act requirement is so minimal and permits
the easy imposition of accomplice liability, the bad purpose and
purposeful intent approaches have the effect of compensating with a
heightened mental state, and thereby insuring that minimally involved
defendants are not easily treated as the equivalent of a principal.
Of course, as we have seen, the heightened mental states also work
to the advantage of the accomplice who is not at all marginal, and not
deserving of special protection. In addition, the bad purpose
approach, in particular, goes to an unnecessary extreme. Marginal
accomplices are adequately protected by the purposeful intent
approach. Once an accomplice desires a result, and the result is
criminal, there is no reason to require that the accomplice be aware of
the unlawfulness of the act when such awareness is not required of the
principal.
4. Advantage of the Knowledge Approach: Simplicity and Deterrence
If the goal of accomplice liability is to create a simple rule designed
to deter anyone from rendering assistance to a criminal, then
knowledge makes the most sense. It clearly conveys the message to
any potential accomplice who knows that the principal is committing,
660. See supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
661. See supra text accompanying notes 240-41, 379-82.
662. See United States v. Walker, 99 F.3d 439, 442 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (discussing
United States v. Edmond, 924 F.2d 261, 267 (D.C. Cir. 1991), which noted that if a
premeditated aider and abettor enlists an executioner at the last possible moment, the
jury could convict the aider and abettor of first degree murder and the principal of
second degree murder).
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or about to commit, a crime not to help in any way on pain of being
punished as a principal. Its clarity is what endeared it to the Supreme
Court in Hanauer v. Doane, 3 which relied on it to preclude the
accomplice who rendered an act of assistance to the Confederacy
from standing "on the nice metaphysical distinction" that he knew
that he was facilitating the crime, but did not purposefully intend its
success.
6
Thus, a gun dealer will presumably be deterred from selling a gun to
someone about to commit a murder. The owner of a web hosting
company will be deterred from carrying any sites that the owner
knows disseminate child pornography. Presumably, with these acts of
assistance deterred, fewer crimes will take place. Even in the case of
the really marginal accomplice, like the gas station attendant, it makes
some sense in terms of deterrence. If a gas station attendant simply
refuses to pump gas every time he or she learns that the occupants of
the car are about to drive off and commit an offense, no matter how
easy it is to get gas at another station, there will be at least a few
instances where crimes that would have been committed will be
delayed and thereby forestalled.
That is, in a sense, the rationale of the cases like Fountain 65 and
Hanauer v. Doane, which allow for liability based on mere knowledge
where the crime is, in Judge Posner's phrase, "particularly grave '
(i.e., murder in Fountain, and treason in Hanauer), and the need for
deterrence correspondingly great. At least for such serious crimes, it
is so important to deter anyone from rendering any act of facilitation
that the knowledge approach is applied to impose criminal liability
relatively easily, even when the accomplice has no desire that the
crime succeed. While for lesser crimes perhaps other concerns
predominate, like the need to protect marginal participants (such as
the shopkeeper who sells dresses to a prostitute667), for "particularly
grave" offenses the strong need for deterrence prevails.
Like the knowledge approach, the bad purpose and purposeful
intent approaches also possess a measure of simplicity. However, by
imposing more than just knowledge, they allow the attendant, the gun
dealer, and the owner of the web hosting company to go about their
businesses even when they knowingly facilitate crimes. Thus, if
deterrence is the primary goal, these approaches are not nearly as
effective as the knowledge approach.
The derivative approach is the least desirable of the approaches if
simplicity and predictability (and the deterrence that accompanies
663. 79 U.S. 342 (1870).
664. Id. at 347.
665. United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790 (7th Cir.), modified, 777 F.2d 345 (7th
Cir. 1985) (per curiam); see supra text accompanying notes 286-91.
666. See supra text accompanying note 289.
667. See supra text accompanying notes 290, 318.
1484 [Vol. 70
WHAT WERE THEY THINKING?
them) are the primary goals. From the perspective of the reasonable
person trying to conform his or her conduct to the law, the derivative
approach is the most complicated of the approaches, because it ties
the mental state of the accomplice to that required for the underlying
federal offense, which can vary so widely. Under the derivative
approach, the potential accomplice will often not know whether his or
her act is criminal. If, at his boss's instructions, a secretary alters an
invoice that the boss then mails to the federal government, the
secretary-who knows of the false nature of the document, but has no
desire to defraud the government-may or may not be criminally
liable, depending on the offense that the prosecutor chooses. The
secretary will not be liable for aiding and abetting mail fraud, because
mail fraud requires a specific intent to defraud,"" but may be liable for
aiding and abetting the submission of false statements to the
government, because that offense only requires that the defendant
know the statements are false, 9 and does not require an intent to
mislead67 or defraud. 7' If deterrence is dependent on simplicity and
predictability, the derivative approach will be the least effective of the
various approaches.
The knowledge approach, then, is better than the derivative
approach at achieving simplicity, predictability, and presumably
deterrence. The problem with the knowledge approach, however, is
that, while simple, we have seen that it can be too quick in imposing
liability on marginal participants. While other jurisdictions solve that
problem by creating a separate offense of knowing facilitation, which
is less serious than the underlying offense,' that solution is not
currently possible in the federal system, where 18 U.S.C. § 2 provides
that the accomplice is guilty of the underlying offense, not of some
other, lesser offense.
Still, the problem of the harsh application of the knowledge
approach does not justify its wholesale abandonment; rather, it speaks
in favor of making limited exceptions when necessary. Indeed, as we
have seen, that was the approach of the Second Circuit in United
States v. Campisi,6 3 which, even after Peoni, retained the knowledge
approach, but required purposeful intent for instances involving
otherwise lawful, routine sales, or instances where the connection
between the principal and the aider and abettor is too tenuous to
allow liability merely on knowledge.Y
668. See supra text accompanying note 20.
669. E.g., United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560. 567 (3d Cir. 1994).
670. See, e.g., United States v. Ranum, 96 F.3d 1020, 1028-29 (7th Cir. 1996).
671. E.g., United States v. Shah, 44 F.3d 285,289 n.7 (5th Cir. 1995).
672. Model Penal Code § 2.06 cmt. at 319 (1962) (discussing New York State's
approach, and listing other states that have followed New York's lead).
673. 306 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1962).
674. See supra Part II.B.4.a.
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But, even with these modifications, the knowledge approach cannot
be reconciled with Congress's desire to eliminate distinctions between
the accomplice and the principal. A standard that applies knowledge
to the accomplice no matter what the mental state applicable to the
principal will create, rather than erase, serious distinctions between
the accomplice and the principal.
For that reason, only the derivative approach comports with
congressional intent. While it may not possess simplicity and
predictability from the perspective of the person trying to ascertain
whether his or her conduct will violate the law, that uncertainty places
the accomplice in the same position as the principal, who is also
subject to a myriad of federal statutes with different mental states. If
Congress has determined that mental states should vary according to
the offense, there is no justification for excepting all aiders and
abettors or all causers from that determination.
V. THE RECOMMENDED APPROACH: A MODIFIED DERIVATIVE
APPROACH
The derivative approach is the only approach that really treats the
accomplice as a principal in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 2. The
approach also comports with congressional intent, avoiding disparities
in mental state between the accomplice and the principal, and
allowing for easy application of the "no distinction" rule. It eliminates
the problems created by those causing cases that require a culpable
mental state for the jurisdictional element, when none is required for
the principal or the aider and abettor. It properly treats the
jurisdictional element as a strict liability element that is designed to
permit a federal court to assert jurisdiction, rather than as an element
defining culpability. It is also fairest in that it applies the same mental
state to all participants, and precludes more culpable participants
from taking advantage of the heightened mental states that the bad
purpose and purposeful intent approaches require.
It also has the advantage of being a more moderate, "middle of the
road" approach. In cases involving purposeful intent or bad purpose
offenses, it will increase the burden on the government beyond that
required by the knowledge approach. But, in cases involving
knowledge offenses, on the other hand, it will decrease the burden
below that required by the purposeful intent or bad purpose
approaches.
This Article advocates the derivative approach. If bad purpose is
required of the principal, it should be required of the accomplice, but
only then. If purposeful intent is required of the principal, it should
be required of the accomplice, but only then. And, if knowledge is
sufficient for the principal, it should be sufficient for the accomplice,
but again, only then. If voluntary intoxication is no defense for a
principal who commits a general intent crime, it should not be a
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defense for the one who told him or her to commit the crime; if it is a
defense for the principal, it should be a defense for the accomplice.
That means, in the ordinary case, that the defendant is an aider and
abettor or a causer only if he or she deliberately (not by mistake or
accident) commits an act that aids and abets (or counsels, commands,
procures, or induces) or causes the principal's commission of the
offense, and does so with the same mental state as that required of the
principal.
But, in certain aiding and abetting cases, the derivative approach
has to be modified. The approach works particularly well in cases
where the accomplice is substantially involved in the conduct, and
where there is, therefore, no justification for applying a mental state
that differs from that applicable to the principal. When one
participant writes the threatening letter, and the other one mails it, to
the President, there is no reason to apply different mental states just
because the sender technically is the principal and the writer is an
aider and abettor. The approach also works well, regardless of the
substantiality of the accomplice's involvement, when the underlying
offense is a purposeful intent offense or a bad purpose offense. No
matter how insignificant the act of the accomplice, liability is
appropriate where the defendant acts with either purposeful intent or
bad purpose.
But, for the aider and abettor of a knowledge or lesser intent
offense, in instances where the aider and abettor's act does not
substantially facilitate the commission of the offense, the derivative
approach will sometimes yield problematic results. As we have seen,
an aider and abettor can be held liable based on a relatively
insignificant act, like the simple pumping of gas by the gas station
attendant. Unlike the causer, who, by definition, must commit an act
substantial enough that it can be said to "cause" or bring about the
commission of the offense,675 the aider and abettor is liable for any act
of facilitation, no matter how insignificant.6  The gas station
attendant who deliberately pumps gas (an act that assists the robbers
in driving to, and then robbing, the bank), knowing what it is that the
robbers are about to do, has acted with general intent, which is all that
is required under the derivative approach to be liable for aiding and
abetting the bank robbery.
It makes sense, therefore, in cases involving knowledge offenses,
where the aider and abettor acts with mere knowledge (and would
normally be guilty under the derivative approach), to confine liability
to cases where the aider and abettor has rendered not just any act of
assistance, but rather one that is substantial, "the prevention of which
675. See supra text accompanying note 108.
676. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15. 105.
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makes it more difficult to carry on the illegal activity assisted." 677 In
other words, to be substantial, the act must make it easier for the
principal to commit the offense, an effect not ordinarily required with
respect to the aider and abettor's act of facilitation. 678 If the act of
assistance is insubstantial in the sense that the principal could easily
have obtained the assistance elsewhere (e.g., gone to a different gas
station), then liability should not be imposed when the aider and
abettor acts with knowledge but not purposeful intent.
We have seen a few cases that have suggested increasing the
substantiality of the requisite act when necessary to protect a marginal
participant. For example, the Supreme Court in Scales v. United
States679 quoted an early version of the Model Penal Code adopting
the knowledge approach (later rejected by the drafters of the Model
Penal Code in favor of the purposeful intent approach), which
provided for aiding and abetting liability when the defendant, acting
with knowledge that the principal was about to commit a crime,
"substantially facilitated its commission.""6 In another case, Judge
Posner intimated that the law of aiding and abetting would eventually
jettison the purposeful intent requirement, but compensate for its
absence by requiring an act substantial enough such that its
prevention would "make[] it more difficult to carry on the illegal
activity assisted.""6
The Supreme Court in United States v. Dotterweich6 took similar
steps to protect the marginal aider and abettor in the case of a strict
liability offense. In that case, the Court utilized the derivative
approach to hold the president and general manager of a corporation
strictly liable for aiding and abetting its shipment of misbranded and
adulterated drugs. In doing so, however, it spread a wide net of
liability. Typically, the mental state, rather than the act of assistance,
is what filters out the marginal aider and abettor; the act requirement
is usually so minimal that it excludes almost no one. But, by applying
the derivative approach and holding the aider and abettor of a strict
liability offense guilty without a culpable mental state, the Court
effectively eliminated that filter. Consequently, absent some other
means of limiting liability, anyone rendering any act of facilitation,
including the most marginal employee who played only a minimal role
in making, labeling, transporting, storing, loading, or unloading the
adulterated drugs, would be liable.
The Supreme Court essentially addressed that concern by elevating
677. United States v. Zafiro, 945 F.2d 881, 887 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner. J.), affd on
other grounds, 506 U.S. 534 (1993).
678. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15, 105.
679. 367 U.S. 203,225 n.17 (1961).
680. See supra text accompanying notes 310-13.
681. Zafiro, 945 F.2d at 887; see supra text accompanying note 318.
682. 320 U.S. 277 (1943); see supra text accompanying notes 346-63, 596, 599-600.
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the significance of the substantiality of the act. One who merely
assists in the shipping is not an aider and abettor when it comes to a
strict liability offense. Rather, "[tihe offense is committed ... by all
who do have such a responsible share in the furtherance of the
transaction which the statute outlaws, namely, to put into the stream
of interstate commerce adulterated or misbranded drugs.""" Because
the mental state requirement was eliminated, the Court compensated
by requiring more substantial involvement by the defendant before
aiding and abetting liability could attach.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit, in a "natural and probable
consequences" case, also tied the mental state to the substantiality of
the act. It reduced the mental state required of the aider and abettor
for the consequent offense to foreseeability, but only when the aider
and abettor is substantially involved in the events leading up to the
commission of the consequent offense. When the aider and abettor's
involvement is less than substantial, however, then he or she is not
liable for the consequent crime unless acting with knowledge or
purposeful intent.'
Thus, the cases have already contemplated, and occasionally
implemented, an enhanced act requirement when necessary to protect
the marginal aider and abettor who acts with no more than
knowledge. They have also begun the process of determining what
sort of substantial or enhanced act would suffice to provide that
protection.
Concomitantly, the cases have also begun contemplating who is the
sort of marginal participant that should benefit from a substantial act
requirement. For example, in United States v. Campisil5 the Second
Circuit, while advocating the knowledge approach generally,
determined that knowledge would be insufficient to protect the aider
and abettor whose connection to the principal is tenuous, like that of
the defendant in Peoni, or the aider and abettor who engages in the
routine, lawful sale of goods used by the principal to commit the
offense.
Consequently, for the aider and abettor, when the crime is one of
general intent, and the defendant is arguably a marginal participant,
the trial court, in instructing the jury, should modify the "pure"
derivative approach and give an instruction along the following lines:
(The court should first instruct the jury that there must be a guilty
principal who actually committed the offense.) If you find that the
defendant deliberately committed any act at all that aided or
facilitated the commission of the offense, and did so with either a
purpose of making the crime succeed or the intent to violate the law,
then the defendant is guilty of the offense as if [he/she] had
683. Dottenveich, 320 U.S. at 284.
684. See supra text accompanying notes 405-07.
685. 306 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1962); see supra text accompanying notes 268-73.
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committed it [himself/herself]. If, however, you find that the
defendant did not have the purpose of making the crime succeed or
an intent to violate the law, but, nonetheless, find that the defendant
acted deliberately and with the knowledge that [his/her] act would
aid or facilitate the commission of the offense, then you may convict,
but only if you find that the defendant's act of facilitation
substantially aided or facilitated the commission of the offense. A
substantial act is one that makes it easier for the principal to commit
the crime. A routine, lawful sale of a commodity readily available to
the principal from multiple sources would be an example of an act of
facilitation that is not substantial.
